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The CIA in Latin America



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The CIA in Latin America



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ЦРУ ПРОТИВ ЛАТИНСКОЙ АМЕРИКИ

На английском языке

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INTRODUCTION

"The military means are rooted in a strategic concept which, disguised as 'the struggle for the free world', is nothing other than a search for increasingly effective ways of maintaining all the links within the social and economic structures which preserve exploitation. However, the most elaborate creation of these political and economic means is the subversive organizations dedicated to the 'destabilization' of questionable governments."

Gualterio Cuevas Mardones,
Argentine journalist¹

There is a small lethargic town in Virginia looking like the setting for a sentimental novel of the kind America was so fond of in the 1920s. The town, about 12 miles from Washington, D.C., is called Langley. It is the headquarters of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. A marble plaque in the main lobby of the CIA building bears the famous quotation from the New Testament: "And Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" (John, VIII: 32).

Let us take a look at what sort of truth American knights of cloak and dagger are preaching or, in broader terms, at the role the intelligence community plays in U.S. foreign policy. Some information on this subject emerged from the hearings held by the House of Representatives in early 1980 when, for the first time in the history of this legislative body, the heads of all the major U.S. intelligence services testified there.

The striking thing about these people's testimony was that they echoed one another in trying to convince the audience that their agencies and the intelligence community as a whole were only

gathering the intelligence information the U.S. government wanted. For example, Bruce Clarke, Director of the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center, said that the task of the intelligence community was "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government, using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities".² His views were seconded by Ronald Spiers, Director of the U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (BIR), who said his organization "is primarily a production unit" which "also performs a variety of functions on operational matters in the liaison area between the Department of State and the community to insure that the actions of other intelligence agencies are in line with U.S. foreign policy".³ Admiral Stansfield Turner, at that time CIA Director, summed up his colleagues' attempts to picture themselves as suppliers of information and said that "the intelligence community consciously excludes itself from the policy formulating process"⁴ (meaning foreign policy—*Authors*).

In actual fact, the situation is different. The U.S. intelligence community is above all an effective and influential element of the U.S. government machinery. There is no doubt that at times it plays the decisive part in the shaping of Washington's foreign policy. It is by no means only a body supplying information to the President of the United States but also a powerful tool of U.S. foreign policy. The community is perfectly capable of conducting operations of its own abroad. Its annual budget exceeds 17 billion dollars; the CIA's share is three to four billion. Also, Langley controls a vast network of over 200,000 agents in capitalist countries. It is

hardly credible that this huge army does nothing but gather information for the White House.

The Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947, at the height of the cold war of imperialism against the forces of socialism and democracy. Under the 1947 National Security Act (Public Law 253), the CIA was to gather intelligence information of interest to the U.S. government, and to correlate, evaluate and submit to the government the information gathered by all the other intelligence agencies.

However, the CIA was striving to play an active and independent role, that is, to conduct covert operations. That same year the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) which was charged, under the National Security Act, with preparing recommendations to the President on the purposes and major operations concerning national security, adopted a top secret directive code-named NSC-4/A which gave the go-ahead to the CIA and the other U.S. intelligence agencies for "psychological" operations. NSC Directive 4/A defined psychological warfare as propaganda, including the use of unattributed, forged and secretly subsidized publications; political action involving stateless persons and defectors, and support to political parties; paramilitary activities including support to guerrillas and sabotage; and various economic activities.⁵

In 1948 another, more important directive concerning the CIA—NSC-10/2—was adopted, which shapes CIA activities to this day. Under this classified directive, the CIA was entitled to conduct independently covert operations against foreign countries. The directive included a definition of the term "covert operations": "As used in this directive, 'covert operations' are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which

are conducted or sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly states or groups but which are so planned and conducted that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.

"Specifically such operations shall include any covert action related to: propaganda, economic warfare, preventive direct action including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.

"Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations".⁶

Under this directive the 10/2 Council was set up, the forerunner of the Special Coordination Committee established in 1974 to examine and approve proposals on covert operations and to coordinate the activities of the U.S. intelligence community in this field. After 1948 a series of other directives was adopted on covert operations and on the procedure for their approval. The name of the coordinating body has been changed several times for security reasons: the 10/2 Council was renamed the 303 Committee in 1964, the 40 Committee in 1970, and the 60 Committee in 1974.

But the CIA functions outlined in NSC Directives 4/A and 10/2 remained in force, and were merely modified by the subsequent NSC directives on the CIA. The trend to refrain from em-

phasizing that such operations are obviously hostile to other states is also in evidence. For this reason, the CIA's current documents refer to clandestine intelligence activity as an activity conducted for intelligence purposes or for the purpose of affecting political or governmental process. The U.S. Congress has defined it as "a clandestine operation designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of United States foreign policy; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities".⁷

As usual, Washington explains the need for such covert influence by the fictitious "global communist menace". As early as 1948, NSC Directive 10/2 claimed that the Soviet Union, its "satellites" and communist groups in the "free countries" were bent on world domination. In 1954 the CIA staged a coup and ousted the Arbenz bourgeois government in Guatemala under the pretext that the regime was "communist" and "a threat to the national security of the United States". In 1965 President Johnson sent the Marines to the Dominican Republic to overthrow the Caamaño bourgeois government because, he said, "our goal ... is to help prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere".⁸ In 1973 the CIA overthrew the elected government of President Allende in Chile.

Washington resorts to anticommunism in a bid to trample down all that is progressive and revolutionary; it is the rallying cry of enemies of social progress. In Latin America, dictators, Cosa Nostra gangsters, corrupt politicians, sadistic gorillas from the security services and hitmen from right-wing terrorist organizations are in the front ranks of the crusade for the "free world" and against the "communist menace". Former

CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters (who organized the pro-American coup of 1964 in Brazil) has once remarked that the United States is ready to collaborate with or assist anyone as long as he is an anticommunist.

The true aims of U.S. anticommunist propaganda in Latin America are to discredit communism in the eyes of Latin Americans and brand all opponents of the White House and transnational corporations as Communists. This approach makes it easy to explain U.S. support for the dictators who have seized power in Chile, Haiti, Guatemala, Paraguay, El Salvador and other countries: they, it is claimed, fight against international communism. In other words, it is an attempt to justify the dictators' brutal crimes against their own peoples by referring to the CIA-invented myth of a "world communist conspiracy".

By pinning the label of terrorism on the liberation movement, bourgeois propaganda is trying to play on the fear and revulsion any sane person feels toward crime. Equating the national liberation movement with terrorism, the White House hopes to instill in people the same feelings toward those fighting a just struggle for their rights and thus vindicate its resistance to progressive developments throughout the world.

One can hardly avoid mentioning that as far back as 1951 the United States, the architect of the current hue and cry over "international terrorism", adopted the Mutual Security Act maintaining that terrorism was acceptable as an instrument of national policy. The act has never been repealed, and over the past three decades the United States has used it to the hilt—suffice it to recall Cuba, Chile or El Salvador.

The history of the campaign against "international terrorism" can be traced to the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States tried to level this charge at mass revolutionary action. Subsequently, this policy continued, and in 1973 the American Society of International Law suggested equating national liberation fighters to terrorists. Incidentally, during World War II that was the Nazi term for Resistance fighters.

All this leads one to conclude that the campaign against "international terrorism" is, briefly, an attempt by the White House to make what is illegal appear legitimate and secure a *carte blanche* for interference anywhere in the world.

History offers many examples of the forerunners of today's U.S. secret services overthrowing undesirable Latin American governments and assassinating and torturing patriots and progressives; all this either in the name of anticommunism or claiming they were terrorists. And, in the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. imperialist subversion assumed such great scope and clearcut thrust that one can describe it as Washington's secret war in Latin America. This war is conducted by the *U.S. government* with the help of the intelligence community and vigorous support of the Pentagon, the State Department and other government agencies, U.S. transnational corporations and their own intelligence services. According to Allen Dulles, CIA Director in 1953-1961, "the facts are the CIA has never carried out any action of a political nature . . . without appropriate approval at a high political level in our government".⁹

It is precisely the secrecy enveloping the activities of the CIA which makes it possible to use this agency for dealing with tasks difficult to discharge in the open. The cult of secrecy, bolstered by the anticommunist hysteria in the Unit-

ed States and other "free world" countries has implanted in the CIA, its former operatives charge, a professional sense of being above morality and a conviction that any means are acceptable to reach its goals. Perhaps this is the truth the inscription on the wall in Langley refers to.

For obvious reasons, the leaders of the U.S. intelligence community and White House politicians do not want the public to learn the actual facts of this secret war. That is why information on U.S. intelligence activities in Latin America is scant and fragmentary, and in some cases deliberately falsified by the controlled mass media. Few books have been written in Latin America on this subject. Given the atmosphere of terror and violence in Latin America, it calls for exceptional courage to gather information and produce a book on the intelligence community. Such courageous people include the progressive Argentine journalists Gregorio Selser and Gualterio Cuevas Mardones, the authors of books on different aspects of CIA activities in Latin America.¹⁰ "We believe," Cuevas Mardones says in the introduction to his book *The CIA Unmasked*, "that the elements of information and analysis contained in this book will be able to help the fighters for national liberation see the enemy with greater clarity".¹¹

Scholars and journalists in socialist countries are also active in unmasking CIA activities in Latin America. Books by the Cuban researchers Luis Báez, Héctor Danilo and Manuel Cosculluela deal with little known facts of the CIA's secret war against Cuba.¹² Dr. Julius Mader of the GDR has collected information on 3,000 CIA agents active in the "free world" in his book *Who's Who in CIA*.¹³ In the Soviet Union, there were Ye. Gurov's *Invisible Intervention in*

Latin America, published in 1972, and K. Tarasov's *The Secret War of Imperialism in Latin America*, which appeared in 1978.

Also of interest are the documents and books on clandestine services published in the United States in the 1970s—first and foremost, the reports of Senate commissions headed by former U.S. Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller and by Senator Frank Church, and of the House committee under Otis G. Pike.¹⁴ One can also list here the books by CIA Director Allen Dulles, CIA Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick, Chief of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division David Phillips, and former CIA officials Gerald Johnson, Howard Hunt, Carl Meyer, Tad Szulc and several others. Some CIA documents were quoted in a book by a group of authors under Morton Halperin, published in New York in 1975, and in a collection of documents prepared by Christy Mace and Susan Kaplan and published in London in 1980. The book written by Victor Marchetti, formerly Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director of the CIA, and John Marks, previously staff assistant to the State Department Intelligence Director, and the books by former CIA operatives Patrick McHarvey and Philip Agee created quite a stir in the United States and other countries.

The book we are offering includes no fictitious characters or imaginary situations, no matter how incredible they might appear at first glance. The book is completely factual. Still, it is, of course, not a record but a reconstruction of events based on the actual activities of the CIA and other U.S. clandestine services.

We hope the book will help the reader to form a picture of U.S. covert activities in Latin America.

THE ICEBERG OF SECRET WARFARE

"This Agency continues to maintain the capabilities which are required by NSC directives and national security demands."

Admiral Stansfield Turner,
CIA Director,
February 1980¹

The Darling of the White House

From its inception, the CIA has been and remains the darling of each and every U.S. President. That is understandable if we recall that CIA operations are what the United States' secret foreign policy is all about, and that they are controlled personally by the President in absolute secrecy.

Any U.S. President has virtually unlimited opportunities to abuse his powers citing "national security considerations" as an excuse. The U.S. researchers Warren Hinckle and William Turner, the authors of *The Fish Is Red. The Story of the Secret War Against Castro*, have concluded, after examining CIA subversion against Cuba, that contrary to the view of the CIA as an "invisible government", quite popular with liberal bourgeois journalists, in actual fact, the agency serves as an "instrument of the imperial presidencies".² Specifically, they recall that President Eisenhower ordered the overthrow of the Castro government, proceeding from which the CIA drew up the secret Cuba Project, and President Kennedy, the assassination of Cuban

revolutionary leaders (Operation Mongoose). On instructions from President Kennedy, the CIA created the Department of Special Operations which dealt with the practical aspects of this mission until late 1962, when its functions were transferred to the Committee on Cuba under the NSC, the body in charge of anti-Cuban activities to this day. The Congressional inquiry into CIA activities caused some alarm at the White House, but the inquiry's eventual results proved less than modest. True, in 1977 the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act was passed banning the allocation of Federal funds to the CIA for covert operations abroad without prior consideration of the matter in the Senate and House foreign relations committees. Two watchdog bodies were established: the Senate Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Congressmen asserted that "there began a vigilant oversight over the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government".³

However, the advent of the Reagan Administration called into question even these humble achievements. The 1980 Republican election platform said: "At a time of increasing danger, the U.S. intelligence community has lost much of its ability to supply the President... with accurate and timely analyses...."

"We believe that a strong national consensus has emerged on the need to make our intelligence community a reliable productive instrument of national policy once again...."

"A Republican Administration will seek to improve U.S. intelligence capabilities for technical and clandestine collection, cogent analysis, coordinated counterintelligence, and covert action."⁴

Maintaining that U.S. national interests are directly dependent on the "existence of a powerful and effective intelligence capability" the Reagan Administration has provided the CIA with vast technical and financial resources. Also, efforts have been made to glamorize the image of the CIA, an agency guilty of assassinating "undesirable" leaders of countries with which Washington maintains normal diplomatic relations. In 1980 the U.S. Senate passed the Control on Intelligence Bill which repealed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. In December 1981 President Reagan signed a secret directive enabling the CIA and other U.S. clandestine services to conduct sabotage and terrorist operations abroad—the kind of actions that had been subject to Congressional investigations in the latter half of the 1970s. Bourgeois propaganda presents this directive as part of the effort to fight terrorism more effectively. The U.S. researcher William Leogrande said about President Reagan's approach to the CIA: "The Central Intelligence Agency will once again be the principal instrument of foreign policy. Reagan, like Richard Allen, his assistant for national security, and William Casey, his CIA Director, have advocated officially an expansion of covert operations by the CIA."⁵

Let us take a look at the current structure of the U.S. intelligence community and the place the CIA holds in it. The community comprises over 20 intelligence services. Foremost among them (aside from the CIA) are: the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Military Intelligence, the Air Intelligence Service, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Internal Security Divi-

sion of the FBI, and the intelligence divisions of the Treasury Department, the Energy Department, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Also there is a special top-secret outfit, the National Intelligence Board (NIB), which deals with the launching and operation of U.S. spy satellites and carriers. Obviously, all these intelligence services—they are active in Latin America too—have been given their own specific tasks by the U.S. government. At the same time, they cooperate constantly in furthering the overall objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the region, first and foremost, in suppressing the liberation movement.

The CIA also has specific tasks of its own, but its Director is simultaneously the chief of the entire intelligence community and the President's top adviser on foreign intelligence matters. The Special Coordination Committee (SCC), chaired by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is the coordinating center of the U.S. intelligence community. This committee comprises representatives of all U.S. intelligence services and a representative of the President. Major covert operations are the chief responsibility of the committee. In 1970 this body (still called the 40 Committee at that time) made the decision to launch Operation Chile involving the overthrow of the legitimate government of Salvador Allende and a massive campaign of terror. In 1981 the committee adopted secret decisions on destabilizing the government of Nicaragua and Grenada, stepping up subversion against Cuba and conducting large-scale cover operations by the CIA in El Salvador.

Organizationally, the CIA structure is quite

complicated, but it can be roughly divided into two distinct parts. The first is the office of the Director with two components which assist him in directing the activities of the CIA and the entire intelligence community. One is the National Intelligence Group—a team of analysts who prepare the “blue books” on planned operations and enemy capabilities. Specifically, one “blue book” concerned the revolutionary prospects in Chile. In 1971 the other component was established—the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee. This committee helps the CIA to mobilize the community’s intelligence and technical facilities for joint projects difficult or impossible to cope with for the CIA alone.

The second major part of the CIA structure comprises four functional directorates, the Directorate of Operations the most important among them. The Directorate of Intelligence maintains its personnel in Latin American countries. These people are to ensure an uninterrupted flow of information to Langley. This work is conducted within the so-called intelligence cycle, in five major stages: planning (objectives, etc.), information collection and storage, information processing (for easy use), preparing the end product (by analysing, evaluating or interpreting the information stored), and gearing the end product to the requirements of the particular consumer. The Directorate of Intelligence uses current data to prepare daily and weekly briefs which, together with other classified information, are sent to the consumers—various military and civilian government bodies and individuals.

The Directorate of Intelligence includes a special section which constantly updates a file on thousands of Latin American leaders, activists of political parties, civic organizations, labor

unions, etc. CIA files are made available to U.S. transnational corporations which operate in Latin America and want to secure confidential information about persons applying for jobs at their enterprises.

The CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence works in close contact with the National Security Agency (NSA). Based in Fort Meade, Maryland, the NSA processes the information it receives from hundreds of radio interception and monitoring stations, many of them in Latin America. The NSA uses the latest equipment installed on special radio reconnaissance planes and spy satellites which overfly Latin America. The NSA has a large secret station to monitor radio and telephone communications on Easter Island, a Chilean possession. After the Allende government rose to power in 1970, the NSA had to dismantle these facilities, but after the 1973 fascist putsch, the station again resumed its spying operations. NSA experts also monitor national radio broadcasts and telephone conversations of Latin American embassies, ministries, other government agencies and private companies. Through its agents in the countries of the region, the NSA has access to diplomatic, government and private correspondence.

In 1962 electronic equipment enabled the NSA to glean and record intercepted messages. Little is known about the scope of this effort. Still, the specially designed computer codenamed Harvest, for many years the most efficient in the world, is able to glean intercepted information at a phenomenal rate of up to four million operations per second. This computer intercepts information from Latin America using the gleaning “by special lists” method—that is, it selects the names of political figures, industries and other

key words and phrases of interest as intelligence subjects. As a result, the scale of NSA surveillance over certain individuals and organizations in Latin America defies imagination: the NSA has amassed a collection of hundreds of thousands of files on them. Part of the "collection" has been transferred to the new computer memory bank used jointly by the NSA, the CIA and Defense Department intelligence services. This bank also processes and stores some of the information supplied by CIA agents.

CIA agents in Latin America are responsible for gathering and forwarding to the United States information on the capabilities and intentions of the local communist, patriotic and other organizations, including their international centers and leadership. CIA operatives constantly update and send to Langley the so-called link-list comprising the names of local Communists and their sympathizers. The CIA works to infiltrate its agents into or ensure electronic surveillance of political parties and civic organizations in Latin America.

The CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology is charged with conducting research and development and analyzing scientific information on technical and applied subjects. For example, under contract with this directorate General Dynamics developed a highly maneuverable high-speed launch used in CIA sabotage operations against Cuba. The Pentagon's intelligence services often cooperate with this directorate—specifically, in economic warfare against Cuba. High-altitude U.S. Air Force planes operating from the secret Lake China base, California, spray rain clouds over Cuba with crystals to cause precipitation in non-agricultural areas, thus depriving sugarcane plantations of rain.

Recently, facts have been reported on the use by the CIA of bacteriological and biological weapons against Cuba. Similar facts were reported from Chile during the Popular Unity government. These inhuman weapons are widely used against guerrilla-held areas in countries where the people are up in arms against the puppets of U.S. imperialism. In 1979 bacteriological weapons were used against guerrillas in Nicaragua. In 1981 the CIA started to use these weapons in El Salvador.

The Directorate of Science and Technology manufactures various devices and equipment for dispersing rallies and demonstrations in Latin America. For example, tiny flasks containing a foul-smelling liquid are dumped in the halls where rallies are held. CIA agents spray the premises where people are to gather for a meeting with fine powder which stays invisible on the floor but, stirred up by the audience, produces the effect of tear gas. Increasingly often, an incendiary powder is sprinkled around sites of rallies. Igniting spontaneously, it gives off a great deal of smoke which affects eyes and the respiratory system much more severely than any tear gas. Another type of invisible powder manufactured by the CIA, smeared on a steering wheel or a toilet seat, will cause unbearable itching, while a sticky, colorless grease-like substance causes severe burns on contact. Chemically treated tobacco added to cigars produces respiratory ailments.

The Directorate of Science and Technology is working constantly on methods of controlling human perception and behavior. This book will examine one such CIA operation, conducted in Guyana and codenamed Operation MCultura.

The CIA also develops interrogation tech-

niques using physical and psychological torture. The secret police of Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Haiti and other countries resort increasingly often to U.S.-supplied LSD, prolixin (a substance causing a condition similar to Parkinson's disease) and ansotine (which produces an illusion of impending death). Another method is the so-called psychological assault, when a person's sensory input is cut off by placing him in an isolation cell with a hood on his head and keeping him constantly awake.

CIA officials act as advisers to Latin American security services. They personally direct and participate in tortures and interrogations. One such U.S. expert, a certain Dan Mitrione, who had long worked in Latin America, explained: "The softening-up stage must come first, with the usual beatings and insults. The aim is to humiliate the prisoner, make him realize he is defenseless, disconnect him from reality. No questions, only beatings and insults. After that, beatings in total silence. And only after that, the interrogation. Here you shouldn't cause any more pain than that produced by the instrument you use. This pain should be of a distinct sort, applied to a definite spot, strictly in proportion to the desired effect. During the session one must avoid causing the subject to lose all hope of survival, because this can lead to stubborn resistance. Always you have to leave room for some hope... a remote glimmer of hope." Mitrione told his interviewer Manuel Hevia Cosculluela, the author of *Passport 11333. Eight Years with the CIA*, that he had each prisoner undergo a careful medical examination to determine the state of his health and the degree of possible resistance. "A premature death means the expert has failed. It is extremely important to know in

advance whether we can afford the luxury of the subject's death."⁶

Salvador Cayetano Carpio has written a book describing the way U.S. experts direct torture in El Salvador to which the author was subjected himself.⁷ Not only CIA officers but also agents of the Pentagon's secret services train their Latin American counterparts in interrogation and torture techniques.

In November 1981, a press conference was held in São Paulo, Brazil, by Victor Paulo Laborde, a former Uruguayan Naval Intelligence officer. He described the monstrous torture techniques applied to political prisoners in Latin America. Laborde stated that these techniques were developed in the United States which also trained highly skilled torturers. Before joining the elite naval unit specializing in the torture of political prisoners, he had completed a special training course. The instructors were U.S. Navy officers and CIA agents who used U.S. training manuals. These, including the ones on torture, Laborde said, were codenumbered, but each bore a note saying this was a translation of a U.S. Army manual.

The Directorate of Management and Services has a special role to play in CIA activities. The foreign branches of its Finance Office have a permanent stock of Latin American currencies to finance covert operations. Besides, this directorate uses its "exclusive information" to invest profitably in Latin America.

The Directorate of Operations, or the Clandestine Services, plays the key role in the CIA's secret war against Latin America. The Western Hemisphere Division is in charge of operations in this region; it has several area subdivisions: the first deals with Mexico and Central America;

the second, with the Caribbean countries; the third, with the Andean countries of South America (Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela); the fourth, with Brazil; the fifth, with the La Plata basin countries (Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay) and Bolivia; and the sixth, with Cuba. Each country has a CIA station which comes under the Directorate of Operations. Station chiefs usually use the embassy cover, as a rule holding the post of political adviser to the ambassador. The station chief's immediate subordinates are the chiefs of bases in the major cities of the host country. The chiefs of bases also use various covers—the Agency for International Development (AID), the State Department, other government agencies and the Peace Corps. In the early 1980s CIA stations and bases in Latin America had a combined staff of about 1,000. The 1980 budget of the Western Hemisphere Division was some 200 million dollars.

The Sinister Web

The activities of the U.S. intelligence community—above all, of the CIA—in Latin America are especially dangerous because of the broad network of front organizations and agents using elaborate and hard-to-penetrate covers.

Front agencies—"Delaware corporations" in CIA parlance—hold a place of importance in the CIA's Latin American network. Delaware's lenient corporate legislation makes it easy to set up fictitious firms, and the CIA often registers such companies in that state to provide cover for its subversion in Latin America.

A subsidiary of Thomas H. Miner and Associates, a U.S. public relations company, operated in Uruguay for a long time. It was headed by

Ralph Hatry, an official of the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology. The subsidiary provided a cover for a special group which monitored the telephone communications of socialist embassies in Montevideo. In Peru, a scandal put an end to the activities of the American Plant Protection Company which ostensibly prepared recommendations to the Peruvian government on environmental protection. In actual fact, it was the front of a special CIA unit which compiled files on Peruvian political figures, army officers and trade unionists. Frank Ortiz, the Peruvian station chief, was personally overseeing the operations of Plant Protection; after the cover was blown, he was transferred to Uruguay where he was made station chief. He was then sent to Guatemala as ambassador, and in 1981 he returned to Peru—this time not as station chief but as U.S. ambassador.

The CIA freely uses transnational corporations as a cover for its agents abroad and as a channel to finance covert operations. CIA agents have been reported to serve with the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT), Pan American Airways, the Grace Shipping Lines Company and others. Big corporations and the CIA cooperate in Latin America particularly closely because they are equally interested in maintaining pro-American governments in power. A case in point was the ITT offer of one million dollars to the CIA to have Salvador Allende removed.

The CIA often uses various publishing houses as front organizations. For example, the New York-based Editors Press Service has CIA-financed subsidiaries in virtually all capitals south of the Rio Grande. In Mexico, the CIA is behind Trillans, Letras, Libros mexicanos unidos, Roble,

Diana and Novaro publishers; its front publishers in Argentina are Atlantico, Agoras and Trocal; in Colombia, Albon; in Chile, Orbe; etc. In this way the United States is flooding Latin America with publications manufactured and financed by the CIA or other intelligence services. Besides, the CIA uses publishers as middlemen to hire right-wing journalists and authors to produce the necessary propaganda.

The CIA also frequently uses churches and religious organizations as fronts for its Latin American activities. In the early 1970s a broad spy network was uncovered in Chile. Officially registered as a branch of the World Relief Commission, it was supposed to represent the interests of the U.S. Evangelists National Association in Chile. In fact, it was a CIA front organization. Other such fronts in Latin America include the Church World Service with headquarters in New York, the Andean Evangelist Mission which operates in Bolivia, and the Missions Abroad Church. Maryknoll, a religious order active in many Latin American countries, is infested with CIA agents.

Under the cover of bringing culture and knowledge to the Indian population of Latin America, missionaries working for the CIA are busy fulfilling various CIA assignments. Specifically, they collect economic, political and military information on areas which are or may become scenes of guerrilla activities. In Colombia they broadcast anticommunist radio programs and prepare propaganda campaigns. In Chile, they spot opponents of the Pinochet regime in rural areas. In Venezuela, Brazil and Paraguay missionaries acting on instructions from the CIA identify persons who can pose a potential threat to U.S. interests. In Bolivia they have been caught rec-

ruiting spies for surveillance over dissident groups.

U.S. missionaries have also been caught violating criminal legislation. In Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia, missionaries used the latest equipment to prospect for strategic minerals and map their deposits. The Venezuelan press reports that Nuevas Tribus, a U.S. missionary organization, has 15 secret airfields in the country. What cargoes the planes taking off from these airfields carry to the United States remains a mystery. Such missionaries are often implicated in smuggling, the drug traffic and brutal treatment of Indians.

Particularly resounding scandals have centered around the so-called Summer Linguistics Institute (SLI) which is, officially, a branch of Wycliffe Bible Translator, Inc., a U.S. company, and which proclaims bringing the Bible to Indians in Latin America as its goal. *Uno más uno*, a Mexican newspaper, has exposed the true aims the SLI pursues in Mexico. CIA agents, the paper says, use the Institute as a cover for their subversive activities. Although the Mexican government abrogated its contract with this organization back in 1981, SLI people are still touring the country and collecting classified information. The SLI's illegal activities in Mexico and other countries are facilitated by its cooperation with Jungle Aviation and Radio Service, a company owned by Wycliffe Bible and operating a network of secret airfields and radio stations.

In June 1980 Bishop Gregorio Garavita of Villavicencio, Colombia, produced evidence proving that the "linguists" extracted uranium ore, smuggled it out of the country and sold narcotic drugs in Colombia. He noted that they enjoyed the protection of the authorities and even of the

Colombian defense minister. The Peruvian linguist Alfredo Torres stressed that SLI staff studied rare Indian dialects in order to supply the CIA and the Pentagon with material for devising military codes.

The CIA uses its agents to spot progressive clergymen in Latin American religious organizations; a special secret plan has been drawn up for this purpose. In 1975, the CIA concluded a secret agreement with the top echelons of the Catholic Church in Bolivia on joint efforts against progressive clergymen. Paragraph 4 of the agreement stipulates that the relevant information should be made available to either side within 24 hours. Recently, the existence of similar agreements between the CIA and some representatives of the Catholic Church in Colombia, Mexico and Peru have been disclosed. The local security services are also involved in the implementation of these agreements. *The Nation*, a U.S. publication, had good reason to refer to such American missionaries as "CIA secret missionaries".⁸

Another important element in the subversive operations of the U.S. intelligence community is the Peace Corps, with a total of over 7,000 members in Latin America. Officially, the mission of the Peace Corps is to demonstrate the United States' readiness to extend technical assistance to Latin Americans and to help average Americans (the Corps' volunteers) learn about the needs and wishes of Latin Americans. In actual fact, the Corps is full of FBI and CIA agents. Essentially, the Peace Corps disseminates pro-American propaganda, collects intelligence information and recruits agents.

In 1974 the Peruvian government demanded that the United States recall the Corps from

that country charging that the organization was used as a cover by U.S. intelligence agents for subversive activities against the Peruvian government. One of the "volunteers", a certain William Fitzpatrick, played the part of an "expert in public catering" in the Peruvian city of Cuzco. Prior to that, he had been exposed as the CIA station chief in the Dominican Republic. Peace Corps members have staged a veritable recruitment drive looking for stool pigeons among students at Latin American universities. It has also been reported that in many countries of the region the Corps "volunteers" have been caught collecting information on progressive parties, organizations, statesmen, officials and army officers.

"Non-profit" organizations are very active in Latin America, too. They include the Edsell Foundation, the Beacon Fund, the Panamerican Foundation and the Kentfield Fund, all registered in Delaware; and the Kaplan Foundation, the Andersson Foundation and the Gotham Foundation, registered in New York. All are CIA fronts providing channels for financing subversion in Latin America. The CIA also uses some West German and Australian banks for this purpose. In 1980, the scandal that broke out over the Nugan & Hand Bank of Australia disclosed that this large bank had been set up by the CIA for financing its intelligence operations and arms sales in various regions, including Latin America. A CIA official has admitted that Nugan & Hand was the agency's chief treasurer, promptly transferring the necessary funds to the designated place on CIA instructions. After this disclosure, the CIA switched to a different chief channel of financing, the Castle Bank, registered in Nassau, the Bahamas, and presided over by Paul L. Edwards of the CIA. An interesting detail is that

in the 1970s, subversion against the Jamaican government of Michael Manley was financed by the Miami-based Perrine Bank which, as Mexican journalists have found out, was a subsidiary of the Castle Bank. The Cuban daily *Granma* wrote about the latter that "this bank is a favorite with various Mafia bosses, corrupt entrepreneurs and the CIA".⁹

In 1968 and 1973 the government of Guyana commissioned Shoup Registration System International, a private U.S. firm, to count the votes in the Presidential elections. An investigation by nongovernmental groups revealed that this company was a CIA front and that it entered on the voters registration lists names of persons long dead, of executed criminals and even of racehorses.

The actual strength of a CIA station staff in a Latin American country is much greater than the official figure. Aside from bona fide CIA officials, there exists in every Latin American nation a broad range of "national agents" recruited locally. These paid CIA agents are omnipresent. For example, Philip Agee has said that in Ecuador, such agents can be found among congressmen, army officers, trade union and student leaders, journalists, diplomats (including the Ecuadorean representative at the United Nations), businessmen, hotel owners (whose hotels are wiretapped), clergymen, owners of advertising and insurance companies, leaders of political parties, scientists, university teachers, car salesmen and even members of the Juventud Católica basketball team.

Many people in the Latin American mass media who aid in the dissemination of subversive propaganda in the region also collaborate with the CIA. Langley has secretly established and is

financing a broad network of such agents used each time a secret propaganda campaign appears to be in order. These people act as spies and try to influence Latin American public opinion. They provide the CIA with direct access to many newspapers, periodicals, press agencies, radio and television stations, publishing houses and other Latin American mass media.

CIA stations try to maintain permanent ties with Latin American governments, as well as intelligence and repressive agencies. Contacts with security services enable the CIA to gather the necessary information not only on the democratic and anti-imperialist movements in the region but also on political and military leaders. In 1980, the press reported that Interior Minister Luis Vargas Garmendia of Uruguay was a CIA agent.¹⁰ In early 1982 Miguel Nassar Haro, chief of the Mexican National Security Directorate, was identified as a CIA collaborator who supplied Langley with information on refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala. When American journalists asked Langley for details, the reply was "no comment". "The CIA fears", the *International Herald Tribune* wrote, "that publicity about the case will force the Mexicans to limit their intelligence cooperation with the United States."¹¹

Infiltration of Political Parties

The CIA works hard to infiltrate Latin American political parties and civic organizations. This is easy as far as right-wing and center bourgeois parties are concerned, both because of the certain ideological similarity between their leaders and CIA agents and due to the fact that these quarters are riddled with corruption and are will-

ing to accommodate imperialist interests. It comes as no surprise therefore that CIA agents are active in all Latin American bourgeois parties of any significance. The better-known party leaders who worked for the CIA in various periods include Epifanio Mendes Fleitas (the Paraguayan Liberal Party), Renato Perez Druhe (the Christian Social Movement, Ecuador), Rafael Arizaga (the Conservative Party, Ecuador), Sergio Onofre Jarpa (the National Party, Chile), Benito Nardone (the Blanco Party, Uruguay) and others. Incidentally, Nardone was also President of Uruguay, and his wife Olga Clerisi de Nardone was also a CIA collaborator. Nardone was not the only Latin American President who was a CIA agent at the same time. Manuel Hevia Cosculluela, a man who broke with the CIA, quotes a long list of its agents in Latin America and describes techniques used to recruit them in his book *Passport 11333. Eight Years with the CIA* (Havana, 1978).

CIA agents also try to penetrate the revolutionary movement of Latin America. According to *Time* magazine, a large part of the funds earmarked for the destabilization of the Allende government was used to infiltrate Chilean agents into the upper echelons of the Socialist Party of Chile and pay agents provocateurs to make "deliberate mistakes".¹² Manuel Naranjo, leader of the Ecuadoran Socialist Party, and Enrique Amaya Quintana, leader of Peru's Leftist Revolutionary Movement, worked for the CIA too. Many CIA agents have been and still are active in Trotskyite parties and organizations.

Philip Agee's book *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* offers interesting details of CIA infiltration of Latin American political parties.¹³ For example, he describes the way political parties were

used to oust, in the 1960s, the Ecuadoran Presidents who did not suit the White House. At the beginning of that decade the CIA station secured control of the central bodies of two parties (the Conservative Party and the Ecuadoran Revolutionary Nationalist Action) and infiltrated its agents into the ruling Velasquista National Federation. These political forces and certain CIA-controlled trade unions and student organizations formed the support base for the 1961 coup which overthrew President Velasco Ibarra. The CIA followed the same pattern in planning the overthrow of another Ecuadorean President, Carlos Arosemena. The coup was staged by CIA and DIA agents who worked among the military and in the Ecuadorean security service, while mass support was furnished by the leaders of the CIA-bought parties which formed a "united front" comprising the Revolutionary Nationalist Action, the Conservative Party (the two parties that had ousted Velasco), the right wing of the Radical Liberal Party, the Anticommunist Christian Front, the Liberal Popular Revolutionary Party and the Social Democratic Party of Ecuador. The "united front" launched a psychological assault on the Arosemena government, charging that it was communist, pro-Cuban and was bent on plunging the country into chaos.

Far from being even remotely pro-communist, both Velasco and Arosemena held anticommunist and anti-Cuban views. But, in the opinion of the CIA station, they were unable to stem the upsurge of anti-imperialist liberation in Ecuador which coincided with the victory of the revolution in Cuba.

Here is another example. At the 1958 Presidential elections in Chile the Socialist Salvador Allende, the candidate of the Popular Action

Front, was a close runner-up to Jorge Alessandri, the right-wing candidate. Since neither Allende nor Alessandri received the required absolute majority of votes, the question of the Presidency was to be decided in the Chilean Congress, and the CIA had to spend a great deal of money and effort to ensure the "election" of Alessandri.

Washington viewed Alessandri's unconvincing victory as the first harbinger of trouble ahead. The White House told the CIA it should secure the victory of an "acceptable" candidate at the next Presidential elections (held every six years in Chile). This time everything was staked on Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democratic leader.

The decisive factor in Washington's choice of this son of a wine taster was the character reference he received from Augusto Edwards, head of the second biggest financiers' group in Chile and of the Edwards clan. This clan represented the Rockefellers' interests in Chile. Apparently, big business in the United States took this into consideration.

Salvador Allende was again nominated by the Left, and a broad anticommunist campaign was launched to discredit him and intimidate voters. The CIA made wide use of the press, radio broadcasts, films, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, banners and slogans painted on walls. The scale of the campaign can be seen from the fact that CIA propaganda experts prepared up to 20 radio broadcasts a day for the radio station in Santiago de Chile, and up to 44 for provincial stations.¹⁴

The CIA spent over 20 million dollars on Frei's election campaign—an unheard-of sum for Latin America. The campaign was also unprecedented in political terms, both for Chile and for Latin America as a whole. Frei received powerful support not only from the CIA but also from the

Catholic community in Western Europe and from U.S. monopolies. To stop Allende, they were ready to extoll the "revolution in freedom"—the name Frei gave to his demagogic program. Still, most of the work was done by the CIA. Its interference ensured an overwhelming and not merely simple majority for Eduardo Frei at the 1964 elections.

With the Christian Democrats in power in Chile, CIA infiltration of the country's political parties became endemic. Speaking at a confidential meeting held in Chile, CIA official Edward Cohen said: "Our people can penetrate the leadership of all organizations and political parties. If we act intelligently, we'll not only neutralize Marxist action. We'll also be able to control the more important organizations of the country.... Our people must be everywhere."¹⁵ Asked whether this would apply to the ruling Christian Democratic Party too, Cohen replied in the affirmative and said the task was to secure control over it.

The CIA also paid great attention to the Chilean trade unions. In this, the agency relied on the National Confederation of Longshoremen under CIA agent Vencheslao Moreno, and the Communications Workers' Union. To infiltrate rural organizations, the CIA used its front agency, the International Development Fund. Penetration of the student movement was aided by the U.S. National Student Association and the CIA-financed Youth and Student Fund of New York, Intercontinental Research Company and World University Service based in Geneva.

The report *Covert Action in Chile* indicates that prior to 1970 the CIA spent millions of dollars for these purposes.

The CIA stepped up its infiltration of Chilean

political parties and organizations after Allende's victory in the 1970 elections. The 40 Committee decided that in 1971 alone at least three million dollars was to be spent to bribe activists of opposition parties and organizations. On the eve of the March 1973 parliamentary elections the opposition parties received 1.4 million dollars from the CIA. On August 20, 1973 (three weeks before the coup) the 40 Committee allocated over one million dollars to finance the opposition parties.

Some of these funds were handed over to the CIA-created terrorist organizations of the Patria y Libertad type, but the leaders of the Christian Democratic and National parties also received large sums. Besides, the CIA spent about four million dollars to finance action against the government by trade unions, especially the Teamsters' Union. Finally, large amounts were detailed to bribe the mass media and finance their right wing. Specifically, *El Mercurio*, a newspaper owned by the Edwards family, received over 1.5 million dollars from the CIA. Incidentally, Langley had been financing this paper since the 1950s.

The CIA also took steps to bribe some Popular Unity activists. According to U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry, many extreme Leftists close to Allende and even some Socialist Party leaders were on the CIA payroll. By the end of the Allende government's stay in power the CIA had agents and informers in all the major parties of the Popular Unity coalition.

In mid-1971 CIA agent Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Chairman of the Chilean National Party, succeeded, with the help of the banker Benjamin Matte and Roberto Viaux, a retired general who collaborated with the CIA, in uniting virtually

all the conservative, far right and pro-fascist organizations in a National Front. In October 1972 Sergio Onofre set up the National Front of Private Activity, ostensibly to protect the interests of small and medium-sized businesses, but actually to take part in terrorist activities directed against Popular Unity. In late 1972 all these fronts merged to form the "Invisible Front". After the March 1973 parliamentary elections, the right wing of the Christian Democrats openly joined this reactionary coalition.

From its very first days, the CIA has been trying to weaken and, if possible, completely destroy progressive trade unions in Latin America.¹⁶ Trade unions are the immediate responsibility of Sector IV in the CIA's International Organizations Division. The American Institute for Free Labor Development has always collaborated closely with the CIA in Latin America. The AFL-CIO provides 25 percent of the Institute's annual budget of 75 to 80 million dollars. The rest is paid, in roughly equal shares, by U.S. monopolies (over 100 companies, with ITT, Anaconda Copper, United Brands, the Chase Manhattan Bank, the Bank of America, Exxon and the First National City Bank of New York as the biggest contributors), the government (the Agency for International Development), and the CIA's "Delaware Corporations" (the Michigan Foundation, the Kaplan Foundation, the Gotham Foundation and some others). From 1962 to 1980, 2,000 Latin Americans were trained by the Institute, and over 80,000 graduated from special training centers in many Latin American capitals.

The growing interest the CIA displays toward the Latin American trade union movement is largely rooted in the mounting influence the latter exerts on political developments in the

region. The working class has become better organized, and trade unions have grown bigger. While in the 1950s the unions numbered about four million members, the figure for the early 1980s is over 20 million. Imperialism would like to use Latin American unions to its own advantage, deprive them of their independence, dampen the class thrust of their action, and prevent their participation in left-wing coalitions.

The CIA tackles this job in close cooperation with the U.S. reactionary union headquarters, above all, the AFL-CIO. In recent years, its right-wing leaders have been pursuing an increasingly subversive policy in Latin America. The struggle against the progressive forces in the Latin American trade union movement and its fragmentation is only one of several imperialist objectives. The U.S. intelligence community tries to prod the unions into subversive activities against the governments Washington dislikes. Efforts along these lines have been particularly great in the Caribbean—above all, in Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and the Bahamas. There, U.S.-trained union leaders have set up extremely influential groups in political terms. Attempts to organize a united anti-imperialist popular front in these countries invariably run into vigorous resistance put up by these groups.

The CIA uses different channels to infiltrate the trade union movement—the American Institute for Free Labor Development, special training centers financed lavishly by U.S. monopolies, the State Department and the CIA, and agent networks at the grass-roots and top levels in the Latin American unions. All U.S. embassies in Latin America have labor movement sections headed by CIA officers. In order to facilitate in-

filtration, the CIA set up the Latin American Labor Committee in New York in 1975. With branch offices in Mexico City, Bogota and Caracas, the committee is staffed by CIA agents recruited among Trotskyites and anarcho-syndicalists.

Chile offers an example of the way trade unions and their leaders can be used to further imperialist interests. Since Chile had a trade union confederation which united a large part of Chile's organized wage and salary earners and pursued an anti-imperialist policy (the United Trade Union Confederation of Chilean Workers), the CIA and the AFL-CIO decided to split it with the help of certain corrupt unionists.

Vencheslao Moreno, nicknamed Don Venche, was one of these "activists". His labor union career began in the port of Valparaiso: in 1946 he became chairman of the Valparaiso union of longshoremen and in 1950, chairman of the Chilean National Confederation of Longshoremen. In the early 1960s Don Venche was recruited by the CIA station.

Collaboration with the CIA and the AFL-CIO proved very lucrative for Moreno and his cronies in the confederation's leadership. Moreno made a fortune and became a shareholder in U.S., Argentine, Chilean and other companies, the owner of tenement houses, a transport company and the like. In the latter half of the 1960s, Don Venche was put on the board of governors of the American Institute for Free Labor Development. He also became Vice-President of the International Transport Workers' Federation and Executive Committee member of the reformist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

In the period when the Popular Unity government was in power, the CIA made wide use of

people like Moreno to stage illegal strikes which inflicted severe economic damage on Chile. After the coup, the fascist junta replaced the United Confederation with the puppet National Trade Union Center of Workers under Eduardo Rios, a close friend of Don Venche's.

The Pentagon's Troubleshooters

There are many ways in which the Pentagon constantly interferes in the internal affairs of Latin American countries. A special system has been created to carry out reprisals against the liberation movement of the region. Since 1958, the U.S. Southern Command has been in operation, charged with pursuing the United States' military policy in Latin America. Since 1963, the Seventh Special Forces (Green Berets) has been stationed at Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone. Aside from Green Berets, the United States also uses the two Marine battalions stationed in the Canal Zone and the one at Guantanamo, Cuba, for operations in Latin America. Some sources estimate that in 1981 the strength of U.S. units in Latin America was 26,000 servicemen, including some 9,000 in the Canal Zone, 2,000 at Guantanamo, and 3,500 in Puerto Rico.⁴⁷ Add to that the Joint Task Force for the Caribbean and Central America, established on orders from President Carter in 1979. The Task Force has 18,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division and the Marines.

All these units are the troubleshooters called on to suppress any action in Latin America hostile to the United States. Since the turn of the century, U.S. troops have invaded Latin American countries over 40 times. The Chilean journalist Volodia Teitelboim wrote that from 1920 to

1973 there had been 90 reactionary military coups in Latin America.⁴⁸ "In recent decades," he noted, "the CIA has been behind most of them."⁴⁹ The United States also frequently sends in Green Berets. On the whole, there is no essential difference between the 1965 landing of U.S. troops in Santo Domingo and operations by special forces in Guatemala, El Salvador or other countries. Still, the latter type of intervention offers a better cover and attracts less attention while it is just as effective militarily. It follows that politically it is a more convenient technique to be used in countries where the anti-imperialist struggle is going on. Often, Green Berets are present in Latin American countries under bilateral military agreements or without any legal excuse at all. Green Beret activities in Latin America, the *Chile-América* magazine notes, are always coordinated with those of the CIA.²⁰

The "counterinsurgency operations" of the Pentagon and the CIA in Latin America are among the more important techniques U.S. imperialism resorts to to fight the liberation movement there. In 1974, the Pentagon drew up a standard plan for combating the guerrilla movement in Latin America and distributed it among the Organization of American States members via the Inter-American Defense Board. This was a pattern based on LASO, the Latin American Security Operation, prepared by the Pentagon in the early 1960s.

Under the LASO plan, any armed reprisal should go through four major stages: the preparatory stage, mopping-up, containment, and the constructive or stabilization stage. The first phase included preparations to support subsequent operations. The mopping-up stage was to destroy major guerrilla units and their bases. The third

stage was essentially a continuation of stage two: the task is to liquidate scattered groups and individual guerrillas, to prevent them from merging into new units. Finally, the fourth stage envisaged steps to stabilize the political situation in the area of guerrilla operations.

Under U.S. Army Field Manual 34-21 on special operations, Green Berets are trained in the art of killing people, blowing up buildings, conducting sabotage, staging ambushes and raids, spying, shadowing suspects, instigating panic, etc. In the Canal Zone they are drilled in counterinsurgency tactics, and study arms, communications equipment, the Spanish and Portuguese languages. Many Green Berets are veterans of the war in Vietnam; now they are gaining new experience in El Salvador and other countries of the region.

Trained in sabotage, provocations and assassination, Green Berets are waging an undeclared war in many Latin American nations. Each year they carry out hundreds of various operations—from wiping out guerrilla groups and assassinating progressive figures to staging revolts, committing sabotage, encouraging hatred of the Left, engaging in terrorist activities, raiding publishing houses, etc. Green Berets unleash reprisals not only against persons suspected of being guerrilla sympathizers or of assisting guerrillas, but also against the entire population of guerrilla areas. The technique of setting up “strategic villages”—concentration camps for local inhabitants—is used widely. Special units posing as guerrillas infiltrate these areas to discredit the real guerrillas by committing terrorist acts, looting, etc. The Counterinsurgency Planning Manual states expressly that the “internal defense plan” and the “internal security plan” (also

known as the “counterinsurgency plan”) are to be drawn up by the U.S. military advisers to the government of a given Latin American country.

The White House and the Pentagon see suppression of popular action and the ensurance of “internal security” as the foremost task of the region’s armed forces. A report prepared by a group of U.S. analysts (the Santa Fe Group) for the Inter-American Safety Council stresses that security from external and internal threat is the chief objective of the United States’ policy in Latin America.²¹ Consequently, the report recommends “reactivating . . . our traditional military ties on the continent, offering military training and assistance to the armed forces of the American continent”.²²

The United States works through the system of its military schools and academies, through its military missions in Latin American countries and the Inter-American Defense Board to prepare Latin American armed forces for tackling this job. Joint military exercises, constant contacts in the Inter-American Defense Board and at inter-American military conferences, training and advanced training for army officers in the United States, reciprocal visits by military delegations and cadets from military academies, the study of the English language and of U.S. military manuals and other books by Latin American army officers, the Americanization of culture—all this is used to further U.S. interests in the region.

By now almost 20 percent of all Latin American armed forces have been professionally trained in counterinsurgency tactics and subjected to anticommunist brainwashing either in the United States or at U.S. bases in the Canal Zone. Con-

sidering the limited and sporadic nature of the guerrilla movement in the region, 20 percent is no mean figure. Still, the Pentagon spares neither effort nor money to keep this up. Could it be that the local punitive forces are being trained for future troubleshooting? At any rate, one can be sure that in conducting a broad retraining program for Latin American armies and creating in them special forces after the Green Beret pattern, the Pentagon is thinking not so much of the "guerrilla threat" as of forging an effective tool for interfering in the internal affairs of Latin American nations. These disciples of Green Berets are now the elite part of most of these armies and hold key positions there. They also make up the bulk of the security forces. They direct the suppression of demonstrations and strikes, raids on left-wing organizations, and the terrorist activities of fascist gangs. It was evident from the tragic 1973 developments in Chile that the Chilean Special Forces treated unarmed people with particular brutality and ruthlessness. The Chilean *Gestapo*—the National Information Directorate, DINA, renamed the National Directorate of Information in 1977—was mostly staffed by Special Forces officers.

Latin American history offers numerous examples of the ways military regimes evolve, under certain conditions, into a new form of imperialist domination and the armies, into a direct tool of U.S. imperialist policies. The Colombian journalist Alvaro Delgado stresses that "the Yankee military philosophy has disfigured the military institution to a degree where in some countries one can say there exists an army of occupation, a brutal oppressor of its own citizens".²³ The Salvadoran army officer Umberto Orellana has remarked bitterly that "the army of El Salva-

dor... is a satellite dependent on the U.S. Pentagon".²⁴

Let us consider only one example—that of the Dominican Republic. This country began to attract U.S. attention as early as the 19th century. In 1869 Orville E. Babcock, the U.S. ambassador, even talked the Dominican dictator Buenaventura Báez into selling his country to the United States. General Báez cadged a provision on personal "compensation" for himself to the tune of 150,000 dollars a year for life. Due to circumstances beyond the general's control, the deal fell through: Báez had to flee from the wrath of his people in a hurry. In 1905, 1913, 1914 and 1916 U.S. Marines landed in the Dominican Republic to "restore law and order" in the interests of American banks and sugar companies, the 1916 occupation lasting until 1924. By that time the United States had created the republic's army and chosen the commander for it—Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, a former U.S. Marine sergeant about whom Franklin D. Roosevelt said: "Trujillo is a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch."

The "Trujillo era" lasted from 1930, when "our son of a bitch" seized power in the Dominican Republic, to 1961, when CIA agents killed him on a deserted highway near the capital. The ex-sergeant renamed the capital after himself, had 3,000 monuments to himself erected, usurped every possible and impossible decoration and title and proclaimed himself the "benefactor and father of the new nation". In 1961 the Trujillo family had amassed property worth 800 million dollars.

Trujillo's U.S. sponsors had never had it so good. Under his regime, American investment increased ten-fold. Senator James Eastland, who

visited Trujillo in November 1958, extolled him as one of the greatest figures in the free world, leading his nation to freedom, dignity and sound judgment. Allen Ellender, also a U.S. Senator, said he would like people like Trujillo to lead all other Latin American countries. One might note in passing that tens of thousands were killed in Trujillo's "mainstay of freedom".

However, there came a time when the White House no longer liked the way the "benefactor of the nation" behaved. He acted as though he had forgotten to whom he owed his power. Besides, President Kennedy came up with a plan of expanding the sphere of "representative democracy" in Latin America, and the Dominican Republic, where not a single general election had ever been held before, stood out like a sore thumb. President Kennedy ordered the CIA to have Trujillo removed. On May 30, 1961 a group of CIA agents led by General Antonio Imbert ambushed "one of the great figures in the free world" on his way back home from his mistress and riddled him with bullets.

Joaquin Balaguer, a member of Trujillo's coterie, appeared on the political scene and was appointed "Provisional President". But General Pedro Echevarria, supported by the Pentagon, declared Balaguer was "too soft" and staged a military coup on January 16, 1962. At this point President Kennedy interfered and in December the first elections in Dominican history were held. However, taking the White House completely by surprise, they ended in a sweeping victory for Juan Bosch, a liberal who had spent 24 years in exile. On February 27, 1963 Bosch was inaugurated as President. Ten days later, the Dominican military launched a putsch in an attempt to overthrow the constitutionally elected president, os-

tenably to "save the country from communism". New attempts were made in April, June and August. Finally, on September 25, 1963 Juan Bosch was overthrown in a coup prepared by Colonel Lear Read of the CIA, Generals Antonio Imbert and Elias Wessin and Defense Minister Victor Elby Viñas.

In order to ensure the success of the coup and rule out any accidental difficulties, the CIA and the DIA had created in the Dominican army special forces under General Wessin. Trained by Green Beret instructors since 1962, these forces received arms and equipment from the United States on the eve of the coup which they brought off, on signal from the CIA station, on September 25. The Pentagon and the CIA put an end to "representative democracy".

After the overthrow of Juan Bosch, an acute power struggle broke out between Imbert's, Wessin's and Balaguer's groups. General Wessin declared he had saved the nation from "Soviet communism". General Imbert made his claim too, maintaining that he and not Wessin had overthrown Bosch. Since General Wessin had the weightier argument—the special forces under his command—the Presidency was filled by his protégé Donald Reid Cabral who loved to be called by his nickname "the American": his admiration for anything labeled "Made in U.S.A." knew no bounds.

On April 24, 1965 the supporters of Juan Bosch and of the Constitution started an uprising in Santo Domingo. The following day Cabral left for the United States. Colonel Francisco Caamaño, the 32-year-old leader of the Constitutionalists, became Provisional President. An aristocrat who, under Cabral, commanded the "white helmets", an elite police force, had received his

military training in the United States and served with the U.S. Marines, was immediately branded as a "Communist" in Washington. The U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic William T. Bennett arrived at the San Isidro military base and personally appointed a "government" headed by General Wessin.

Wessin told journalists he was a "crusader for freedom" and "fighter against international communism". At five o'clock in the afternoon on April 28 Wessin's crusade to save his country from communism ended in the desertion of his special forces; Wessin called Ambassador Bennett on the telephone and reported the news. This did not surprise Bennett: Washington did not really expect Wessin to cope with the situation, and on the morning of April 25 President Johnson had dispatched a naval task force to the Dominican Republic; one day prior to the defeat of Wessin's forces the commander of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division had been ordered to occupy the San Isidro military base.

The invasion was planned in advance. In early April 1965 a dress rehearsal had been staged—military exercises codenamed Quick Kick on the island of Vieques in Puerto Rico, conducted by the 82nd Airborne and the 2nd Marine Corps divisions.

It now remained merely to repeat the operation, this time in Santo Domingo. At 18.30 on April 28 the U.S. aircraft carrier *Boxer* received the Presidential order to launch the invasion. U.S. Marines seized the port of Ayna 11 kilometers west of Santo Domingo, while paratroopers occupied the San Isidro base. By May 8 the strength of U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic had reached 22,000 aside from the 8,000 servicemen on board the 40 naval vessels anchored off

Santo Domingo. The objective of the intervention was to pin down the Constitutionalist forces in the capital, prevent the complete rout of the remains of Wessin's forces, and overthrow the Caamaño government. Wessin himself was sent off to Panama in an American plane, and on May 7 Imbert replaced him as "President". Over 10,000 Dominicans were killed and wounded in the United States' intervention.

From May 24 the intervention in the Dominican Republic assumed a disguise: according to a decision by the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States the so-called Inter-American Peace Force moved in to "restore order". They comprised 20,000 U.S. troops, 1,170 Brazilians, 250 Hondurans, 159 Nicaraguans, 21 Costa Ricans, two Paraguayans and one Salvadoran. The U.S. invaders remained in Santo Domingo until September 1965, installing Eduardo Garcia as the new "President".

In June 1966, openly rigged elections were held, "won" by Joaquin Balaguer, a close friend of Trujillo's. In other words, the "Trujillo era" continued, although without the "father of the new nation" himself. Balaguer's fall in 1978 was mostly caused by revelations of corruption and the bribes he received from U.S. and British companies. The scandal could not be covered up, and other politicians used the popular indignation to their own advantage. In 1978 Antonio Guzmán installed himself as President; he was a close friend of Balaguer's. History repeated itself: first the Trujillo pattern without Trujillo, then the Balaguer pattern without Balaguer, but with the invariable presence of the CIA, the DIA and U.S. transnational monopolies.

WAGING A SECRET WAR

"The peoples of Latin America and other parts of the world know full well what U.S. foreign policy has meant to them throughout history. The United States has had many governments, each with its proper characteristics, with its salient features, in some cases even quite distinctive. The pendulum has swung from administrations which posed in the eyes of other peoples as peacemakers with an olive branch in hand to governments which from the very beginning brandished a stick to intimidate revolutionaries and champions of independence. Obviously, the goals have always remained the same: all efforts have been aimed at maintaining U.S. political, economic and ideological domination.

"The threats to Cuba, the attacks against Nicaragua, Grenada and the Salvadoran people, the plans to put pressure on Mexico, the direct participation in the British colonialist expedition against Argentina over the Malvinas, the close ties established with dictatorships like in Chile or Uruguay—all this is typical of the current period..."

Javier Rodriguez, Cuban journalist¹

CIA Assassins and Their Disciples

The CIA, the FBI and other U.S. intelligence services have long maintained continuous contacts with the security services of some Latin American countries. Moreover, these ties are intertwined to such a degree and the influence of the U.S. intelligence community on these services is so great that, according to many researchers, the repressive organizations of the Western Hemisphere are being integrated into a single system under the aegis of the CIA.

It is a well-substantiated fact that the chiefs

of several Latin American security services, including Interior Ministers, are appointed only after a careful screening by the CIA and only with CIA approval. Philip Agee had good reason to describe the CIA's relations with Latin American security services as "intimate". "The CIA," he said, "offers everything to the security services of the regimes in favor with the United States—money, instructors, weapons and equipment."

Since 1962 the so-called public security program has been conducted in Latin American countries, launched on instructions from President Kennedy. Officially, the U.S. State Department is the responsible agency, although in actual fact it is the mission of the CIA and the FBI. Over the past decade alone, the United States has trained some 20,000 Latin American police officers and security advisers. Of these, thousands were trained at the International Police Academy in Washington. After international pressure forced its closure in 1975, the CIA extended a helping hand to its colleagues from the FBI. Today Latin American police officers are being trained by the International Police Services, Inc., a CIA subsidiary. Some of them are also sent to the U.S. Border Patrol Academy in Los Fresnos, Texas, and the FBI Special School in Quantico, Virginia. The FBI and the CIA also have "mobile training teams" that visit Latin American countries to train the local police and security forces.

The United States tries to convince the Latin American public that this assistance is aimed against crime which is on the rise in the region. But that is merely a decoy. The International Police Services training course focuses on the study of "communist subversion" and the suppression of the working-class and democratic movements. Latin American police officers are taught

not only various ways to combat manifestations or strikes but also interrogation and "removal" techniques to be applied to suspects, etc. Acting jointly with the local police forces, the CIA and the DIA have established a broad network of clandestine terrorist organizations in Latin America which are implementing Operation Attila—a CIA-designed plan of political assassinations to bleed the liberation movement white. These organizations include the Anticommunist Movement, the Squadron of Death and the Communist Hunt Teams in Brazil; the Falcons in Mexico; the Black Hand in Honduras and Colombia; ORDEN and the White Warriors' Union in El Salvador; Ojo por Ojo, the White Hand and the New Youth Movement in Guatemala; the Cobra in Venezuela; the Alpha-66, the Tacuara and the AAA in Argentina; the Squadron of Death in Bolivia; and countless others. The Guatemalan businessman Raúl García Granados, one of those who finance the terrorist organizations of his country, has said that "the Squadrons of Death have lists of suspected Communists of all kinds and they kill them. It is a war between Communists and anticommunists". His brother Jorge García Granados echoes Raul: "We are in a shooting war. Of course, it is bad to kill, but when you are at war and someone has to be killed, you kill him." And here is a quotation from Colonel Germán Chupina Barahona, Guatemalan National Police Director, nicknamed the Butcher of Guatemala: "I fully support the Squadrons of Death. They are eliminating our enemies the Communists."²

A report on Brazil published in London in 1973 stresses that the assassinations are committed by organizations comprising police officers, lumpens and fascists.³ Agamemnon

Duarte, a Brazilian judge, said the "CIA was behind" them.⁴ Most members of the right-wing terrorist groups are recruited from among the police or the special forces trained by U.S. Green Berets. *The Triple A and the CIA: Cordoba Accuses!*, a pamphlet published in Buenos Aires in 1974, cites documentary proof of the ties existing between Argentine terrorist organizations and the CIA.⁵

The scope of the CIA's ties can be seen from the activities of Dan Mitrione who, after a term of work in Brazil, went to Uruguay as chief of the public security program service to share his expertise. He spent most of the day in his office in the Uruguayan General Police Directorate. Nominally a senior adviser to the police, he was in fact the boss. At night he met with agents provocateurs and visited a villa on Malvin Embankment, the CIA's chief torture chamber for political prisoners. People who somehow managed to regain their freedom linked the name of Mitrione to the most brutal kinds of torture; but these people, whose survival was nothing short of a miracle, were extremely few. Victor Villanueva wrote in his book that "the inquisition of ages past is child's play compared to the things disclosed about these organizations".⁶ U.S. Senator Frank Church has called Uruguay the biggest torture chamber in Latin America. One might add that it is the Senator's countrymen from the CIA and the FBI who are responsible for this state of affairs. Over 7,000 people are in jails and detention centers. Some 100,000 have been subjected to interrogation and torture. Almost 500,000 (one out of every six Uruguayans) have fled the country to save their lives and human dignity. The fate of those detained in the Inferno and Infierno Verde interrogation centers gives

rise to grave concern. Here the most inhuman torture methods are used, and many prisoners die at the hands of their interrogators. All in all, almost 100 centers have been set up in Uruguay to try and break the will of Communists and other patriots.

The CIA has established similar centers in many other countries of the region. CIA and DIA agents bring suspected Left sympathizers to these places. Even the buildings of the U.S. public security program in Latin America have been turned into jails. Americans are torturing and killing thousands of Latin Americans in their own sovereign countries.

In many nations of the region, the security forces are the CIA's chief tool in its campaign against progressive democratic movements. Notably, these bodies are directly controlled by the CIA and FBI agents who have infiltrated them; the security forces implement the regional policies coordinated by the CIA. The intelligence services of these countries perform similar functions. Military Intelligence Chief Miguel Perez of the Dominican Republic has said that his office has virtually turned into a branch of the DIA and the CIA because it is mostly staffed by Cuban counterrevolutionaries (CIA agents) and by Dominicans who have graduated from the Green Beret school at Fort Bragg.

The danger of the Americanization and CIA control of the Latin American security services is compounded by the fact that the CIA trains secret police units used to bolster dictatorial regimes. DINA, the Chilean secret police created after the overthrow of Allende and renamed the National Directorate of Information in 1977, is a case in point.

Alfredo Stroessner has been ruling Paraguay

for 30 years. In 1954 the DIA and the CIA made this grandson of a Bavarian police officer President, and the United States has pampered him ever since. Stroessner is an admirer of Hitler and patron of the nazi criminals hiding in Paraguay. The country has become the last refuge for all kinds of scum. This was where Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the Nicaraguan dictator, fled after 1979 (and where he was eventually assassinated). Stroessner's palace guard includes former SS men who have again donned military uniforms.

Intimidation and terrorism are the methods Stroessner uses to keep rigging his elections. The "self-electing President" feels no misgivings over the fact that 1.5 million people—half the population of Paraguay—have left the country.

Juan José Penayo, a former political prisoner, reports that close to the Third Police Department building, where Paraguayan Communist Party leaders are kept, and practically next door to the Paraguayan Supreme Court building, there is an interrogation center where FBI and CIA agents train Stroessner's gorillas in the most sophisticated torture techniques with prisoners as guinea pigs. A certain Campos Alum, a CIA agent, is on the staff of the Paraguayan Interior Ministry as its liaison man with the U.S. embassy. A special group under Alum screens the detainees and decides on what is to happen to them. In the Interior Ministry, Alum also directs the activities of secret agents (the so-called *piragues*—"invisible men") specializing in political assassination.

The windows of the Department of Investigation remain lit all through the night, and passers-by cross themselves fearfully. No one knows how many unfortunate prisoners branded as "undesir-

ables" have entered it never to reappear. As a rule, no official arrests are made in Paraguay for political reasons—people are simply seized in the street or dragged out of their beds at night. When relatives try to learn about the fate of those detained, the police deny any knowledge of them.

No one knows how many people have fallen victim to the *pileta* or the *sargento*. The former is the name of a torture technique: the prisoner's head is kept submerged until he chokes, then he is beaten into insensitivity. When he regains consciousness, the procedure is repeated. Besides, the "pileta" is a tub filled with sewage and not merely cold water. The *picana electrica* (electric stick) is another favorite with the jailers who want to "break in" newcomers. Torturers often use a whip with steel balls plaited into the end of the lash, and the *sargento*—a sort of cat-o'-nine-tails.

The police round up one or two thousand "suspects" in each of the recurrent raids, but few of these people are eventually brought to trial. After a while, their bodies, their hands tied with barbed wire behind their backs and their throats cut, are washed up on the Argentine bank of the Paraguay River. Otherwise they disappear without a trace. The police keep denying any knowledge of them.

The situation is similar in Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, Haiti, El Salvador and many other countries of "free" Latin America. No specific charges accompany the mass arrests conducted everywhere. Security agents break into a man's home, arrest him and loot or destroy his property. Once the detainee is brought to one of the numerous "security" centers, he is subjected to interrogation to force a "confession" out of him. Some of the wittier security officers ask the prisoner what

type of torture he would prefer: in a democracy, he is entitled to free choice. Then the torture begins. The Chilean journalists Elizabeth Reimann and Fernando Rivas describe 18 types of physical and at least 20 types of psychological torture used in Pinochet's "free Chile".⁷ All prisoners in Uruguay have to constantly wear dark hoods over their eyes. Prisoners are left hanging by their wrists or hair; stripped naked, they are forced to sit astride a wooden beam for hours and even days on end. Beatings often result in permanent injuries. Women prisoners are also subjected to inhuman treatment; many have been raped.

The overwhelming majority of the detainees have never been involved in politics and are therefore unable to produce any information of interest to the security forces. It follows that we are dealing with a psychological terror campaign to intimidate the population.

Thousands upon thousands of Latin Americans disappear as "missing persons". Their fate is extremely difficult to trace because the terrorist pro-U.S. regimes in most Latin American countries have suspended habeas corpus safeguards citing martial law or "internal war" as excuses.

"A country under occupation" is not a figure of speech but a specific expression of the concept, advanced by the rulers of Chile, El Salvador, Uruguay and some other Latin American countries, and stipulating that a new world war—"the war against communist subversion"—is already on, and that they are fighting it on the home front. In an attempt to vindicate their reprisals and terrorism they claim that "we can do anything because there's an internal war on".

Those who have "confessed" either end up "missing" or are given a prison term. An OAS

report on human rights in Haiti cited numerous examples of this.⁸ A certain Exéchiél Abélard, producer of the evening program of Radio Metropole, was arrested by the secret police of the dictator Duvalier and thrown into the Fort Dimanche prison "without recourse to any legal procedure". The report states that "Mr. Abélard died in prison of tuberculosis".⁹ There had been no serious conditions in Abélard's previous medical record, and his sudden death "of tuberculosis" inevitably raised certain questions. All inquiries by the OAS commission into the charges against Abélard remained unanswered by the government of Haiti: "Abélard did not deal with political questions," the report says, "but at the time of his arrest he was investigating a housing project sponsored by the Minister of Social Affairs."¹⁰ Tuberculosis is the most common cause of death among prisoners in Haiti (half the cases cited in the report). The prisoners themselves, however, attribute these deaths to the assassinations committed by Duvalier's secret police. Prisoners are taken out at night, killed with a club (Duvalier has decreed that ammunition is to be spared) and buried at a secret cemetery 50 meters from Fort Dimanche.

The conditions of prisoners in Haiti defy description. Tiny cells are jammed with 20 to 30 people who have to take turns sleeping. Each receives a 20-gram piece of bread, a bowl of ground corn and two cups of water a day. Medical care is nonexistent. The torture, humiliation and appalling conditions are aimed at breaking the prisoners' will and pushing them into insanity.

A report of the OAS commission on human rights in Paraguay cites a typical example. In reply to the commission's inquiry into the fate

of Miguel Angel Soler, Secretary of the Paraguayan Communist Party Central Committee, arrested on November 30, 1975 and tortured to death, the government declared that Soler had never been arrested at all and that "news was received from Montevideo to the effect that he had moved to Moscow".¹¹ An inquiry about the peasant leader Arturo Bernal, who was arrested and then died after 55 days of torture, elicited the reply that he had contracted a disease and died.

Kidnapings, illegal arrests, assassinations and torture are a daily occurrence in "free" Latin America. The February 21, 1980 issue of *L'Humanité* contains the following figures: over 30,000 people have been killed in Chile after the 1973 coup; over 40,000 in Guatemala after 1962; 100,000 in Haiti under the Duvalier dynasty; 50,000 people have been killed in Paraguay; 20,000 were "missing" in Argentina in 1977 alone; 50,000 have been killed in El Salvador over the past two years. In Latin America as a whole, over one million people have been killed in the past 20 years.

In 1979 the U.S. House of Representatives yet again held hearings on human rights, this time in the Subcommittee on International Organizations. The hearings were entitled "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy".¹² The Congressmen were not yet issued the scientific paper prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the U.S. State Department—*Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. This document was to appear the following year; meanwhile, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher maintained that everything was fine with human rights in Latin America. Even in Paraguay? "The situation in Paraguay has been improving," Christo-

pher said. "The trend is in a good direction." In short, it had been decided that Paraguay would receive new U.S. loans. There followed this exchange between Tony Hall, Chairman of the Subcommittee, and Christopher regarding this decision:

"Well, you had a human rights report on Paraguay. As I remember, there were gross violations. Who made the decision? Who changed your interagency decision to go ahead with that? Was it the Human Rights Staff of the State Department?"

"No, it was a decision I made in consultation with the Secretary of State. It was made on the recommendation of the ambassador (of the United States to Paraguay—*Authors*).'" ¹⁴

It turned out that Robert White, the U.S. ambassador to Paraguay, had submitted a report to the State Department claiming that the human rights situation in that country had improved and recommending increased U.S. assistance to Paraguay in order to "meet basic human needs" and ensure "improvement in the human rights climate".¹⁵ In 1980 the *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* indicated there had been "improvement" in the human rights situation in Chile, Paraguay, Guatemala, Haiti and other countries.

Hitmen from the CIA

Orlando Letelier, a leader of the Socialist Party of Chile and a close associate of Salvador Allende, served as Chilean ambassador to the United States, Interior Minister, Defense Minister and later Foreign Minister in Popular Unity governments. At the time of the coup, Letelier was in La Moneda, the Presidential palace. After the

palace was taken and Allende killed, Letelier was thrown into the concentration camp on Dawson Island, "the Island of Death". After long months of fascist prison, he managed to leave Pinochet's Chile and settled in Washington together with his wife and four sons. He began lecturing at the American University in Washington and working for the Center for International Studies. Letelier had many connections with influential members of the U.S. political elite, especially in the Democratic Party; this was what had brought his release from Dawson Island. Letelier's circle of friends included Senators Edward Kennedy and George McGovern, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church, and Representative Michael Harrington. The latter two initiated, with encouragement from Letelier, the U.S. Congressional investigation into the role the CIA had played in the overthrow of the Allende government.

To get even, the CIA arranged the assassination of Letelier. On September 21, 1976 a powerful explosion destroyed Letelier's car while he was driving along Embassy Row near the White House. Letelier died on the way to hospital. A bomb had been planted under his car and detonated by remote control. Immediately, rumors spread through Washington asserting that Soviet agents were responsible for the assassination, that they were trying to "discredit the Chilean junta and bolster the waning anti-Chilean psychological assault".

It was perfectly obvious that Letelier had been killed by DINA agents or their hired hands. But U.S. authorities began investigating the case only two years later, and it was as late as 1978 that the criminals were arrested (three DINA officers remained at large). The trial was held

in 1979—almost three years after the assassination.

The trial revealed that in August 1976 the Paraguayan authorities had issued passports to Juan Ross and Alejandro Romerano, and the U.S. embassy immediately granted them U.S. entry visas. Pinochet had personally asked Stroessner for passports for Ross and Romerano. As George Landau, the U.S. ambassador to Paraguay admitted, the passports were photographed (at the CIA station—*Authors*) and a diplomatic courier left on the same day to deliver the photos to General Vernon Walters, Chief Deputy Director of the CIA. The photographs in the Paraguayan passports, it turned out, were identical with those in the passports of the Chilean citizens Hans Silva and Armando Lion, issued in Chile and used a short while before for entering the United States. Ross, alias Silva, was identified as Michael Townley, a U.S. citizen living in Chile, and Romerano, alias Lion, as DINA Captain Armando Fernandez Larios, a crony of DINA chief General Contreras. It was also revealed that, aside from these people, other accomplices in the assassination were the Cuban counterrevolutionaries and CIA agents Guillermo and Ignacio Novo, Alvin Ross Diaz, Virgilio Paz Romero and José Dionisio Suárez.

Interesting information also exists about CIA Director George Bush's connection to the assassination of Letelier. A personal friend and ally of President Reagan, Bush received reports from the U.S. ambassador in Paraguay on the planned assassination several weeks before the event. According to Saul Landau, co-author of a book on the Letelier case published in London in 1980, "George Bush put them in his file and didn't do anything about it. Even after the assas-

sination he didn't pass on to the FBI the information that he had."¹⁶

Given the vested interest of the CIA in the matter, the hearings of the Letelier affair were held in an atmosphere of understanding between the CIA and the court, somewhat marred by Townley's admission that the DINA bosses had entrusted Letelier's removal to himself and Fernandez, and that he had been the one who planted the bomb. As expected, only the small fry were put behind bars. Guillermo Novo and Alvin Ross were sentenced to life imprisonment and Ignacio Novo, to a term of eight years. However, as early as the fall of 1980 a Federal Court of Appeal overruled this sentence and ordered the case revised; a new trial is to take place in 1983. José Dionisio Suárez, the Cuban counterrevolutionary who detonated the bomb by remote control, disappeared, as did Virgilio Paz, another accomplice in the assassination. Their escape was aided by the CIA which supplied them with money and forged papers.

The DINA officers—General Contreras, Colonel Espinoza and Lieutenant (later Captain) Fernandez—were not put on trial either. The junta refused to hand them over to the United States which insisted on the extradition only halfheartedly. In 1981 a Chilean court acquitted these criminals.

As regards Townley, he only received a 40-month prison term; he had served one third of it by the time the sentence was passed. Released a year later, he returned to Chile and to his job. That is hardly surprising if one recalls that Michael Townley is a career CIA officer, now a colonel. Officially, he held the job of an "electronics expert" with DINA. He had traveled to the United States under various assumed names;

and was an especially frequent visitor at the Audio-Intelligence Service Company, a CIA front in Florida. In the United States he had bought electronic surveillance devices and electric shock equipment to be used for torture.

Assassinations similar to that of Orlando Letelier have become particularly frequent in Latin America over recent years. Their victims include Carlos Prats, the Chilean general who was commander-in-chief under the Allende government and vigorously resisted U.S. imperialist schemes; President Juan Jose Torres Gonzalez of Bolivia; Oscar Arnulfo Romero, the Archbishop of El Salvador who repeatedly appealed to the U.S. President to end military and economic assistance to the Salvadoran junta; and many others. General Rafael Hoyos Rubio, Chief of Staff of the Peruvian armed forces, President Jaime Roldos Aguilera of Ecuador, and General Omar Torrijos, Commander of the Panamanian National Guard have all died in mysterious air crashes.

Prisma latinoamericano magazine discussed these accidents, described in the U.S. press as "mysterious deaths", and said: "In their police investigation manuals, the experts tell their students to proceed, first and foremost, from the premise of who benefits from the death of the individual in question if there is a suspicion that it was not due to a natural cause. . . . We would like to extend the investigators' rules and state that when statesmen and military leaders at odds with imperialism keep dying, one should look for the CIA behind it all."¹⁷ "In keeping with this theory," the magazine went on, "one can easily see that the death of Roldos suited Mr. Reagan's warlike policy in two substantial respects: it removed from the Latin American political scene a fighter for the observance of human rights and a

political figure who recognized the right of peoples to self-determination and rejected all kinds of armed intervention aimed against countries like Cuba, El Salvador or Nicaragua."¹⁸ The report of the U.S. analysts who outlined President Reagan's Latin American policies for him (the Santa Fe Group) bears out the hypothesis advanced by the magazine. Specifically, one of the recommendations denounces Roldos' political views and advises openly that the U.S. government should check the spread of "the Roldos doctrine" in Latin America. We know how the CIA acted on this recommendation.

U.S. imperialism also had a stake in removing Omar Torrijos, who died in a plane crash on July 31, 1981. His official title was Commander of the National Guard; in fact, he was the political leader of the Panamanian people and the initiator of a complex and largely even unique national revolutionary process begun in October 1968.

On October 11, 1968 a military coup by the Panamanian National Guard under General Torrijos ended the long succession of figurehead politicians who had ruled the country on instructions from the United States. The new government exhibited a trend toward progressive transformations and toward restricting the unchallenged sway of U.S. fruit-producing monopolies. Several reforms were enacted. In 1970 the National Guard occupied the Rio-Hato base leased to the Pentagon during World War II. In 1971 Panama officially refused the services of the U.S. Peace Corps. Finally, General Torrijos directed the campaign to revise the U.S.-Panamanian treaty on the Canal. On October 1, 1979 new treaties entered into force between the two countries. They envisaged the transfer of full sovereignty over the Canal to Panama by the year 2000.

Another aspect of Torrijos' politics which provoked hostility in Washington was that the general advocated an independent foreign policy and openly opposed imperialism and neocolonialism. Omar Torrijos discovered and frustrated several U.S. conspiracies against Central American and Caribbean nations. Under Torrijos, Panama was one of the few Latin American countries which provided effective internationalist assistance to Nicaraguan revolutionaries in their hard struggle against the Somoza dictatorship. Panamanians from the Victoriano Lorenzo Brigade fought side by side with volunteers from other Latin American countries against Somoza. Marti Torrijos, the general's 16-year-old son, took part in the decisive Sandinista offensive against the dictatorship.

Omar Torrijos once said that "he who has devoted his life to struggle against social injustice would hardly die of old age". The CIA began to hatch plots against him immediately after the 1968 coup. Following the abortive military putsch of 1969, CIA agents began preparations for his assassination. Information to that effect leaked to the press; the *Miami Herald* reported that CIA agents were preparing to assassinate Omar Torrijos. Two former CIA operatives corroborated the story.¹⁹ "And while the revolution has lost a recognized leader," Félix E. Dixon, member of the People's Party of Panama Central Committee, wrote, "those who would like to always see Latin America muzzled by an updated Monroe Doctrine had better not rub their hands with pleasure. General Torrijos was convinced that no one would be able to stop the progress of the cause begun by him."²⁰

The assassination of Torrijos was prepared by Howard E. Hunt, a veteran CIA operative, assisted by Manuel Artime, a Cuban counterrevolu-

tionary leader. However, when the preparations were in full swing, Hunt was recalled to Washington to take part in the bugging of Watergate. On June 17, 1972 he was arrested, together with his three accomplices (also CIA agents), in the Watergate complex. With Hunt out of action, the CIA hired José Celso, a professional hitman who favored rifles with telescopic sights, to assassinate Torrijos. The plan backfired when Celso was detained in Panama while trying to smuggle in drugs. For the third attempt, the CIA set up a special group under Colonel Leonard Conane. The group arrived in Panama armed with silencer-equipped machine-guns, cigars which could fire projectiles, explosives hidden in film cameras, and booby-trapped electric torches and cigarette packs to be detonated electronically by remote control. All this equipment was delivered by CIA agents Philip Smith and William Darquin to a U.S. base in the Canal Zone and then handed over to the actual assassins.

The CIA also assassinated Archbishop Romero. Shortly before the murder of this head of the Catholic Church in El Salvador in March 1980, the U.S. ambassador to Italy visited the Vatican and demanded that Romero be stripped of his powers because he stood in the way of the United States' plan to bolster the pro-U.S. regime in that country and denounced the terrorist policies of the Salvadoran junta. The U.S. ambassador warned that if Romero was not removed, the Americans would not be able to guarantee his safety. A few days later, during a Sunday mass, the Archbishop was killed by CIA hitmen. One of them was Roberto D'Aubuisson, currently a member of the Salvadoran government.

Organized and carried out by U.S. intelligence services, political assassinations of prominent La-

tin Americans are supposed to erode the liberation movement and intimidate the patriots. Many leaders of Latin American communist parties have fallen victim to these crimes. Since 1960, over half the Central Committee members of the Guatemalan Party of Labor have been killed; its outstanding leaders Victor Manuel Gutierrez, Octavo Reyes, Leonardo Castillo Flores and several others were assassinated in the 1960s. In December 1972 Bernardo Alvarado Monzon, Secretary General of the Central Committee, was killed, and in December 1974, his successor Humberto Alvarado Arellano. That was a great loss for the patriotic forces.

The CIA assassinates Latin American political and public figures acting in accordance with Operation Cóndor, directed by "Operation 40", a top secret CIA group. In order to conceal its involvement as thoroughly as possible, the CIA usually operates jointly with the secret services of several Latin American countries. A special coordinating group, comprising representatives of the CIA and of the local secret services, has been set up with its headquarters in Santiago de Chile and a branch office in Miami.

Aided by their local colleagues, U.S. clandestine agents organize political kidnappings. For example, Antonio Maidana, First Secretary of the Paraguayan Communist Party Central Committee, was arrested in 1958 and spent 19 years in Stroessner's prisons and concentration camps. In 1977 public opinion forced the Paraguayan authorities to release Maidana, Alfredo Alcorta, Julio Rojas and several other freedom fighters who were kept in detention after their acquittal by a Paraguayan court. However, in August 1980, Maidana and his comrade Emilio Roa were kidnapped in broad daylight in Buenos Aires and,

as it was reported later, brought back to Paraguay by CIA agents. They were imprisoned in a jail near Asunción. The Argentine authorities issued no official statement concerning this crime. A statement of the Communist Party of Uruguay on Maidana's kidnapping says, among other things, that Latin American peoples have yet again seen the brutal nature of the reprisals committed in the Southern Cone countries and the extent to which Latin American dictatorships act in concert.

Operation Diablo Continues

Guatemala offers a good example of how the CIA eliminates its political opponents and of who acts as its accomplice in the mass extermination of their own people to meet the alien interests of the United States. "It has been 26 years since a revolutionary process in Guatemala was stemmed," says the Cuban journalist Carlos Mora Hermán. "The government of the United States, acting through the Dulles brothers and the United Fruit Company (the notorious 'Mamita Yunai') succeeded in overthrowing the democratic regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán. Over the 26 years that have elapsed, the country has been ruled by military regimes. Over this period, more than 70,000 people have been assassinated. . . ." ²¹ *The New York Times* has admitted that the government of Guatemala conducts a methodical campaign of assassinations. ²² A 1981 Amnesty International report entitled *Guatemala: A Governmental Program of Political Murders* cites hundreds of cases of people killed with the knowledge and on the orders of the government. ²³

The 1954 overthrow of the democratic government of President Arbenz ended the Guatemalan

bourgeois-democratic revolution which had captured world public attention since its beginning in 1944. The defeat of the revolution was felt as a painful blow both in Guatemala and abroad.

Let us reconstruct the true sequence of these events. First and foremost, note that U.S. imperialist conspiracies against Guatemala, fully dominated previously by the powerful "Mamita Yunai", began immediately after the people ousted the dictator Jorge Ubico, a U.S. puppet, in 1944. By the time of the June 1954 coup, about 30 attempts had been made to overthrow the democratic government.

The 1951 decision of the Arbenz government to nationalize (for compensation) the unused land belonging to UFCO (the United Fruit Company) was received in Washington with rage. Powerful U.S. interests wanted UFCO business in Guatemala, viewed as a "banana republic", to continue as usual, unhampered. UFCO shareholders included CIA Director Allen Dulles, his brother John Foster, the State Secretary, David Rockefeller and others.

But UFCO was only part of the reason. The other part was the potential threat the Guatemalan bourgeois-democratic revolution could pose to U.S. imperialism in Latin America. Its success could bring about an upsurge of the liberation struggle elsewhere in the region: after all, it was the second revolution of this type in Latin American history after the Mexican revolution. And given the free rein of McCarthyism in the United States at that time, many American leaders saw even a bourgeois-democratic revolution in Latin America as the hand-writing on the wall. This climate made it easy for the Dulles brothers to act. John Foster Dulles, "the major foreign policy figure of the 1950s, actively fostered

and led the coup d'état—in concert with his brother Allen, then director of the CIA",²⁴ wrote the U.S. historian Stephen Schlesinger.

In January 1954, on instructions from President Eisenhower, the U.S. National Security Council adopted a plan for the overthrow of the Arbenz government. Codenamed Operation Diabolo, the plan had been prepared personally by Allen Dulles, aided by his deputy Frank Wisner. Wisner brought in Walter B. Smith, chief of State Department intelligence, John Peurifoy, the U.S. ambassador to Guatemala, and Joseph Randon, the CIA station chief in Guatemala, to work on the plan.

On Randon's recommendation, Colonel Castillo Armas was appointed head of the "liberation army". Armas had taken part in three rebellions against the Arevalo and Arbenz governments after training at the Fort Leavenworth.

Here is a telltale dialogue that occurred in the U.S. Congress seven years later, during the hearings on the activities of the intelligence community. The answers were given by Whiting Willauer, formerly the U.S. ambassador to Honduras, who worked both for the State Department and for the CIA:

"Mr. Ambassador, was there something of a team in working to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala, or were you alone in that operation?

"There was a team.

"Jack Peurifoy was down there?

"Yes, Jack was on the team over in Guatemala; that is the principal man, and we had Bob Hill, Ambassador Bob Hill in Costa Rica ... and we had Ambassador Tom Whelan in Nicaragua. ... And, of course, there were a number of CIA operatives in the picture.

"What was Mr. Dulles' involvement in that case?"

"Mr. Allen Dulles?"

"Yes."

"Well, the CIA was helping to equip and train the anticommunist revolutionary forces."²⁵

Jack Peurifoy, the U.S. ambassador to Guatemala, was a "self-proclaimed tough guy from South Carolina who carried a pistol in his belt" and obviously saw himself as someone out of a Western movie. He literally showered the White House with coded messages demanding "whip lashes on Guatemala's back"—that all types of assistance be stopped, the trade agreement abrogated, and anticommunist propaganda within the country stepped up. U.S. policies against democratic Guatemala obviously contained the germs of the notorious destabilization policy of the 1970s.

In early 1954, Guatemala's coasts were blockaded. In violation of international law, U.S. naval vessels stopped and searched on the high seas "suspect" ships bound for Guatemala. The U.S. press launched a noisy campaign to convince the readers that Marxists were about to send tanks to invade the Canal Zone in force from Guatemala.

At a National Security Council meeting on the morning of June 16, 1954 CIA Director Allen Dulles told President Eisenhower everything was ready for the coup. After the meeting was over, State Secretary John Foster Dulles called a press conference at which he announced that Guatemalan patriots had risen against Arbenz the Communist. That was the signal for the coup to begin.

The next day Castillo Armas' "liberation army" invaded Guatemala from Honduras. Simultaneously, U.S. planes started bombing Guatemalan cities. The U.S. airlines which controlled Guate-

mala's airways ceased their operation, and the ships belonging to the White Fleet Company, a UFCO subsidiary and serving as the country's foreign shipping links, suddenly left Guatemalan ports. "Well, boys," Peurifoy told U.S. embassy officials assembled in his office, "tomorrow at this time we'll have ourselves a big party."²⁶

However, the CIA scenario went awry. Four days after the rebellion had started, President Eisenhower was told the "liberation army" had been routed and was fleeing to Honduras. The Pentagon suggested another U.S. Air Force strike against Guatemalan cities, followed by a landing of the Marines. Allen Dulles, who had previously told the President that Arbenz would be overthrown within 24 hours, now cited "weather conditions" as an excuse. Late on June 27 the situation changed: Peurifoy sent a message to John Foster Dulles reading: "We expect radical change of Guatemalan government."²⁷

The CIA-bribed Guatemalan army officers rushed to the rescue. On June 28, Colonel Carlos Enrique Díaz, commander of the army, saw Peurifoy and declared he was ready to assume power. The next day Díaz led a military delegation to the Presidential palace. He demanded that Arbenz resign immediately.

Arbenz was forced to capitulate. Some members of his government called on him to arm the people and create a militia, to move decisively against the conspirators. However, Arbenz refused.

In these conditions CIA agents had no difficulty in bribing Díaz and bringing off a coup "from within". On June 29, after Díaz had done his bit, he was summoned to the U.S. embassy, arrested and flown out to New Orleans in a U.S. Air Force plane. Enter another "President", Colo-

nel Carlos Monzón, but not for long. On July 7 he, too, was invited to the U.S. embassy where Peurifoy handed him a check and airplane tickets to Mexico City. Monzón emerged from the ambassador's office and told the crowd of Guatemalan newsmen waiting outside the interests of the nation demanded that he resign and hand power over to Colonel Armas.

The bloodbath engineered in Guatemala by the gorillas and CIA agents took a toll of 21,000 lives. Thousands were thrown into jails and torture chambers. Castillo Armas outlawed "Communists and all communist sympathizers", trade unions and peasants' organizations. Labor legislation was suspended, and all rights of workers and peasants abolished. CIA agents compiled a list of "dangerous Communists" to be eliminated; later it turned out that "the new government had registered 72,000 persons as Communists or sympathizers".²⁸

According to *The Nation*, it was the Dulles brothers who demanded that Armas cleanse the country of Communists. In a message sent to Ambassador Peurifoy after the coup, John Foster Dulles told him to "persuade proper authorities" (that is, the Armas government) "to slap criminal charges, with accompanying publicity, against Communists against whom there is criminal evidence thus focusing public and diplomatic attention [on the] criminal rather than political character [of] their offenses".²⁹

In 1958 Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes became President, succeeded in 1963 by Colonel Enrique Peñaralta Azurdia, formerly Defense Minister. A guerrilla movement began to emerge in Guatemala. Again, U.S. monopolies felt concerned over the future of their investments in the country.

In early 1963 the Pentagon and the CIA

launched counterinsurgency operations in Guatemala. For twelve months, military hardware and advisers were airlifted from the United States to Guatemala. By early 1965 about 2,000 Green Berets had been sent there. The counterinsurgency campaign was supported by U.S. Air Force planes operating from bases in the Canal Zone. Napalm bombs were used against the guerrillas.

FBI and CIA experts reorganized Guatemala's security service. A reign of terror set in: agents, provocateurs infiltrated guerrilla units. Trotskyites working for the CIA did especially great harm to the Guatemalan guerrilla movement by precipitating its split.

From October 1966 the CIA and the reactionaries began a systematic terrorist drive against the Left, eliminating its activists and leaders, and all dissenters. It was especially brutal in rural areas. Government helicopters and planes kept strafing and bombing areas suspected of harboring guerrilla sympathizers. Thousands of innocent Indian peasants were summarily executed, many disappeared without a trace.

Today, the secret war of U.S. imperialism against the people of Guatemala is still on. American-armed and American-trained, the army, the security service, the terrorist organizations created by the CIA are committing genocide, fighting for the interests of U.S. and Guatemalan plutocrats. The paramilitary terrorist organizations include the White Hand, the New Anticommunist Organization, the Ojo por Ojo, the Squadron of Death and others. Their activities are coordinated by "Commando-6", a group directly controlled by the CIA station in Guatemala. "Commando-6" is staffed by police officers who have graduated from the International Police Academy in Wash-

ington and serve with the Interior Ministry.

The *International Herald Tribune* has reported that despite obvious political terrorist acts committed by the Guatemalan government, the U.S. State Department continues to support this sadistic regime.³⁰ According to *Visión*, a U.S.-based magazine, more than 20,000 people were killed, about 80,000 wounded and one million left homeless in Guatemala over the period from 1978 to 1980 alone.³¹ It remains to be added that the junta and its Washington sponsors are planning the extermination of 50,000 more Guatemalans. As to the fighters against "international terrorism" at the White House, they still lavish aid and money on the brutal regime. Operation Diabolo is going on.

"Our Man in Jamaica"

In July 1973 the U.S. State Department was in turmoil; Michael Manley's government had declared Vincent de Roulet, the U.S. ambassador to Jamaica, persona non grata. There were hysterical calls to "teach those niggers a lesson" for daring to oust the U.S. ambassador, Washington's viceroy in that "banana republic". However, this wave of behind-the-scenes invective at the White House quickly subsided. The free and objective U.S. press said absolutely nothing on the subject.

This was so unusual that George Crile, a *Harper's Magazine* journalist, decided to look into the matter. The result was an article entitled, quite appropriately, "Our Man in Jamaica".³² Although Crile was clearly sympathetic toward de Roulet, the facts he cited were eloquent enough. De Roulet became ambassador after he donated 175,000 dollars to Richard Nixon's election campaign. After his arrival in Jamaica, de

Roulet began to blatantly interfere in the country's internal affairs, treating cabinet ministers as his servants. When voices were raised in the Hugh Shearer government advocating nationalization of the bauxite industry, controlled by U.S. and Canadian monopolies, de Roulet "took appropriate steps". He brought Shearer, the Prime Minister, to Langley, to CIA Director Richard Helms. In de Roulet's words, "I manipulated it. Yes, I brought him right into the CIA building. It gave us a chance to talk about Cuba a hell of a lot and it gave us a chance to get a hook into him."³³ Shearer became surprisingly cooperative after the talk in Langley.

But the results of the February 1972 elections left de Roulet stunned. Shearer was beaten by Michael Manley, the leader of the People's National Party. De Roulet tried to handle the new government the old way—by threatening that the CIA would overthrow Manley if he refused to be cautious and loyal. When this failed, the U.S. ambassador got down to business. He was busy organizing a coup when the Jamaican government declared him persona non grata.

Besides, the CIA had other grudges against Manley. In December 1972 Jamaica established diplomatic relations with Cuba and in March 1975, with the Soviet Union. Naturally, Washington was also concerned about U.S. investments in the Jamaican bauxite industry in view of the reforms the Manley government was contemplating. The U.S. press immediately branded Manley as a Communist, although it is common knowledge that he was a typical right-of-center Social Democrat and his party belonged to the Socialist International.

Washington applied to the Manley government the destabilization tactics used previously against

the Popular Unity government in Chile. The economy was hit hardest, above all by the refusal of the International Monetary Fund and other financial agencies to provide Jamaica with loans. This crippled Manley's economic program.

The CIA began to organize the opposition. *Psychological Warfare in the Media: the Case of Jamaica*, a book published in Kingston in 1980, takes a close look at the propaganda campaign waged against the Manley government. The conclusion is that it bore a striking resemblance to the CIA-inspired campaign in the Chilean press against the Allende government. The book describes the psychological warfare of the reactionary mass media of Jamaica as ideological terrorism aimed at confusing the population and dividing society.³⁴ In 1975-1980 the *Daily Gleaner*, Jamaica's biggest newspaper, featured hundreds of articles received from sources close to the CIA and attacking the government.

The CIA was subverting the army and the police, thus threatening the entire national liberation movement of Jamaica. In June 1980 a CIA-prepared military coup was attempted, and the putschists murdered many advocates of the revolutionary course. All told, over 600 people died at the hands of right-wing terrorists and CIA agents from January to October 1980. Jamaican security discovered that special devices, including ultrasensitive optical equipment, were installed in the U.S. embassy building. This enabled the CIA to keep all of Kingston under surveillance. U.S. intelligence established close ties with Jamaican politicians, army officers and businessmen. The CIA took a direct part in acts of violence and the propaganda campaign against the Manley government and the Left; it also financed the opposition.

Numerous cases of doctored ballots and other fraudulent tricks by the opposition were reported during the 1980 elections. Mounting tensions pushed the usually centrist social strata to the right.

The Manley government gave in: it lacked the firmness "to counter the tactics of imperialism and home reaction. Their tactics were based on economic destabilization and psychological warfare, especially through the media. Nor did these forces stop at political assassination."³⁵ As a result, the 1980 elections were won by Edward Seaga, the Jamaica Labour Party leader. In Georgetown, *The Mirror* responded with a headline reading, "CIA Destabilizers Oust Manley".³⁶

CIA Target: Grenada

On March 13, 1979 a popular revolution swept Grenada, a small Caribbean island, and ended the 25-year-old dictatorship of Eric Gairy, a U.S. imperialist puppet. A group of patriots led by Maurice Bishop, a 35-year-old lawyer, attacked the True Blue army barracks near St. George's, the island's capital. At 10 in the morning Bishop addressed the people of Grenada over the radio, calling on them to join the uprising: "We call on the people of Grenada—youth, workers, fishermen, peasants, women and the middle class—on the entire people of Grenada to join our armed revolutionary forces."³⁷ The popular uprising ended in the fall of Fort George's, Gairy's bulwark.

Eric Gairy, who drowned the country in blood, plunged it into utter economic chaos, and left only 47 dollars in the national treasury, found refuge with his U.S. sponsors. In the United States, the CIA organized an army of mercena-

ries bent on returning to Grenada led by Gairy.

In the words of Maurice Bishop, imperialist quarters in the United States are hatching plots to isolate the Grenada revolution, destabilize the situation in Grenada and overthrow the popular government. The bourgeois press is publishing incessant reports full of lies and slander about the country's current policy, accusing it of subverting the Caribbean.

The CIA scheme included a stepped-up slanderous campaign in the press, sabotage of the island's economy, and plots to assassinate Grenada leaders. Maurice Bishop's extensive interview to the Costa Rican *Nueva Sociedad* magazine in 1980 stressed the CIA's effort to launch terrorist activities and sabotage. Here is an excerpt from this interview:

"Q.: About the security (of Grenada—*Authors*) and the destabilization attempts. How do you assess modern destabilization techniques? The old ones, like armed invasion and direct violence, are no longer used as freely as the more refined methods. What are the specific destabilization policies threatening the process in Grenada?"

"A.: I think that destabilization as a science has been updated and 'improved', from the point of view of those who make use of it. Today, because the world is changing and because imperialism is no longer invincible, the tactics of direct invasion or gunboat diplomacy are no longer effective—although these major old techniques are still used these days—the governments, institutions and organizations who would like to have a government overthrown are increasingly resorting to destabilization techniques.

"To us, destabilization has three major aspects, all closely interrelated. From our viewpoint, the first aspect is destabilization through prop-

aganda. This manifests itself in the publication of slanderous and malicious articles in the national, regional and international press, with the aim of creating a false impression of what is happening in the country, that is, claiming that the people, the citizens are losing their faith, their self-confidence and their confidence in their leaders and their ability to cope with problems and conflicts. We have been affected by it, and there are still instances of this type of destabilization, quite massive in our case....

"The second aspect is economic destabilization which can take very different shapes. We have experienced the following in this respect:

"First, it has been attempted to ensure that the only airline whose planes land in Grenada should no longer do so. Second, there have been attempts to deprive us of our own currency. That was a clear case of economic pressure via the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority. This authority, based in St. Kitts, comprises nine islands in this subregion. Third, some countries from which we have traditionally imported certain goods do not deliver them on time. Those are the examples of economic destabilization and the techniques used against us....

"The third level is violent destabilization which can also take different forms—for example, the form of purely terrorist activities. It can also take the form of deliberately planning an internal coup or committing external aggression by mercenaries or possibly using the elements in Grenada who are dissatisfied with the process or perhaps directly using a foreign government or a foreign organization for this purpose. We have had experience in this regard too. In the first days of our revolution there were attempts to overthrow us, but we were able to frustrate them

very promptly, in the same way we frustrated certain individuals' attempts to destroy our revolution. More recently, we have had two attempts within three weeks—one in October and one on November 2; facts point to the involvement of a foreign government.... The CIA has worked out a plan to topple the Grenada Revolution."³⁸

The CIA plan to destabilize the Grenada government was codenamed "Pyramid". The crusade against Grenada was undertaken.

In 1981 several new conspiracies were exposed. They were aimed at physically eliminating members of Grenada's popular revolutionary government and restoring the old order. The numerous documents found on the conspirators and confessions of U.S. intelligence agents bear out the CIA's involvement and even its leading role in the sabotage and other crimes against Grenada.

After the CIA's attempts to topple the Grenada's government fell through, the US Administration took the path of open military intervention. On October 25, 1983 it sent American troops against the independent, sovereign state of Grenada. The US marines landed on the isle with the support of warships. The invasion was undertaken under the false pretext of "security" for the US citizens on the isle, although it is well known—and this was openly stated by the Grenada authorities—that they were not threatened by anyone. At the same time Washington claimed that its actions had been prompted by the "concern for human rights". What statements could be more cynical and hypocritical than those in which the right of a people to free and sovereign existence has been trampled under foot under the pretext of the "concern for human rights"! In actual fact, however, it is a matter of

direct armed aggression against the peace-loving people who has never menaced any country in the world.

The purpose of the intervention is to overthrow the present social system in Grenada, to install a new government subservient to Washington by use of force and to frighten the other freedom-loving peoples of Latin America.

Operation MCultra

The 1970s U.S. Congressional investigation of the U.S. intelligence community revealed the existence of the so-called MCultra project. "MC" stands for mind control, and "ultra" was the code name used in nazi Germany to denote work on "superweapons". One CIA document described the project's objective as developing "chemical and biological materials capable of producing human behavioral and physiological changes".³⁹

The chief objective of the MCultra project was to turn the population of the capitalist West into robots incapable of social protest. Professor David McNell, a neurologist at Michigan University, has said that society should be realigned so that each person would do from birth what society wants him or her to do, and that compared to the now available behavioral control techniques, even the hydrogen bomb is only a child's toy. According to Professor Barchas of Stanford University, "the discovery of the neuroregulators may prove as important to humanity as that [Einstein's] equation. We are on the edge of a new era".⁴⁰

Operation MCultra is directed by the CIA, the FBI, the DIA and other members of the U.S. intelligence community. According to one of the

officials in charge of the program, who has refused to identify himself, the main objective is to save the world from communism. After all, the massacres of hundreds of unarmed Guatemalan Indian peasants branded as "communist guerrillas" are nothing compared to the opportunities inherent in the MCultra program. Thus Latin America has been chosen as a testing ground for the substances and techniques developed in the CIA's secret laboratories. Official sources in the United States have declared that the MCultra program was in operation in the United States from 1953 to 1973, when it was discontinued. In fact, however, it was simply transferred to Guyana and entrusted to the CIA station there and a certain Jimmi Jones who was recruited for the purpose.

Jones founded a religious cult, the People's Temple, in the United States in the 1950s. Joined by representatives of U.S. national minorities and white Americans opposed to racial discrimination, the Temple was watched closely by the CIA and the FBI and suffered from persecution. The aim was to force the cult's members to leave the United States, so that the CIA could experiment on unsuspecting people unhampered.

In 1973, when the program was allegedly discontinued, Jones suggested to his followers that they leave the United States and move to an English-speaking country in Latin America. They chose Guyana. In 1974 the Guyanese government provided some 25,000 acres in a remote area to the People's Temple (comprising about 1,000 members). These people moved to Guyana and named their settlement Jonestown after their leader. On November 18, 1978 Jonestown became the scene of a terrible tragedy, when 914 people committed suicide. This was the official version

the CIA disseminated via the U.S. and Latin American mass media.

After a long investigation, Joseph Holsinger, an American lawyer, has concluded that the members of the People's Temple were exterminated deliberately in the course of a secret operation codenamed MCultra. Holsinger has found that Jones was an agent of the CIA in charge of experiments to perfect mind control techniques. In Jonestown, CIA men used the same methods the Directorate of Science and Technology had developed under the MCultra program: powerful narcotic drugs and chemicals, hypnotism, sleep deprivation, special diets, brainwashing sessions, etc. The ultimate goal was to completely erode generally accepted moral principles among the cult's members and turn them into willing tools of Jones, a CIA agent.

Some other papers written on the People's Temple (specifically, the one by Mark Lane of the United States) maintain that the cult was virtually a socialist group and that the CIA heaped slander on it for the "revolutionary" suicide of its members. But evidence supplied by survivors points to a different conclusion. Many survivors have reported that Jones maintained contacts with the U.S. embassy in Brazil and with Richard McKoy, a CIA operative in Guyana. Jones' morals can be easily deduced from his criminal record, the use of torture in Jonestown (even children were tortured) and sexual perversions. *El Tiempo*, a Colombian newspaper, has justly remarked that Jones was deliberately destroying all normal human relations, including family ties.⁴¹

When relatives of these human guinea pigs learned about what was happening in the Temple, they asked Congressman Leo Ryan, in whose

constituency the cult used to operate, to look into charges that Jones and his henchmen were keeping people in the Temple against their will. Together with a group of newsmen, Ryan left for Jonestown and there apparently succeeded in gathering exhaustive information. That was when the first act of the tragedy occurred. On November 18, 1978 "persons unknown", later identified as CIA agents, mowed down Ryan, his three companions and Patricia Parks, a defector from the cult, on an airfield.

The experiment was no longer a secret, and a quick cover-up was in order. After the congressman's assassination, the CIA decided to stage a mass "suicide". Subsequent investigation has revealed that many "suicide cases" in Jonestown were actually shot at point-blank range or strangled. Who was responsible for that? Let us remember that Jones had a security service under a certain Joseph Wils, who disappeared "mysteriously" together with his men after the Jonestown events.

Apparently, the CIA decided to get rid of Jones (his body was found among the victims). A faked tape recording of these unfortunates' last moments was produced:

"Jones: . . . You be kind to the children and be kind to seniors, and take the potion like they used to take in ancient Greece, because we are not committing suicide—it's a revolutionary act. . . .

"Woman: O.K. There's nothing to worry about. Everybody keep calm and try and keep your children calm. Let the little children in and reassure them. . . . They're not crying from pain; it's just a little bitter-tasting.

"Jones: Let's get gone. Let's get gone. We tried to find a new beginning. But it's too late."

The finale of the tragedy was quite revealing. As soon as the news of the Jonestown massacre became public, the CIA moved to cover up its tracks. The bodies were promptly airlifted by U.S. Air Force planes to the United States in specially provided sacks and quickly cremated, despite protests of relatives, under the pretext that they constituted a "social hazard". The CIA killed two birds with one stone: first, it is now impossible to confirm the version of the Guyanese police who were the first to arrive at the scene and determined that many Temple members had been shot or strangled—contrary to the CIA version claiming they had taken "the potion like in ancient Greece". Second—and that is even more important—it is impossible to identify the type and concentration of the special chemicals used in the CIA experiment. Photographs taken by Guyanese security indicate that Jones was killed by several shots in the back fired from a short distance. Evidently, at the last moment the "revolutionary preacher" refused to commit the "revolutionary act" and tried to escape.

Notably, despite demands by the Guyanese public insisting on an international investigation, the country's government took no steps to ascertain the truth. Moreover, the Georgetown *Mirror* is convinced this truth is hidden deliberately from the people.⁴² In 1979 a new sect from the United States arrived in Guyana—the House of Israel under a certain "rabbi Edward Emmanuel Washington". The "rabbi" told *The New York Times* that his followers were ready to die for their beliefs.⁴³ So there is every reason to assume that the experiment is still going on.

Psychological Operations

The unremitting terror, the gross violations of human rights, the assassinations and torture of dissenters long practiced in Latin America under the guidance and with direct participation of the CIA need a smokescreen. This function is performed by the CIA's psychological operations in Latin America.

Anticommunist propaganda is accompanied by crude demagoguery and slander aimed against the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist community, against progressive Latin American regimes and all advocates of social progress and national liberation. The U.S. ruling quarters and their allies in Latin America refer openly to their plans to preserve or establish control over areas "of vital importance" to the West by any means, including armed force. The intention is proclaimed to resist social and other domestic changes there.

Propaganda clears the way for imperialist policies, trying to whitewash them and justify imperialist crimes. The foremost propaganda effort is centered on the "Soviet threat" myth—from inventions about the "threat" to Western ideals to the bugbear of imminent armed invasion and the alleged "runaway" military buildup by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Another propaganda effort is Washington's noisy and slanderous campaign over "Soviet involvement in international terrorism". The American press itself admits that this drive is geared to expand the scope of the alleged "Soviet threat to U.S. interests". The United States' oppression of Latin American peoples is passed off as a response to the "forays of international communism", as a struggle against "international ter-

rorism". Anticommunism, this ideological and political weapon of imperialism, has been used widely in Latin America.

Playing on people's fears and fomenting mass psychoses to stifle social protest is a favorite technique of imperialist propaganda. The stream of hysterical and malicious slander in the bourgeois mass media over the developments in El Salvador is a case in point.

The Latin American mass media have traditionally used various CIA-supplied cliches to extoll the United States and everything related to it—"the free world", "the land of unlimited opportunity", "welfare society", "democracy for all" and the like. Cliches concerning socialist countries have a different ring to them: "totalitarian regimes", "the Iron Curtain", "the long arm of Moscow", "subversion", "red propaganda", "the menace from the East", "international terrorism", etc. Bourgeois propaganda invariably describes progressive movements, organizations, trade unions and their activists as "antipatriotic", "red" (the milder version is "pink"), "playing into the hands of the enemy", as "communist stooges" and so on. CIA-prepared radio programs on international issues destined for Latin America usually refer to communist "ultimatums", "saber rattling", "missile threat" or "human rights violations". Soviet peace initiatives are dismissed as a "rehash of old proposals", while U.S. plans, even those aimed at securing unilateral advantages, are hailed as "firm", "constructive", etc. Labels are also pinned on certain Latin American leaders. Those openly advocating improved relations with the Soviet Union, greater international security and cooperation are presented as "Moscow's stooges", "incorrigible liberals", "idealists", "naive" and "procommunist"

politicians. Specifically, these terms were applied to President José Lopez Portillo of Mexico whom the U.S. Congress branded as a "procommunist". *Uno más uno*, a Mexican newspaper, referred to this unprecedented attack as a "syndrome of paranoia" among U.S. Congressmen.⁴⁴

CIA propaganda takes different forms. Latin American audiences are fed a mixture of truths, half-truths and distorted truths ("gray" propaganda) and often outright lies ("black" propaganda)—all presented as fully authentic. The most frequent "black" propaganda trick is to attribute certain information to a nonexistent source or to ascribe a lie to an actual person or organization. For example, in Chile the leaflets against the Allende government written by the staff of the CIA station were distributed on behalf of Chile Jóven, a fictitious organization.

"Black" propaganda also uses provocative statements—usually calling on the population to rise against the newly installed government in order to provoke and justify government reprisals against Communists. The CIA is constantly engaged in a propaganda effort to picture Latin American communist parties as cabals allegedly financed and directed from Moscow and alien to the national interests of their countries. It is enough to brand this or that Latin American figure as a Communist to trigger hostility toward him among certain population strata. That was the technique the CIA used against Arbenz in Guatemala, Bosch and Caamaño in the Dominican Republic, Goulart in Brazil, Frondizi in Argentina and many other statesmen who had never been Communists or even communist sympathizers.

Here is an excerpt from Philip Agee's interview to *Granma*:

"Q.: Does the U.S. Government's accusation to the effect that Cuba has sent a special force to fight in El Salvador remind you of any similar operation conducted by the CIA when you were an official of its stations in Quito and Montevideo?"

"A.: It was a classical propaganda technique. In the years when I was with the CIA in the 1950s and the 1960s, to use lies in order to allegedly prove the links of a revolutionary movement in this or that country with Cuba or the Soviet Union. We used it practically daily when I was with the CIA.

"Q.: Is there any specific case you could cite as an example?"

"A.: Yes, there are several. One interesting case in which I took part occurred in 1963, when a new revolutionary group was organized in Ecuador. By wiretapping telephones we learned enough about what they were doing. One of the leaders of this movement (Flores—*Authors*) went to Cuba, or at least we thought he was going to Cuba from the information we received. While he was away we faked a document of this organization which was 80 or 90 percent authentic but to which we added expressions of gratitude to Cuba for the money, training and arms Cuba had supplied to that movement, which was a lie. But that was the connection we wanted to see in the press, appearing in the form of a report by this leader to the Cuban authorities describing the progress of his organization.

"To make use of this document we put it in a toothpaste tube. We squeezed out the toothpaste and inserted the report. I gave the report which I myself had written to the Treasury Minister who was my friend... we used to play golf almost every Sunday.

"Q.: What was this minister's name?

"A.: It was Juan Sevilla. He gave the report to Carlos Rendón Chiriboga, the customs chief at the airport. Rendón waited for Flores' arrival. . . . He had the tube in his shirt. . . . He planted the tube in Flores' suitcase, then 'discovered' it and immediately arrested Flores.

"Later the Treasury passed the report to President Carlos Julio Arosemena who felt friendly toward Cuba. For a long time Arosemena refused to break relations with Cuba, but a military revolt, also instigated by the CIA, forced him to sever relations shortly before his overthrow. Three or four days later I got a call from the Interior Minister; we met and he gave me the report asking me to examine it and see whether it appeared authentic. 'Sir,' I said, 'leave the report with me for two or three days so all of us at the CIA station can analyze it.' I waited out a while and told him, 'Sir, we all agree this is really an authentic document', and I suggested he release it to the press.

"Then nothing happened for four or five days. From an agent we had in the government I learned that the report was considered to be too damaging because it meant that that movement had infiltrated the government. . . . That was why Arosemena did not want it to be made public. So I gave a copy of the report to a journalist from *El Comercio*, the biggest Quito daily, who had been on our payroll, and he published the report. It was a tremendous sensation throughout the country, reprinted in Guayaquil and in provincial newspapers, and in less than a month a military coup ousted Arosemena. We had it our way. . . .

"We acted almost the same way in Uruguay, and then there was the case of forged documents

in Peru which secured the severance of relations between President Prado's government and Cuba." 45

During the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 imperialism used the "communist threat" bugbear and referred to members of the Caamaño nationalist government as "Communists". UPI and AP reported that the streets of Santo Domingo were strewn with the bodies of people killed by Communists and that a group of "53 diehard Communists" organized terrorist acts, raids on churches and embassies and firebombings of historic sites. But when the list of this group's members was printed in virtually every Latin American newspaper and broadcast repeatedly over the radio, it turned out that the CIA had been too hasty: the list included the names of infants and people long dead. Those Western newsmen who wanted to corroborate the CIA invention failed to unearth a single fact or even a hint of any atrocities committed by "diehard Communists". Instead, they found that U.S. soldiers executed captured patriots.

U.S. propaganda in Latin America is particularly feverish at the time of Presidential elections in the region, when everything is put into action to ensure victory for the man supported by the White House and the local reactionaries. During the Presidential elections in Chile the vast U.S. propaganda machine was doing its utmost to convince people that a Popular Unity victory would spell the end of the nation. Voters were told all kinds of lies about communism and the "sinister" intentions of the Left. Shopkeepers and artisans were assured that the Allende regime would ban private trade and close their workshops. Landless peasants were advised that the Communists would nationalize their livestock,

while owners of small plots were told their land and property would be confiscated.

Chilean radio stations frequently broadcast the sounds of machine-gun fire followed by a woman's piercing scream "They killed my son! The Communists killed my son!" and then came the announcer's knowing voice: "Communism can offer only blood and suffering."

Everywhere one could see wallposters with a picture of a "Cuban worker" allegedly confessing to a priest just before execution. The caption read, "Chileans! If Allende wins ... will this happen in Chile?" and claimed this was an "authentic photograph".* The CIA commissioned Orbe Publishers to produce *Allende Has Won*, a book depicting the victory of the Left as the blackest pit of hell.

On the eve of the election day *El Mercurio*, a newspaper owned by the Edwards family of Chilean millionaires, featured a composite photograph of a Soviet tank with a hammer and sickle and "USSR" stenciled on it in huge letters in front of La Moneda, the Presidential palace. The caption was, "The government of communist stooges will throw Chile open to these tanks, and they will crush our most sacred possession—FREEDOM." It was signed Chile Joven (Young Chile).

The frantic psychological assault on the voters lasted for three months. Reactionary Chilean newspapers and periodicals poured out a steady stream of similar composite photos and notices. Posters, leaflets and the like literally flooded Chilean cities. *El Mercurio* and *Tercera de la*

* *El Siglo*, the Chilean communist newspaper, discovered that the photograph had been taken under the Batista regime. Still, the poster continued to be printed in huge quantities.

Hora serialized "memoirs of a former Kremlin agent" which read like a maniac's ravings.

Acting through Orbe Publishers, the CIA printed a mass market pamphlet on the "Kunakov archive", advertising it as authentic evidence of "Soviet espionage in Chile". Subsequently, it turned out that the "Kunakov archive" was an almost literal translation of a U.S. spy thriller.

The CIA also played on religious feelings. Hundreds of thousands of anticommunist leaflets were scattered across Chilean cities and villages. The leaflets bore the likeness of Our Lady of Carmen and the inscription "Our Holy Lady of Carmen, Ruler and Patron of Chile, save us from godless communism."

The Andalien advertising agency acted with particular zeal during the 1970 Presidential elections in Chile. In June alone, Andalien arranged for 40 Chilean radio stations and 22 newspapers to broadcast and print anticommunist features, mailed 100,000 pamphlets and as many copies of the *Palmada en la frente* satirical periodical, and launched the *Ideas* magazine full of anti-Soviet articles and dirty gossip.

Andalien's confidential documents, which found their way into the hands of the Left, disclosed the company's close links to the CIA, the real architect of the psychological terror campaign in Chile. Andalien spent a huge sum of 2.2 million dollars a month for this purpose. Its account books showed that the money had been provided by ITT, Anaconda Copper, the Bank of America, the First National City Bank of New York, the Sociedad ganadera de Tierra del Fuego, the biggest agricultural company in Chile, and the financiers Edwards, Alessandri and Matte. One third of the sum was supplied by the Edsell Foundation, a CIA front.

CIA propaganda uses various massive brain washing methods against Latin Americans, relying mostly on affecting ill-informed, prejudiced and ignorant people and their weaknesses. The tools include the entire range of Dr. Goebbels' tricks—lies, rumors, falsification, biased presentation of facts, constant repetition of a lie.

It all centers primarily on oversimplified and misrepresented stereotype notions of communism and other social phenomena. The chief method is to affect emotions in order to provoke a definite reaction.

A prominent role in psychological operations in Latin America belongs to the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

A network of USIA branches has spanned the region. Essentially, they are brainwashing factories. One building often houses a library, a printing shop, a screening room, exhibitions, courses of English and editorial offices of various bulletins and periodicals.

First and foremost, however, USIA uses the radio, specifically the Voice of America, the center of ideological sabotage. As much as 60 percent of VOA foreign language broadcasting time is reserved for Latin America. Besides, tape recordings of these broadcasts are rebroadcast daily by 1,500 Latin American radio stations.

Television also plays an important part in pro-American propaganda. Latin American television stations have been divided among three U.S. networks—ABC, NBC and CBS. ABC alone controls 64 television stations in 16 Latin American countries. ABC has established the Central American Television Network, which has enabled it to control most television stations in Central

America, and then united large television stations throughout the continent in the Latin American Television International Network Organization. About 80 percent of all Latin American television programs are produced in the United States, and most are anti-Soviet and anticommunist. Propaganda films are of special importance to USIA. NBC has acquired shares in the television stations of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile and Argentina.

Information on foreign affairs is supplied to the Latin American press mostly by UPI and AP, the largest U.S. news agencies. Besides, they provide 75 to 90 percent of reports on international and Latin American developments published in the newspapers and periodicals of Central and South America.⁴⁶ The United States Information Agency also offers (free of charge) biased, anticommunist information on international events to the local press.

USIA and the CIA control most of these countries' press through commercial advertising. The ten major agencies of the United States are in complete control of the Latin American advertising market. McCann-Ericksson, an advertising agency with branches in all Latin American countries, has an annual business turnover of more than 70 million dollars. McCann-Ericksson has completely monopolized advertising in Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. Earnings from commercial advertising usually make up 60 to 85 percent of the budget of most Latin American newspapers and periodicals, and since over 70 per cent of advertising comes from U.S. companies, the press is directly dependent on them. It follows that the United States is free to eliminate publications it does not like by depriving

them of financial contributions and to replace them with organs supporting U.S. policy and ideology. The situation is similar with regard to television. In Venezuela, for example, television commercials are the exclusive domain of the Venezuelan Federation of Advertising Agencies and the National Association. The former is financed by General Electric, Firestone and other U.S. companies. The biggest shareholder in the latter is the Sears, Roebuck and Co., with its chain of big department stores in many Latin American countries.

Of the ten foreign advertising agencies behind the so-called Brazilian Advertising Association, nine are American. Financed by the Ford Motor Company, General Electric, Coca-Cola, Mobil Oil do Brazil and others, they direct the way economic, political and financial issues are covered on Brazilian television.

USIA and CIA influence on the local media expands greatly the scope of U.S. propaganda impact on the Latin American audience. Using USIA materials, the Latin American mass media are also able to influence people usually suspicious of U.S.-manufactured propaganda by presenting it as a "national" product. USIA has organized over 100 "friendship societies" and "binational centers" in Latin America, also for propaganda purposes.

The U.S. State Department and USIA control or finance a number of major periodicals published in the United States and distributed in Latin America: *Life*, *Visión*, *Selecciones de Reader's Digest*, *Americas* and other magazines. The Latin American publishing industry is actually in the hands of the Hearst Corporation, the Western Publishing Company, Walt Disney Productions, Reader's Digest and the Time-Life group.

USIA and the CIA publish numerous magazines, pamphlets and books. USIA's three publishing centers in Mexico City, Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro produce over two million copies of 250 to 300 books and pamphlets a year. Most of the anticommunist literature in Latin America is turned out either by local publishers financed by the CIA and USIA or by front organizations of the U.S. intelligence community.

"Research"

The passengers of the December 22, 1964 Pan American flight from the United States to Chile included a certain Hugo Nutini, an Italian by extraction, a Chilean by birth, and a U.S. citizen since 1963. Known to the Chilean academic community as a specialist on the Indian question, he was in fact an agent of the CIA, recruited while he had still been a Chilean national. Officially, the purpose of his visit was to spend Christmas with his father Gino Nutini, a resident of Los Andes, a small town near the capital. Of course, Hugo Nutini was glad to meet with his colleagues from the University of Chile, introducing himself as coordinator of a sociological survey the National Foundation, a private agency, planned to conduct in Chile. Nutini inquired whether his Chilean colleagues would agree to take part in the survey—for a lavish fee.

Hugo Nutini's scholarly contacts in Chile ended in a surprise for the CIA. A Chilean researcher forwarded a photostat of the "sociological questionnaire" to the newspaper *El Siglo*, and a resounding scandal broke out. The reason is clear from the text of the questionnaire published in *El Siglo* on June 12, 1965. The document, prepared

by Pentagon intelligence and codenamed Plan Camelot, had an introduction and four sections A, B, C and D. The introduction outlined the purpose of the survey—to identify the causes of the “internal war” and suggest appropriate recommendations. The authors of Plan Camelot defined “internal war” as mass revolutionary action, no matter whether peaceful or armed. The desire to “change the existing system” was listed as the key indication of “internal war”. The program, expected to cost six million dollars, was to be completed in three and a half years.

Section A contained a detailed program for analyzing the conditions leading to “internal war” and Section B, a selection of specific types of government action in such situation. U.S. analysts mapped out the government’s course of action in case of revolution, guerrilla operations, armed uprising, refusal by a part of the state apparatus to obey the central executive authority, general strike, etc. Section C called for the development of a mathematical model capable of identifying the type of domestic political situation and recommending the measures necessary to control it fully. Finally, Section D offered a remarkable mathematical model of a potential “internal war”.

A look at the composition of Plan Camelot is sufficient to realize it was an intelligence document. But the quarrel between the State Department and the Pentagon reported in the American press yielded even more amazing details. The U.S. State Department declared that the scandal over Plan Camelot in Chile was caused by “misconceptions”, that it was a routine research project and that the State Department had absolutely nothing to do with it. Ralph Duncan, the U.S. ambassador to Chile, even claimed that he

had first learned about Plan Camelot from *El Siglo*.

The attempt of the State Department to get off scot-free and put the blame on the Defense Department incensed the Pentagon. An official statement disclosed that, first, the State Department and the U.S. ambassador to Chile were fully aware of Plan Camelot because State Department intelligence officers had taken part in its elaboration and implementation and that, second, they financed the plan jointly with the Pentagon.

On December 17, 1965 the U.S. Defense Department stated officially its intention to continue with the elaboration of various measures to enable military and other government agencies to influence the process of social change. Lieutenant General William Dick of the DIA said, quite explicitly, that projects of the Camelot type would provide the Defense Department with all the necessary information on the area of potential operations. Lieutenant General A. Batts, also a high-level official of the DIA, added, while addressing the Senate Appropriations Committee, that the chief purpose of Plan Camelot was to prepare recommendations on suppressing international communist subversion in Chile.

The investigation of the Camelot case by a Chilean Chamber of Deputies commission of inquiry revealed that the CIA staff officer Hugo Nutini was coordinator of the plan in Chile, and his assistant Rex Hopper was in charge of the CIA- and DIA-financed Special Operations Research Office at the American University in Washington.

The plan was put into operation in Chile in August 1964, with experts from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and at least six other U.S. universities taking part. A DIA re-

search team conducted a survey among the high-ranking officers of the Chilean armed forces. One of the questionnaires said in the foreword that its purpose was to study Chile's armed forces in order to better understand, of all things, their links to the people. The foreword was followed by 41 questions, their subjects ranging from the reasons why the person surveyed chose to join the armed forces to whether he considered it proper for civic authority to be superior to the military, which political party he belonged to or sympathized with, to a very revealing question reading: "A survey of a representative cross-section of the Chilean population has demonstrated the civilians' strong faith that the military will defend the Constitution should it be violated. In what circumstances do you believe the military should act in this matter?" In conclusion, the interviewee was asked to give information on his biography and qualifications, name his relatives serving in the armed forces or the police, indicate whether he had been abroad and to what country. Under Plan Camelot, civilians were also surveyed to ascertain their attitude to the armed forces. Unlike the army questionnaire, this one was made anonymous—the Americans did not ask the subject's name, place of employment or occupation. The DIA experts were interested in the interviewee's sources of information about the army (friends, relatives, the press, the radio, personal ties, etc.), in his assessment of its role in politics, and in his opinion of which social strata most army officers belonged to, whether Chile's neighbors were likely to attack her, the circumstances in which the military should assume power and why the army had not made any serious attempts in this direction over the past 25 to 30 years.

U.S. experts also inquired into broader issues. They distributed a questionnaire with 352 questions on 72 pages among students. Detailed information was solicited from each student, up to a question about his paternal grandfather's occupation, politics, religion and other views. The questionnaire was obviously aimed at starting a police file on each subject.

The Center of Socio-Economic Studies created with Ford Foundation money at the University of Chile distributed two equally detailed questionnaires in Santiago de Chile. The first was 190 questions long, the second one, shorter by two thirds. The range of the questions was phenomenal. Question 23: "Would there be class struggle if all the employers treated their workers as members of one big family, looking after their needs and taking disciplinary action whenever necessary?" Question 32 included the following brilliant statement: "What the country needs is neither socialism nor a utopian 'third system without socialism or capitalism' but a series of social reforms and a more adequate planning system which would help build strong and viable capitalism in Chile." Question 101: "Should foreigners who come to Chile to criticize or interfere in politics be deported?"

The authors of the questionnaires were especially interested in the Chileans' attitude to communism. Numerous questions were asked about their views of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, of the economic and social achievements, the status of workers, women and the church under socialism. Question 123: "True democrats should not support communism, should they?" Question 124: "Communists have no morals. Do they advocate free love?" Question 130: "Communists care nothing about our country's

prosperity and merely crave power to use it to Russia's advantage: true or false?" Next question: "The Chileans' principal task is to frustrate a Marxist victory and suppress international communism: true or false?" And so on and so forth.

On December 16, 1965 the Chilean Chamber of Deputies condemned "interference by foreign organizations in our internal affairs". Caught red-handed, the U.S. Defense Department announced arrogantly, on December 17 (see above), that it would go on with its spying operations. True, the U.S. State Department declared that Plan Camelot in Chile was being discontinued. In actual fact, the Pentagon and the CIA immediately delegated responsibility for it to the U.S.-Chilean Public Relations Institute they had set up in Santiago de Chile.

As a result, the U.S. intelligence community succeeded in collecting all the information it needed on the Chilean political situation against the possible victory of the Left. Long before the bloody fascist coup of September 11, 1973, Operation Chile was rehearsed at the U.S. Center for International Conflicts Settlement in the course of war games attended by top Pentagon, CIA and State Department officials. The rehearsal was based on the information collected under Plan Camelot. The specific information on the Chileans' political preferences solicited in the numerous American questionnaires was also put to practical use. The man-hunt which began in Chile after the fascist military coup has been conducted in accordance with the lists compiled by the CIA and the DIA and the information collected and processed in the course of Plan Camelot.

Plan Camelot was by no means unique. The Pentagon has spent over 40 million dollars on sim-

ilar ventures in Latin America. They have been conducted in virtually every capitalist country of the region following the Camelot pattern—in Peru (Plan Colony), Colombia (Simpático), Argentina (Job 430), Bolivia (Andes), Mexico (IRA), Brazil (IRI) and so on. All were carried out under the aegis of the DIA and the RAND Corporation, created by U.S. Air Force Intelligence in 1964 to do research for the Pentagon.

All these programs are camouflaged skillfully as public opinion polls ostensibly conducted by civilian (at least by name) agencies; the American University in Washington usually is involved too.

The information is collated and analyzed by the DIA under the TEMPER program drawn up by the RAND Corporation for all of Latin America. TEMPER has been essentially devised to determine the parameters of crisis thresholds (i. e., the intensity of a given crisis) in the target countries and to plan the response of the Pentagon and the CIA. This means that the DIA and CIA "academic" research in Latin America is in fact purely pragmatic. U.S. imperialism needs to know precisely where terrorism can be stepped up by Washington's local stooges like Pinochet or Duvalier, and where the situation calls for interference by U.S. Green Berets, paratroopers or Marines.

OPERATION CHILE

"Mission accomplished. La Moneda taken
President dead."

General *Xavier Palacios*,
September 11, 1973¹

"Do you believe that Chile has definitively
escaped the Marxist menace?"

"In September 1973 we were facing a coun-
try profoundly affected by Marxist Soviet
aggression. I cannot offer easy recipes for
fighting Marxism-Leninism, but I am con-
vinced that it is the inescapable duty of all
those who want to see Chile great and free."

Augusto Pinochet in an inter-
view to the *Ercilla* magazine,
March 1981²

Prologue

The "academic" research done under Plan Camelot led DIA analysts to conclude that the 1970 elections would be won by the candidate of the Left. The Pentagon maintained that only armed interference would be able to "save Chile from going communist". The CIA's leaders held similar views, proceeding from what their station reported from Santiago de Chile. And only State Department Intelligence maintained that the opposite was true that 74-year-old Jorge Alessandri would become President. Following a series of sessions of the 40 Committee in the fall of 1969, CIA Director Richard Helms instructed Henry Heckscher, the CIA station chief in the Chilean capital, to render all possible support to Alessandri and to oppose the intention of the Left to create a joint coalition and nominate its own Presidential candidate.

The decision was forced on Helms. As CIA documents revealed later, in June 1969 the Santiago station received a confidential directive on stepping up work among the high-ranking army and police officers and ascertaining how they felt about staging a coup in case a "Marxist government" assumed power. Heckscher assured his superiors that there were forces in the Chilean army ready to act. The CIA station decided to stage a show of strength to prove its worth, acting through its agent, General Roberto Viaux.

In September 1969, during a parade to mark the day of Chilean independence, some army officers made a show of refusing to salute the President. On October 24 General Viaux led the mutiny of the Tacna artillery regiment in the capital. Simultaneously, his supporters tried to push the garrison of San Felipe, a town near Santiago, into action. However, troops loyal to the government succeeded in resuming control. On December 16, Viaux was court-martialed and sentenced to be deported. But he refused to leave the country and continued his subversive activities. The general had powerful friends in the CIA.

Viaux made propaganda tours of army garrisons declaiming that Chile was suffering from a deadly disease, that surgery—an extreme but warranted method—was required, and that the army alone could save Chile from "international communism". Viaux had enough money: the CIA paid him handsomely. Unfortunately, there was no shortage of willing listeners either.

A long-established Chilean myth maintained that the army never interfered in politics, that everything had always happened peacefully and constitutionally, and that the armed forces were the guarantors of the Constitution. In actual fact, over the 150 years of independence up to 1970

Chile had gone through four civil wars and about ten coups.

With their goals in view, the DIA and the CIA assiduously courted the elite of the Chilean armed forces. In late 1969 three Pentagon generals were having lunch with four Chilean army officers in a Washington suburb. The host was Colonel Gerardo López Angulo, the Chilean Air Force attaché in the United States. The luncheon was given in honor of General Carlos Toro Mazote, chief of the Air Force academy, who arrived to tour similar facilities in the United States. The conversation turned to the forthcoming elections in September 1970. When the dessert had been served, an American general asked what the Chilean army would do should Allende win. General Toro replied: "In half an hour we'll capture La Moneda, even if we have to burn it."

Others at the table included General Ernesto Baeza, chief of Chilean army intelligence who later directed the storming of La Moneda and ordered to have it burned, Air Force General Sergio Figueroa Gutierrez, whose planes bombed La Moneda, and Admiral Arturo Troncoso, who led the September 11, 1973 naval mutiny and the capture of Valparaiso (this was the signal for Operation Chile to begin).

Obviously, CIA activities in Chile in the 1960s were aimed at creating a system which could be put into action in an "emergency"—if Salvador Allende became President.

The CIA attached considerable importance to right-wing terrorist organizations. American intelligence had established links with Chilean fascists in the late 1940s. In 1947 the CIA set up the Chilean Anticommunist Movement which raided progressive organizations and assassinated leaders of left-wing political parties. The move-

ment's leaders were Sergio Onofre Harpa, René Silva and Francisco Búlne. Onofre was a Conservative Party activist and a close friend of the Edwards millionaires. He willingly became a CIA agent. René Silva, who worked for *El Mercurio*, the Edwards' biggest newspaper, had been the fuhrer of the local nazis from the Chilean National Socialist Movement in the 1930s. Like Onofre, he later became a paid agent of the CIA. Francisco Búlne, of the Búlne banker family (partners of the Alessandri-Matte family), urged physical "extermination of Marxists".

Notably, the nazis from the Chilean National Socialist Movement formed the backbone of the Chilean Anticommunist Movement and two other reactionary organizations the CIA created in Chile in the 1960s—Chile Libre and the Family and Property Protection Federation. A short time later CIA money revived the Chilean National Socialist Party under Franz Pfeiffer.

On March 25, 1970 the 40 Committee held a session to discuss preparations for the elections in Chile and the overall political situation there. The committee approved a psychological campaign plan against the Left coalition and to discredit Allende personally; the sum detailed for this purpose was one million dollars. Generally, the campaign was to follow the pattern used by the CIA to ensure victory for Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democratic leader, in 1964.

The plan was to undermine Popular Unity from within, split the coalition and force the Radical Party to leave it. The CIA, the report entitled *Covert Action in Chile* said, used black propaganda to sow discord between Communists and Socialists and between the national trade union federation and the Communist Party of Chile.³

On April 10, 1970 CIA Director Richard Helms received a delegation of the Council of the Americas, a powerful organization comprising representatives of the biggest U.S. monopolies operating in Latin America. The delegation was led by President Jay Parkinson of Anaconda, with interests in the Chilean copper-mining industry. In May the CIA Director received John McCone who served on the board of directors of ITT, a military-industrial corporation, and who had been CIA Director in 1961-1963. These U.S. tycoons said they were concerned about the possibility that events in Chile would take an undesirable turn and urged the CIA to put things right. They also offered to the CIA a special fund of several million dollars to be used against Salvador Allende and the Popular Unity parties. According to *Covert Action in Chile*, "the CIA turned down ITT's proposal to make funds available for CIA transmission to Alessandri but did provide the company advice on how to pass money to Alessandri. Some \$350,000 of ITT money was passed to Alessandri during the campaign—\$250,000 to his campaign and \$100,000 to the National Party. About another \$350,000 came from other U.S. businesses."⁴

On June 27 the 40 Committee held another meeting on Chile. By that time U.S. intelligence had conducted two parallel polls in Santiago de Chile to predict the outcome of the Presidential elections to be held in September. The CIA concluded from its poll that Alessandri would receive 42 percent of the votes and win. State Department intelligence also deduced a victory for Alessandri from its own survey, but expected him to win 40 percent of the votes. Under the Chilean Constitution, should neither candidate win an absolute majority of votes, the question of the Pres-

idency is decided in the Congress, and the candidate who wins more votes there is elected. U.S. intelligence asked the 40 Committee for additional appropriations to bribe Chilean Congressmen so as to ensure Alessandri's victory. Henry Kissinger, then the President's assistant for national security, spoke sharply at the meeting: "I don't see why we have to let a country go Marxist just because its people are irresponsible."⁵

On August 7, 1970 the 40 Committee again held a detailed discussion of the situation in Chile and decided to allocate an additional 1.8 million dollars to mount covert operations against Popular Unity and Allende.

The elections held on September 4, 1970 belied the U.S. intelligence surveys and forecasts. Allende won the election by receiving 37 percent of the votes against Alessandri's 35 percent and Radomiro Tomić's 28 percent (the Christian Democratic candidate).

The mass media in the United States and most Latin American countries presented Allende's victory as a triumph of "international communism". U.S. periodicals carried editorials under very revealing titles: "Chile: Another Cuba?" in *U.S. News & World Report*, "Chile: A Marxist at the Top" in *Newsweek*, "Fidel Was Glad: Salvador Allende Winner" in the *National Review*. A classified USIA directive circulated among the agency's local offices throughout the world said that "the United States have vital interests in Chile" and that the "Allende victory represents a definite psychological setback to the United States and a definite psychological advance for the Marxist idea".

Two Tracks

U.S. imperialism and the local oligarchy could not reconcile themselves to the Popular Unity victory which installed the Socialist Salvador Allende in La Moneda. They could not and did not want to allow the people to become masters of their own future and build a society without exploitation.

On September 8, 14 and 15, 1970 the 40 Committee and the U.S. National Security Council held closed meetings in the White House to decide what was to be done about Chile. At the September 8 meeting CIA Director Richard Helms said that action against Allende taken via the Chilean Congress would hardly be effective and that after his inauguration the opposition would soon disintegrate. Therefore Helms insisted on "armed action" as soon as possible. He was supported by Henry Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell.

Since the question was a complicated one it was decided to ask the U.S. embassy in Chile to assess carefully the pros and cons of a U.S.-assisted coup and of organizing an opposition to Allende in Chile. On September 12 Ambassador Edward Korry replied to the 40 Committee that he doubted the feasibility of a military coup in the immediate future. At the September 14 meeting it was decided that the CIA should take all the necessary steps to prevent Allende's inauguration as President of Chile. "On September 15, 1970," a U.S. Congressional report on intelligence activities said, "President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to the United States. The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a direct role in organiz-

ing a military coup d'état in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency. The Agency was to take this action without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile." ⁶

On September 15, the third meeting on Chile was held in the White House, attended by President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms and Attorney General John Mitchell. Helms made brief notes of the President's instructions: "1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile! ... worth spending ... not concerned risks involved ... no involvement of Embassy ... \$10,000,000 available, more if necessary ... full-time job—best men we have ... game plan ... make the economy scream ... 48 hours for plan of action." ⁷

Thus the White House decided to bar Salvador Allende from La Moneda. Since the task was complicated and sensitive, it was to be tackled on "two tracks".

Operation Track I was entrusted to the U.S. embassy in Chile and several other U.S. agencies, including the CIA. "Late at night on Tuesday (Sept. 15) Ambassador Edward Korry received at last a message from the State Department," a classified letter from ITT in Chile said, "giving him the go-ahead to act in the name of President Nixon. The message gave him maximum authority to do everything possible—except for a Dominican Republic type of action—to prevent Allende from taking power." ⁸

Operation Track I proceeded from an alternative between keeping Allende out of the presidential palace by "constitutional means" and staging a coup. The plan envisaged cooperation with Frei or, at the very least, his tacit consent.

Under the Track II plan, the CIA was to prepare the coup without Frei and in absolute secrecy, without informing either the U.S. ambassador or the State Department or even the 40 Committee which authorized covert operations.

In its elaboration of Track I the White House tried to accommodate the interests of the Chilean oligarchy to the greatest extent possible; this oligarchy believed that on October 24 the Chilean Congress would elect Alessandri and not Allende. On September 7 an ITT intelligence officer wrote to the board of directors: "The Alessandri faction has not surrendered. In a very confidential and private session on Sunday afternoon with Dr. Arturo Matte, Alessandri's brother-in-law and his closest advisor, I was briefed on their strategy: They are somehow expecting the electoral tribunal to show that the official vote recount favored Alessandri, not Allende, and that President Frei will support this decision. The armed forces, most of whose leaders are pro-Alessandri, would be expected to support Frei."⁹

A "military solution" to the Chilean problem was also discussed at the meeting. Matte said: "The armed forces are agreed on the extreme danger to democracy that Allende's assumption of power involves. They agree he must be stopped. However, the armed forces leadership and Frei prefer a constitutional way out (i.e., congressional election of Alessandri) that doesn't preclude violence—spontaneous or provoked. A constitutional solution, for instance, could result from massive internal disorders, strikes, urban and rural warfare. This would morally justify an armed forces intervention for an indefinite period."¹⁰ Besides, "the Alessandri camp is fully aware of the consequences of such a maneuver—a bloodbath. . . . Dr. Matte, acknowledg-

ing this, said this was necessary to prevent communism from taking over the country."¹¹

On September 14, the Chilean banker Augusto Edwards, the "Rockefellers' man", left for Washington. He met with Richard Helms on the same day. The CIA Director noted that although the Agency did not rule out a possible congressional election of Alessandri on October 24, it was in favor of a "military solution" of the Chilean problem—a coup.

It had quickly become clear that steps taken by the U.S. embassy under Track I had led nowhere, mostly because of vacillation on the part of Frei and his closest assistants. Frei was facing a dilemma: he did not want to be accused either of delivering the country to a "communist" government or of helping to precipitate a possible civil war. The CIA also learned that the U.S. plan to bribe the Christian Democratic Congressmen into voting against Allende was going awry: many Christian Democrats, especially on the left wing of the party, intended to vote in favor.

So on September 21, while the Track I effort was still going on, the CIA sent a coded message to its Santiago station chief: "purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power", and "Parliamentary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective". On September 28, General Philpott, Deputy Chief of the DIA, sent a coded message to the military adviser with the U.S. embassy ordering him to support the CIA operation.

The CIA set up a special group under Thomas Karamessines, Special Operations Director, to act on the Track II plan. Karamessines was in Chile from October 13 to 22, supervising the operation personally. On the Chilean side, retired General Viaux, the key figure in the CIA-planned coup,

was in charge of the Track II operation. On October 13 the CIA station chief reported to Langley that "station has arrived at Viaux solution". Three days later another message followed: "We continue to focus our attention on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing to block Allende."

Viaux helped CIA agents to persuade several key Chilean military figures to agree to taking part in the conspiracy. The plan provided for simultaneous mutinies in the garrisons of Santiago de Chile, Concepción and in the navy; the establishment of a military junta under Generals Valenzuela and Viaux; and mass reprisals against supporters of Popular Unity.

In the latter part of September Chile was rocked by bomb explosions. These criminal acts were not spontaneous. Significantly, official information indicated that 5,300 U.S. citizens, many of them CIA agents, entered Chile from July to September 1970. Pablo Rodriguez, the leader of Patria y Libertad, an organization created by the CIA, said at a rally: "If you want a civil war, we are ready."

A report on CIA activities in Chile noted that the military conspiracy was stymied by the decisive opposition to the coup on the part of General Schneider, commander-in-chief of the Chilean armed forces; because of his firm commitment to the constitutional process, "the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators".¹²

Schneider was no Left-winger, the way his fascist opponents in the army tried to present him: he was simply an honest patriot. He believed in the Constitution and was ready to defend it. That was why on October 8, 1970 Langley ordered its station chief in Santiago de Chile to have him

"removed". The CIA organized a special group to deal with the assassination, comprising Chilean fascists, paid hitmen and CIA agents. The group was led by Arthur Widow, a CIA operative. The CIA expected the assassination to trigger a military coup scheduled for October 22.

The CIA group began its hunt after General Schneider. There were abortive assassination attempts on October 18, 19 and 20. Finally, on October 22, General Schneider was killed. That same day Jim Hendrix, chief of the Latin American department in the ITT intelligence service, sent a coded message to the company's top executives describing the situation: "Whether it will develop into any military action remains to be seen, but at this stage it seems doubtful with General Prats now in command. Prats supported Schneider in his attitude toward General Roberto Viaux, who had attempted to spark a military coup earlier. Prats does not like Viaux personally. As far as we can determine, Prats will display the same loyalty . . . as Schneider did in the past."¹³

Three days later there was another message: "General Carlos Prats is described as a political moderate, a professional who'll brook no outside tampering with the armed forces. Contrary to the general expectation, the military did not move against Allende over the weekend (Schneider was assassinated on Saturday—*Authors*). It was believed that the killing of Schneider was a prelude to the coup. . . . The thinking is that if the Schneider shooting was not really the prelude to the coup, it was a skillful manoeuvre to eliminate from the top the one man who would have permitted Allende . . . to neutralize the military."¹⁴

The operation fell through on both tracks. General Carlos Prats restored order in the armed forces and arrested the chief conspirators. On Oc-

tober 24 the Chilean Congress elected Allende President. A week earlier a conspiracy to assassinate Allende had been uncovered in Santiago de Chile; the plot had been headed by Arturo Marshall, a retired major.

The Reshuffling

As always, the failure of the United States' Chilean policy resulted in a search for a scapegoat. Not one but two were found: Ambassador Korry and CIA station chief Heckscher were recalled from Santiago de Chile. The former was accused of having underrated the "communist threat" in Chile and of "flirting clumsily" with the Christian Democratic leaders, the latter, of defeatism. The fact was that in his reports to the CIA chiefs Heckscher had expressed his doubts of General Viaux's ability to bring off the coup and even maintained that the cadre of the general's supporters had been infiltrated by MIRists (members of MIR, Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario—the Left Revolutionary Movement—a party which had once belonged to the Popular Unity coalition). Korry was replaced by Nathaniel Davis, in Kissinger's opinion one of the ablest U.S. diplomats, who headed State Department intelligence after his term in Chile. Heckscher's place was taken by Daniel Arzac, Jr., an old CIA hand.

Nathaniel Davis was born in Boston in 1925. In 1943 he joined the Office of Strategic Services, the direct forerunner of the CIA. In 1947 he started his career in the State Department. After two years in Czechoslovakia and some five years in Italy, Davis served with the U.S. embassy in Moscow for a short time (1954-1956). After his return from Moscow, State Department and CIA

chiefs used him as an expert on Soviet affairs and "international communism".

In 1960 Davis, then first secretary of the U.S. embassy in Venezuela, worked hard to force this country to sever its diplomatic relations with Cuba. In 1965 he was promoted and became U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria, but only briefly: in 1966 he was made adviser to the National Security Council. A new turn in Davis' career came in 1968, when he was sent to Guatemala on the difficult mission of "pacifying" the country. CIA and FBI agents, people with "pacification" experience in Vietnam, were dispatched to aid the Sovietologist. Davis' influence with the Guatemalan government was so great that the latter dared not take a single decision without his advice. Now he was U.S. ambassador to Chile.

Harry W. Schlaudemann was the ambassador's right-hand man. He began his service with the State Department (and with the CIA) as an official of the U.S. consulate in Barranquilla, Colombia. Having worked in Colombia until 1956, he was appointed chief of the consular section of the U.S. embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria. From 1962 to 1965 he served in the Dominican Republic where he rose to become the CIA station chief. It was on his insistence that William T. Bennett, the U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic, asked President Johnson to send in troops in May 1965. In August 1965 Schlaudemann was made deputy chief of the State Department Caribbean section. When the CIA started its propaganda campaign against Allende, it looked for an expert to orchestrate it, and Schlaudemann was chosen for this task. In June 1969 this CIA agent arrived in Santiago de Chile as a second secretary of the U.S. embassy.

Unlike Schlaudemann, Chilean CIA station

chief Daniel Arzac, a former army man, was a career officer of the CIA. He had worked in Vietnam using the U.S. embassy as a cover, organized the infiltration of the left-wing and guerrilla movement in Colombia and the extermination of activists there. Later he had advised the Uruguayan security service on the elimination of the Tupamaros movement.

Deane R. Hinton, another CIA man (on CIA staff since 1956) had worked with Davis in Guatemala. In Chile he dealt with the strategy of economic sabotage and subversion aimed against the Allende government. Keith W. Wheelock, who had been involved in preparing the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, had been in Chile since 1966; as political adviser to the U.S. ambassadors he had been dealing with election campaigns. In 1969 he had left the diplomatic service to work more freely with Chilean politicians. As an officer of the CIA station he was responsible for the infiltration of Chilean political parties, specifically, the Radical Party. In the period of the Popular Unity government Wheelock was liaison man between the U.S. embassy and rightwing terrorist organizations.

Donald H. Winters of the U.S. Air Intelligence Service (AIS) held the post of cultural attaché in the U.S. embassy—an excellent cover for his constant contacts with the top ranking officer of the Chilean Air Force, especially with his friend General Gustavo Leigh. James F. Anderson, another AIS officer, was deputy U.S. consul general in Santiago de Chile.

The cadre of CIA operatives in Chile included John B. Tipton, whose career had begun in State Department intelligence and who had been involved in the 1964 coup in Bolivia. Raymond A. Warren, an expert on Chilean trade unions,

had taken part in the 1954 coup in Guatemala. In Chile, he had maintained liaison with the terrorists who had prepared Schneider's assassination. Like Warren, Frederick W. Latrash had been party to Operation Guatemala.

U.S. State Department intelligence was represented in Chile by Ernie M. Isaacs, who had previously worked in Honduras and Argentina. In August 1972 Colonel Lawrence A. Corcoran of the DIA arrived to fill the post of Air Force attaché. On the eve of the coup he presented the Chilean Air Force with a gift of 17 guided missiles, each worth 50,000 dollars.

Captain James Schwitzer, the naval attaché, arrived later, in February 1973. His Vietnam experience in interrogation and torture came in handy in August 1973 when supporters of Popular Unity were arrested at the Talcahuano naval base and charged with "conspiracy to commit mutiny". After the coup of September 11, 1973 Schwitzer became adviser to DINA, the Chilean Gestapo.

Destabilization

Operation Chile was to be a large-scale and complex effort, so the U.S. National Security Council created a special group under Henry Kissinger, then the President's assistant for national security, to provide overall coordination for the activities of all the U.S. government agencies engaged in subversion against the Allende government. CIA Director Richard Helms was charged with directing the operation in its everyday aspects. Under President Nixon's orders, Helms received a daily bulletin of intelligence information on the situation in Chile and the measures taken.

President Nixon told Helms to make the Chilean economy scream. Even a cursory glance at the economy explains why this was where the conspirators began. First of all, the Chilean economy depends largely on the production and marketing of copper. The copper industry supplied 80 percent of the country's export earnings and 20 percent of government revenue. It was no coincidence therefore that U.S. imperialism decided to strike first against the copper industry, thus delivering the coup de grâce to the entire Chilean economy.

Another important factor working against the Popular Unity government was the country's extremely heavy economic dependence on imports—not only of industrial goods and equipment but also of raw materials, foodstuffs, oil and petrochemical products. Chile's financial position in international economic relations was weak and, technologically, the country was tied to imperialist powers, above all the United States.

All that predetermined the nature of the CIA's economic sabotage against Chile. The final plan for strangling the Chilean economy was drawn up by a group of U.S. experts under Treasury Secretary John Connally and his assistant John Hennessy. The plan provided for an economic blockade against Chile and the subversion of its economy from within. It involved the U.S. government and American monopolies.

Here is a revealing quotation from a dialogue between Senator Frank Church and William Broe, chief of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, which occurred in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 1973:

"Senator Church: Did you discuss with Mr. Gerrity (member of the ITT board—Authors) the feasibility of possible actions by U.S. com-

panies designed to create or accelerate economic instability in Chile?

"Mr. Broe: I explored with Mr. Gerrity the feasibility of possible actions to apply some economic pressure on Chile; yes sir...."

"Senator Church: ...Did you discuss with Mr. Gerrity the feasibility of banks not renewing credits or delaying in doing so?"

"Mr. Broe: Yes, sir...."

"Senator Church: Did you discuss with Mr. Gerrity the feasibility of companies dragging their feet in spending money and making deliveries and in shipping spare parts?"

"Mr. Broe: Yes, I did."

"Senator Church: Did you discuss with Mr. Gerrity the feasibility of creating pressure on savings and loan institutions in Chile so that they would have to shut their doors, thereby creating stronger pressure?"

"Mr. Broe: Yes."

"Senator Church: Did you discuss with Mr. Gerrity the feasibility of withdrawing all technical help and not promising any technical assistance in the future?"

"Mr. Broe: Yes, sir." 15

So the CIA, acting in concert with U.S. monopolies, aimed its blows at the Chilean economy to wreak economic havoc and aggravate the domestic political situation in Chile. Edward Boorstein wrote: "The CIA also had its role in the production of economic chaos. It would penetrate labor unions and professional and business associations and promote actions by them—strikes and lockouts—against the UP government. It would concentrate on strategic industries, for example, copper and transportation whose stoppage would be costly in foreign exchange or would cripple the whole economy." 16

The United States abruptly cut down on its trade relations with Chile. The sharp drop in U.S. imports, primarily of machinery and equipment, was particularly painful for the Chilean economy. Since the United States was Chile's chief supplier of the means of production and the Chilean economy depended to a great extent on these deliveries, their sudden reduction affected negatively the country's overall development. Chile also ran into serious difficulties with the imports of fuels, raw materials and food. American banks and companies provided Chile with no more short-term credits which paid for most of the current import transactions. Unable to pay for her imports in cash, Chile found itself in an extremely difficult position. The United States discontinued its economic assistance to Chile. The credit blockade of Chile was joined by the banks of Canada and several West European countries (the Netherlands, Great Britain and others), and by international financial agencies, first and foremost the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Transnational corporations took a similar position. The U.S. companies which intended to make new investments in Chile abrogated earlier contacts. Over 1,000 foreign experts left the country, deliveries of equipment stopped, many mines were about to break down, and at some of them production was deliberately obstructed, disorganized and openly sabotaged.

In 1972 and 1973 the CIA used its ties with the copper industry labor leaders to instigate strikes which resulted in huge losses for Chile—some 200 to 250 million dollars. No wonder that production costs in Chile soared.

Inevitably, this affected the country's export earnings.

The United States took special measures to undercut world prices for Chilean copper. Large quantities of copper from the American strategic stocks were dumped on the world market. Simultaneously, U.S. copper companies stymied the attempts by Corporación del Cobre, the Chilean government company, to sell its products to Western Europe. In 1972 alone the drop in copper prices cost Chile 200 million dollars.

Economic subversion was only part of the CIA's mission. It was equally important to create a situation in which the Allende government would be paralyzed, Popular Unity fragmented and the reactionaries consolidated into a united front. The CIA spent millions of dollars to rally all right-wingers into the so-called National Front which united all of Chile's reactionary, extreme right and profascist organizations and parties, and to put its stooge Sergio Onofre in charge. The CIA also succeeded in blocking all attempts by the Allende government to establish a dialogue with the Christian Democratic Party. Finally, the CIA organized and trained right-wing stormtroopers—terrorist gangs which began to build up the necessary "political climate".

After Allende's victory on September 4, 1970 new fascist organizations mushroomed in the country which chose pretentious but rather monotonous-sounding names—"We Will Not Sell Out Chile", "Anticommunist Action Group", "Save Chile", "Nationalist Liberation Offensive" and many others. On September 5, 1970 fascists from Patria y Libertad staged their first march in the capital. Chanting "Arise, Chileans! The Russians are at the gate", "Eliminate the Communists" and "Down with Allende", their column swept

downtown Santiago de Chile, picking fights with Popular Unity supporters.

This organization was brought into being by the CIA. It grew from a gang of criminals led by the lawyer Pablo Rodriguez. The CIA noticed this admirer of Hitler and supplied him with funds to turn his gang into a terrorist organization whose objective was to overthrow the Allende government and establish a fascist dictatorship in Chile. Walter Thieme, a dedicated nazi, directed the terrorist operations of *Patria y Libertad*. If it takes to kill hundreds and thousands to free ourselves from Marxism, he said, we'll do it.

Aside from *Patria y Libertad*, there was the so-called Rolando Matus Brigade which comprised commando units recruited among the National Party's youth organizations. CIA experts under Colonel Richard Townly put members of *Patria y Libertad*, the Rolando Matus Brigade and other similar organizations through a U.S. Green Beret training course in specially created camps.

Other organizations of the extreme right also set up paramilitary terrorist groups in 1971-1972. Arturo Marshall, a retired major, coordinated their activities with those of the CIA.

By the fall of 1973 the situation in Chile had deteriorated abruptly. The country felt the increasingly painful effects of the U.S. economic blockade and counterrevolutionary sabotage. Major industries were hobbled by shortages of raw materials. Long bread lines were an everyday occurrence in working-class districts while warehouses in the "barrios altos" (districts of the rich) were bursting with food. Profiteering and black market operations swept the country, all this against the background of inflation and mass unemploy-

ment. The situation was aggravated further by the reaction-inspired campaign of "civil disobedience" to the Constitutional government and by the political strike of truck owners. Violent disturbances became increasingly frequent in Santiago de Chile. Mobs of lumpens bribed by the CIA and the oligarchy emerged from the slum districts and marched downtown. Together with Invisible Front gangs they looted and set fire to the headquarters of Left organizations, blocked streets and killed the drivers who delivered food to workers' districts.

There was one force in Chile which supported the Popular Unity government with particular consistency and firmness—the working masses, above all the working class whose interests were represented in the government by the Communist and the Socialist parties. There is no doubt that most workers were ready to defend revolutionary gains. However, the labor and peasant movements were organized poorly. Created during the Presidential elections, the Popular Unity committees had virtually ceased to function. Chile's Communists were quite right to point out that the readiness of the working class to defend the revolution was not enough: the workers should be prepared both politically and organizationally to rise to this defense—by force of arms if needed. No such preparation was conducted in Chile, and this was an important factor which contributed to the downfall of the Allende government.

Add to that the difficulties Popular Unity had to face. The government was forced to act while lacking full power. The CIA-financed opposition had a parliamentary majority, while the reactionaries controlled the judiciary and held strong positions in the state apparatus too.

In early June the CIA-organized sabotage of the Parliament and the judiciary paralyzed the Popular Unity coalition in the legislative and executive spheres. Many useful and promising efforts of the government, which would no doubt have helped to improve the position of the masses and the economy, were stymied. Again and again, they ran into the walls erected in the Parliament by CIA agents and stooges from the opposition parties. This systematic blocking of government initiatives, a technique used by the reactionaries, sharply exacerbated the economic and political situation in Chile.

The Chilean reactionaries, entrenched in the legislature, invariably labeled all moves by the Popular Unity government "illegal" and "unconstitutional." Using their numerous agents in the Latin American media, the CIA top brass kept misrepresenting what was happening in Chile, heaping publicity on the "fighters" against these alleged "violations of the Constitution." The campaign, lavishly financed by the CIA, was ultimately aimed at creating the impression that the overthrow of the government was a legitimate reaction to these "violations."

The Conspiracy in the Army

Carlos Prats wrote in his diary: "I do not think that either President Allende or the Popular Unity parties realize the depth of U.S. influence in our armed forces and especially on the mentality of the Chilean military."¹⁷

After Popular Unity assumed power, the Communists urged the parties of the coalition to start vigorous work in the army. But this call was invariably opposed by the Socialists and most of

the other Popular Unity parties. The impression is that the Allende government had no clear picture of who among the generals was truly loyal to it. Suffice it to recall that up to September 11, 1973, General Pinochet, the leader of the coup and the current fuehrer of Chile, remained among the most trusted aides of Salvador Allende and even suggested plans to counter the conspiracy.

The fact that after the inauguration of the Popular Unity government relations between the Chilean military and the Pentagon, as well as the social composition of the officer corps remained unchanged proved deadly for the revolution. Certain "Leftist" mistakes committed by some of the President's advisers also produced a negative effect on the relationship between the Allende government and the patriotic Chilean army officers.

The breakaway of the middle strata from Popular Unity in mid-1973 brought about a certain shift to the right among army officers, most of whom belonged to these strata. As class contradictions in Chilean society became more pronounced, most officers viewed Popular Unity with increasing hostility. This was especially true of air force and navy officers, largely members of the middle strata of the urban bourgeoisie.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon was very active in the Chilean armed forces. After Allende took office, U.S. military assistance to Chile did not cease but even rose steeply: according to official U.S. data, it totaled 30 million dollars in the period from 1971 to 1973. The actual figure, however, was 93 million dollars.

This close attention—at first glance, surprising—the Pentagon paid to Chile was easily understandable: it was an effort to strengthen ties

with the military elite of the country. The situation in Chile reflected a trend common for all Latin American countries: as the domestic political situation became more complicated, the Pentagon worked harder to prepare the country's armed forces. Graduates of the Bernardo O'Higgins Military School were sent to U.S. Special Forces centers for field training. The ranks of "Black Berets", the Chilean special forces created with U.S. assistance as early as 1966, swelled rapidly. These cutthroats behaved with particular brutality in the September 11 coup and in reprisals against civilians. Later they staffed the numerous torture centers.

The CIA had good reason to choose General Pinochet to lead the military conspiracy. An admirer of everything American, fluent in English, he had been the Chilean military attaché in the United States under the conservative government of Ibañez del Campo. Pinochet often visited the United States and later, the U.S. Southern Command, too. He had established very close ties with U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.

General Gustavo Leigh was another chief conspirator. His contacts with the CIA had begun in the late 1940s, when he had been personal pilot of President Gonzalez Videla, who had led a U.S.-assisted reactionary coup in Chile in 1948. Subsequently, Leigh studied in the United States and served as the air force attaché in Washington under Presidents Ibañez and Frei. During the Popular Unity period, there were persistent rumors in Chile that Leigh was closely connected to Patria y Libertad.

The CIA station was quick and efficient in recruiting supporters among army and police generals: each was handed a check for 50,000 dollars as soon as he agreed to "cooperate". The Nation-

al Revolutionary Action, a secret organization of army officers set up by the CIA, was working hard too. The Tacna Group, another secret organization led by General Viaux, also earned its keep.

Still, Pinochet's cabal was in the forefront. The chief members of his group had such excellent covers that not a single one was implicated in the conspiracies the authorities exposed: the plots of Major Marshall (March 1971), Colonel Alberto Lame (March 1972), General Canales (September 1972) and Colonel Souper (June 1973).

In April 1972 General Pinochet's group drew up its plan for overthrowing the Popular Unity government. The military coup was codenamed Plan Amanecer and the effort to seize major communications, Plan Silencio. Pinochet entrusted the planning of military operations to General Sergio Arellano, one of his most trusted aides. The operations were disguised as war games to "evaluate the reliability of the Chilean army".

The dress rehearsal of the revolt was held in Santiago de Chile on June 29, 1973. It was an attempt of a military coup by the Second Mechanized Regiment under Colonel Souper and armed units of Patria y Libertad which attacked La Moneda. Simultaneously, a unit of Patria y Libertad members and Bolivian, Brazilian and Cuban counterrevolutionaries recruited by the CIA and led by Arturo Marshall invaded northern Chile from Bolivia. In the south, a revolt was staged by the latifundistas who had created their own "Army of Punta Arenas" under Thieme, another Patria y Libertad leader. Weapons for this army were shipped by sea from Brazil, disguised as agricultural machinery. Preparations for the invasion cost the CIA eight million dollars.

For several hours the tanks which surrounded

La Moneda fought the President's guards and waited for other units of the Santiago garrison to support them. However, General Prats quickly got the situation under control and forced the mutineers to surrender. Patria y Libertad leaders hastened to hide in foreign embassies. The mutiny was suppressed comparatively easily.

But the salient fact is that it caught Popular Unity unawares. The units in Santiago's industrial suburbs also proved to be unprepared for such a turn of events. Souper's attempt demonstrated that the Allende government was not ready to deal with a mutiny even on a limited scale.

The conspirators worked to undermine the positions of Popular Unity supporters in the armed forces by gradually removing them from key posts. Pressure from superiors, slanderous campaigns in the press, demonstrations of "public outrage" in front of the homes of Constitutional-ist officers, threats and, finally, assassinations were used to achieve this end.

As a result of intrigues and persecution, many patriotic senior officers submitted their resignations in August 1973. On August 17 General Gustavo Leigh replaced General César Ruiz as commander of the air force. On August 23 General Carlos Prats, Defense Minister and commander-in-chief of the army, was forced to resign. General Pinochet became commander-in-chief of the army. Here is a quotation from the August 23 entry in the diary of General Prats: "My career is finished. Without overrating my role, I believe that my exit is a prelude to a coup d'état, to great treachery. . . . Now it only remains to set the date of the coup."¹⁸ However, the reactionaries did not leave Prats alone even after his resignation: on September 30, 1974 CIA agents assassinated him in Buenos Aires where he had

emigrated. On August 26 General Hermán Braddy, chief of the Military Academy and member of the Pinochet group, was appointed commander of the Santiago garrison.

There was also a purge among the mid-ranking army officers. All those to be discharged were accused of involvement in a "conspiracy" into which "Leftist extremists" had allegedly drawn them. Arrests were particularly numerous in August 1973. That was also when Pinochet and his henchmen "exposed a conspiracy" in the navy, thus removing their opponents and preventing the patriotic forces in the navy from consolidating. The arrests and brutal torture of hundreds of sailors were part of the preparations for the military coup. The reactionary officers in the navy established close ties with extreme right terrorist groups and acted according to plans supplied by U.S. naval intelligence.

Operation Alpha-1

In the evening of September 10, 1973 Salvador Allende's closest advisers gathered in his house on Thomas Moro Street. The light of chandeliers was shining on paintings by Siqueiros, Picasso, Portocarrero, Matta and other favorite painters of Allende—gifts from his friends. A large portrait of Che Guevara by Juan Balmes was hanging near the entrance to the hall where the meeting was held. A collection of rare pre-Colombian artifacts was displayed in special cabinets. The library was decorated with autographed photos of Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara and Velasco Alvarado, Salvador Allende's childhood friend. And books everywhere, books he had lovingly collected all his life.

The situation in the country was explosive.

Aside from the strike of truck owners which had begun on July 26, new strikes had been called by trade, medical and air transport personnel. Allende was forced to warn the people that the available stocks of flour would last Chile three or four days, no more. Right-wing terrorism had assumed unprecedented proportions.

On September 9 the Christian Democrats demanded Allende's resignation and new Presidential elections. On the night of September 9 U.S. Ambassador Nathaniel Davis flew to the United States to report that the operation to overthrow Allende was ready to begin. He returned to the U.S. embassy in Santiago de Chile 24 hours later. The coup was about to break out.

The meeting in Allende's home discussed the domestic political situation and steps designed to change the course of events. Allende himself believed that the only way out was a nationwide referendum which would ascertain whether the people supported his program of socio-political and economic transformations.

The meeting's participants spoke about the acts of violence committed by the reactionaries and the strict observance of legality by the government. Allende said that the government should act in conformity with the law in a democratic state, stop arbitrary acts, free Chileans from the threat of fratricide and safeguard the gains of the working people.

21.30. A telephone call from La Moneda. Miria Contreras, Allende's secretary, reports that two companies of the Guardia Vieja Regiment are being transported in army trucks from the town of Los Andes toward the capital. The news generates little interest. The meeting is discussing the question of the referendum.

22.30. Another phone call from La Moneda,

The secretary reports that the navy weighed anchor in Valparaiso and put out to sea, accompanied by a U.S. naval task force. No reaction: joint U.S.-Chilean naval exercises, codenamed Unidos-XIV, are scheduled to take place.

23.05. Again, a call from La Moneda: several army barracks in the capital have been put on combat alert. This does cause alarm. Allende asks Defense Minister Orlando Letelier who is present at the meeting to call General Hermán Brady, commander of the Santiago garrison. The general replies he has no information but will make inquiries.

23.40. Letelier calls Brady to find out the result of the inquiries. Brady replies that the rumors are false and that he is personally responsible for peace in Santiago.

Still, about one o'clock in the morning Allende calls General Urrútia, commander of the police corps, a man whose loyalty he does not doubt. Urrútia reassures the President that all is well in Santiago. At two o'clock in the morning Allende closes the meeting.

Late at night on September 10 and early in the morning on September 11 the conspirators put into effect an important part of the preparation for the coup—they purged their own forces. It was learned later that almost 20 percent of the navy's officers and men fell victim to the purge. Those who refused to go against the law and join the mutiny were killed and thrown overboard. Just in case, U.S. naval vessels moved closer to the Chilean ships where supporters of Popular Unity were being eliminated. U.S. naval intelligence officers took part in interrogation and torture of Chilean sailors. At two in the morning Admiral José Merino's group arrested Admiral Montero, commander of the navy.

This was followed by mutinies of army garrisons in Santiago de Chile and other cities; these began with reprisals against Allende's supporters. Simultaneously the troops raided offices, hospitals and universities in search of weapons. Mass searches began on signal from Patria y Libertad whose hoodlums blew up the radio station of the State Technical University, the mainstay of the Left.

4.00. The navy returns to Valparaiso. Chilean and U.S. Marines seize the port and invade the city. Having crushed unorganized resistance in an hour, a rebel column starts moving toward Santiago. At 5.30 the troops which have joined the mutiny start their second operation by arresting Popular Unity activists and jailing them in the Chilean and National stadiums which have been turned into concentration camps. Simultaneously, all radio stations in the country are being seized in the course of Operation Silencio.

6.00. The conspirators broadcast a coded message over the radio: "It is raining in Santiago", signaling the start of the nationwide "internal war".

Twenty minutes later a phone call to President Allende's home reports that the navy has mutinied and that the Marines have taken Valparaiso and are moving in a column of trucks toward the capital. Several minutes later Allende learns about the mutiny of the Los Andes and Santiago garrisons. Having alerted his personal guards, the President leaves for La Moneda, still hoping for support from part of the army.

7.30. Salvador Allende arrives in La Moneda together with his guards and closest colleagues—Defense Minister Orlando Letelier, Interior Minister Carlos Briones, Secretary-General of the Government Fernando Flores and the journalist

Augusto Olivares. Meanwhile, in the nearby Defense Ministry building, the fascists are bickering over who will take which post in the future junta. Finally, Pinochet is chosen as head of the junta.

7.55. Allende makes a direct phone call to the Radio Corporación station and asks it to interrupt its program for a Presidential announcement. The President announces that Valparaiso has mutinied, urges the working people to be vigilant and expresses his conviction that the armed forces will remain neutral. After that, Allende informs all those who have arrived in La Moneda of the gravity of the situation and declares that he will fight to the end. Then he gives orders to defend La Moneda.

8.15. A phone call from the Air Force Ministry suggests that Allende surrender, and in return offers a plane on which he could leave Chile together with his relatives and colleagues. The President turns down the offer.

8.30. Radio Agricultura, the most powerful station in the capital, broadcasts a message saying that power in the country has been taken by a military junta led by General Pinochet. The junta declares that Chile is in a state of "internal war" and that martial law has been therefore imposed.

Allende realizes the scope of the putsch. One can only marvel at the courage of this man, cut off from the outside world and supported by only a handful of loyal friends. His resolution to fight is irrevocable. Addressing the people via Radio Portales, he says: "I declare that I will not renounce my duty and that I will defend with my life the authority the people have vested in me."¹⁹

8.55. Police Corps members begin to leave La

Moreda. Allende tries to dissuade them from following the junta's orders. Suddenly, a group of police officers opens fire on the President. Only the vigilance of Allende's personal guards averts the threat.

9.00. Chilean radio stations repeat the junta's declaration of nationwide "internal war". The mutineers begin their brutal reprisals against civilians and all supporters of Popular Unity.

9.10. Allende broadcasts his last message to the nation via Radio Magallanes, the only Popular Unity radio station still operating in Chile: "Working people of my country! I have faith in Chile and her destiny. Other Chileans will emerge victorious. At this grim and bitter moment, when treason is vying for power, know that much sooner than later great vistas will open again and man of dignity will resume the building of a better society. Long live Chile, long live the people, long live working people!"²⁰

After Allende's speech, Radio Magallanes, the station of the Communist Party of Chile, broadcasts a tape recording of *Venceremos*, the battle hymn of the Left, and all the studio personnel joins in. The song ends in an explosion and bursts of machine-gun fire. The last radio station of Popular Unity ceases its operation.

9.15. The fascists start firing on La Moneda and then launch an assault which suffers heavy casualties and falls back. The resistance infuriates the rebels and they commit artillery and tanks. This also fails. Over the radio, the junta orders La Moneda's defenders to surrender immediately, otherwise the palace will be bombed from the air.

11.00. Hawker-Hunter fighter-bombers appear and lob missiles into La Moneda. Black smoke rises from the palace. Tanks surround the build-

ing and fire at its windows, setting La Moneda on fire. President Allende orders all water faucets on to prevent a fire on the ground floor. Tipping a bazooka, he makes his way into his office and disables a tank with the first shot.

13.30. The President climbs to the second floor. Many defenders have been killed by machine-gun fire and missile fragments. The rebels have occupied the ground floor and, having moved artillery pieces into the inner courtyard, start firing point blank at second floor windows.

(The CIA planned both the coup and the assassination of the President. The latter mission was entrusted to a special group under Captain Roberto Garrido, a CIA agent. At the very start of the assault on La Moneda, some telephone wires got accidentally crossed and Allende heard the order Brigadier General Xavier Palacios who led the assault issued to Garrido—the order to kill the President.)

14.06. Garrido's group fights its way up the stairs from the ground to the second floor and reaches the entrance to the Red Office where state receptions are held. In the cloud of smoke from grenade and tank shell explosions, tear gas and the fire which has spread throughout the palace, Garrido sees Allende and empties a full machine-gun clip into him. The guards counter-attack furiously, recapture the President's body and carry it into his office. Here they place it in the chair, pin on the Presidential sash and wrap the body in the national flag.

Even after the President's death La Moneda's defenders fought back stubbornly. Only by four o'clock in the afternoon the fire which had been raging for hours made further resistance impossible. For seven hours forty people held the palace against tank, air force, artillery and infantry

attacks. Most of them shared the fate of the President. The wounded were captured and tortured to death. Only a handful survived, and these people told the world about the last hours of Salvador Allende.

After taking La Moneda, the putschists were so enraged that they literally riddled the President's body with bullets, and then someone smashed his face with a rifle butt. Having made sure that the President was dead, General Palacios ordered to have the body carried to the Red Office, the doors sealed and extra guards posted. Then a radio message was sent to General Pinochet: "Mission accomplished. La Moneda taken. President dead." The reply was succinct: "Await further instructions".

The instructions were not long in coming. After a brief debate whether it would be better to fake a suicide or announce that Allende had been killed in the fighting, the rebel chiefs made their decision.

Allende's body was taken from the Red Office to the Presidential suite. Palacios and CIA agents watched Chilean Black Beret officers strip the body. The slacks, with bloodstains and bullet holes, were replaced with a pair taken from one of the corpses still lying nearby. It was decided to leave the sweater on, but to cover it with the jacket Allende had left in his office before the battle, and to button it up.

Then the President's body was moved to the sofa. Rigor mortis had set in, and it was now impossible to make its posture look natural. A sub-machine gun, a gift from Fidel Castro, was placed in Allende's lap, with the muzzle pointing to the chin, and then one of the officers pulled the trigger. After that, "witnesses" were called in and told that Salvador Allende had committed

suicide. The body was photographed by Juan Enrique Lira of *El Mercurio*, the only journalist allowed to do so. On the photograph the President is unrecognizable.

That was the end of Operation Alpha-I, another crime organized by the CIA.

A radio conversation between General Nicanor Diaz Estrada and an unidentified general was monitored during the coup:

"We want to know if the medical service chiefs examined the body and filled out the death certificate. You've got to be careful and see to it that the body is not taken to the morgue for an autopsy; it's extremely dangerous because. . . I don't know. . . It's a center of extremists, and so make sure they don't try to steal the body. Go ahead. Over, Nicanor.

"Look, I can't say whether it has already left La Moneda, but about an hour and a half ago Brady ordered an ambulance to take it secretly to the Military Hospital. . . The body stays in the Military Hospital until new orders arrive. Over.

"I read you. I agree. Listen, Nicanor, we've got to take precautions, tell Hermán Brady to guarantee absolute secrecy in the Military Hospital in this matter. When you have information, please call us here. Go ahead. Over, Nicanor.

"Fine. I read you fine. I'll contact number three immediately and as soon as I have any new information, I'll call you. Over.

"Thanks, Nicanor. Over and out."

For over 24 hours since the coup the junta chiefs did not dare tell the people their legitimate President was dead. Only on the following day a television announcer read out an official communique claiming that Allende had committed suicide and that his burial at the Santa-Ines

Cemetery in the town of Viña del Mar had been attended by his family. The communique was a lie through and through. Members of the Allende family were prevented from paying their last respects to the President. Fearing exposure, the generals surreptitiously placed the body in a crypt and only then decided to report that the head of state was dead.

At that time, there was only the official "eye witness account" of Allende's death, and newspapers in the United States and other Western countries vied with one another in inventing details of the suicide version. However, soon those who had been with the President in his last moments and survived miraculously helped reconstruct the true picture. At a Havana rally on September 28, 1973 Fidel Castro based his description of Allende's heroic death on the accounts supplied by these people.

Some Chilean army officers who felt revolted at the crimes they had committed supplied important information too. Later, the public gained access to secret files of the CIA and DINA, transcripts of the putschists' radio communications of September 11 and other revealing data. We have used all this not only to reconstruct the last hours of President Allende but also to arrive at the only possible conclusion: he was killed by CIA agents. And it is common knowledge that orders to assassinate foreign leaders are given personally by the President of the United States.

The fascist junta embarked on a meticulously planned campaign of extermination. Communists, Socialists and labor activists were the first to be killed. Since the "internal war" declared by the fascist generals was nationwide, the "prisoners" were far more numerous than the available jails could hold.

Stadiums, cycling tracks and other sports facilities were used as concentration camps (in Chacabuco, La Serena, Rancagua, Pisagua, the islands of Quiriquina, Dawson and elsewhere). Army barracks, air force bases and police precincts were turned into jails. Torture centers were set up in the Air Force Military Academy, the Air Force Polytechnical Academy and the Defense Ministry. The Chilean Stadium, a comparatively small structure seating some 5,000, became the first concentration camp in the Chilean capital. During the first days, over 6,000 prisoners were crammed in there. Interrogation was conducted in locker rooms and the medical office. The people who survived this fascist inferno now recall with horror the scenes they witnessed there. There were corpses—decapitated, quartered, with bellies ripped open—and bits of human flesh on the walls. Later, the National Stadium was also turned into a concentration camp.

The Pentagon not only aided the Chilean army in preparing the overthrow of the Popular Unity government but also took a direct part in the coup. On August 14, 1973 the Chilean embassy in the United States reported to the Chilean Foreign Ministry that the U.S. State Department requested 27 entry visas for U.S. pilots who were to take part in an aerobatic show in Chile. On the next day the Chilean embassy told its Foreign Ministry that the U.S. State Department was applying for 150 entry visas for U.S. pilots. Late in August a spokesman of the U.S. military mission in Santiago said the performance was being put off until mid-September. Unidas-XIV, the joint Chilean-U.S. naval exercises originally planned for August, were also postponed until early September.

On September 7 a U.S. Air Force Lockheed

SR-57 reconnaissance plane with the identification number 631-3298 appeared twice over Chile. Having taken off from the Villa Dolores base in Argentina, it flew in a triangle from Villa Dolores to La Serena to Puerto Montt. The official reason was to check communications with the vessels and ground support centers of Unidas-XIV.

On the same day 32 U.S. Air Force planes from the Aerobates squadron landed at the El Plumerillo airfield in the Argentine city of Mendoza, although the aerobatic performance was scheduled for mid-September.

The U.S. Navy task force which had arrived to take part in Unidas-XIV and was to put out to sea for exercises on September 7 or 8 remained anchored at Valparaiso. The delay was explained by "engine malfunctions". The U.S. Marines were given shore leave but stayed within the area.

The reasons for all these odd things were revealed later: originally, the mutiny against the Popular Unity government was to begin on September 7. But because of a sudden quarrel between army and police officers among the conspirators, the coup was postponed until September 11.

On September 11 U.S. Marines were among those who took the port of Valparaiso. U.S. planes not only coordinated the operations of the junta's troops but also participated directly in the military action. DIA, CIA and FBI operatives took an active part in the arrests and torture of Chileans.

The Reichstag Arson Case Chilean Style

The CIA attempted a complex psywar operation to furnish at least some semblance of justification to outraged world public opinion for the bloodbath of a coup which overthrew Allende.

The official version was that there existed a mysterious Plan Z and that the armed forces were forced into direct action to prevent the implementation of this plan.

On September 14 General Oscar Bonilla, the junta's Interior Minister, spoke on Chilean television and claimed that the Communists had prepared a "diabolical conspiracy to exterminate high-ranking army officers".

Either because the CIA had failed to transmit the text of Plan Z in time or perhaps for some other reason, General Bonilla never mentioned the alleged code name and referred only to the "diabolical conspiracy". Two days later a television announcer read out an official statement by the junta claiming that the "authentic text" of the communist Plan Z had been found in a safe-deposit box in the office of the Interior Minister in the Allende government. On September 17 General Pinochet confirmed the earlier reports about Plan Z and said that Allende had had plans to exterminate one million people—one Chilean out of ten. The junta chief also promised that Chilean and world public opinion would soon be furnished with all the documents related to Plan Z. The Chilean *Ercilla* magazine ran a commentary on Pinochet's statement and wrote confidently that a draft plan to establish a "Chilean Soviet Republic" which would later apply for accession to the Soviet Union, had been allegedly found among Allende's papers.

The junta's propaganda machine was put into top gear. The media showered the audience with "facts" exposing an international communist conspiracy. All kinds of crimes were ascribed to Allende; there were mind-boggling reports about the huge caches of weapons allegedly discovered in the cellar of Allende's home and other "se-

cret vaults"; lists of people the Allende government was claimed to have earmarked for extermination were made public. Finally, the so-called *White Paper on the Change of Government in Chile* appeared in November. Page 53 featured a "document" entitled "Plan of Mobilization and Operations for the Coup d'Etat. Code Name Plan Z".²¹ The *White Paper* asserted that the document had been drawn up by Cuban experts.

The text of Plan Z raised considerable doubts even among foreign bourgeois journalists. They easily ascertained that the office of the Popular Unity Interior Minister in La Moneda where the "document" was supposed to have been discovered never had any safe-deposit box, and that all the furniture, including a file cabinet and a bookcase, had burned down in the fire on September 11. This took care of the alleged discovery of the "document" in a safe-deposit box or even a file cabinet or a bookcase. Had the authors of Plan Z been aware of it, they would have had it discovered in a more appropriate place.

Colonel Pedro Ewing, government secretary, appeared before newsmen. He gave "the word of an officer" that Plan Z was authentic and that it had really been discovered—true, Ewing admitted, not in La Moneda but in "another place" which could not yet be disclosed for national security reasons. Any analysis shows that Plan Z was a crude fake and that there is no way to prove its authenticity. The CIA made the OAS Special Consultative Committee on Security join the propaganda hullabaloo over Plan Z. This committee published a report entitled *The Marxist-Leninist Process in Chile*.²² Naturally, it featured the text of Plan Z (Appendix 13). The introduction to the report reviled communism and asserted that the Allende government was involved

in the drug traffic and invited foreign terrorist groups to Chile: "The North Koreans, together with the Cubans, were discovered to have been involved in the training of Chilean guerrilla and paramilitary personnel."²³

The OAS report also used Pinochet's *White Paper* as the source of "facts" about preparations for a coup by these terrorists. As proof of Allende's "sinister schemes", the report cited a list of weapons and ammunition in the "caches" discovered after the overthrow of Popular Unity: 164 submachine guns, 312 pistols and some ammunition. Would a sane person believe that anyone could use these weapons to challenge Chile's armed forces, over 30,000-strong in 1973?

Obviously, the only people in need of Plan Z were the conspirators and their White House sponsors. The world reacted with indignation to the fascist coup in Chile. Western propaganda had to convince world public opinion that U.S. imperialism had nothing to do with the putsch or the assassination of President Allende. Something had to be done to check the upsurge of anti-American feelings in Latin America and to exonerate the junta. This called for a clever move which would confuse those in opposition to the junta and its Washington backers. And so the CIA psychological warfare experts and Pinochet's clique invented Plan Z. Of course, the junta did not and could not possibly produce any proof of the document's authenticity. The chief putschists had the nerve to claim that their coup was an act of self-defense, that the atrocities were explained by the quite natural reaction of the outraged military to Plan Z. Leaders of Popular Unity were tortured and killed as authors of the plan; activists and rank-and-file members, as accomplices.

Another thing about Plan Z is that its *White Paper* text resembles, in minutest detail, earlier CIA-produced Plan Cohen which "justified" the 1964 overthrow of the João Goulart government in Brazil, and Plan Safrá Roja used as an excuse for the ouster of the Juan José Torres government in Bolivia in 1971. Camilo Taufic, a Chilean journalist, compared these plans and concluded with a question: "Is that a failure of imagination or continent-wide coordination?"²⁴ The U.S. Congressional investigation of CIA activities did reveal that "CIA collaborators were involved" in the compilation of the *White Paper* which featured the text of Plan Z.²⁵

Referring to this plan, General Secretary Carlos Altamirano of the Socialist Party of Chile stressed: "In February 1933 Hitler ordered the arson of the building of the German government, the Reichstag, and put the blame on the Communist Party, unleashing brutal repression against it and later, against all the political parties of Germany. Deprived of any imagination, the Chilean military junta is resorting to the same infamous trick. It invented 'Plan Z.' I declare with full responsibility that this plan is an absolutely false and grotesque invention of the military junta. Never have we proposed a plan of such nature. Never have our parties resorted to political assassination or terrorism. The invention of this sinister plan is aimed solely at justifying the treachery of the top-ranking officers involved in the plot, their brutality and atrocities, the extermination of thousands upon thousands of working people, and the tortures.

"In a word, the so-called 'Plan Z' provides the four treacherous generals (the junta was composed of four generals—*Authors*) with justification of their usurpation of power, their disloyalty and

their hideous crimes the Chileans will never forget."²⁶

Pinochet's Paradise

Pinochet and his henchmen have established in Chile a regime which is no different from fascism. The international commission of inquiry into the crimes of the Chilean military junta—the commission operates with the support of national Chile Solidarity Committees established in virtually every country—has described the junta's actions as a crime against humanity. The issue has been repeatedly debated in international organizations, including the United Nations. The UN Economic and Social Council, UNESCO, UNCTAD, ILO and many other organizations have denounced the junta's crimes.

The Chilean Congress has been dissolved, political parties have been dissolved and banned, meetings, rallies and manifestations have been outlawed; and Legislative Decree 77 imposes the death penalty for any statement that might be considered "procommunist". Some 3,000 people are in jail, and there is still no information about the fate of the 2,500 people the junta has declared to be "missing".

In July 1974 the National Information Directorate (DINA) was set up to direct the reign of terror; three years later it was renamed the National Directorate of Information (DNI). This agency, created with the help of CIA and FBI experts, was staffed by Patria y Libertad activists, intelligence officers, underworld figures and nazi war criminals living in Chile. Numbering 20,000 officials and undercover field agents, it is a typical secret police force protecting a fascist dictatorship. Half the secret service offic-

ers working for Pinochet have graduated from training courses in the United States.

Violations of basic human rights, brutal terror and the never-ending arrests of innocent people have been elevated to the status of national policy and turned into an everyday routine throughout the country.

The junta plunged Chile into economic chaos. The social gains attained while Popular Unity was in power have been abrogated. Over the years of junta rule, the cost of living has increased 40 times over. More than one million Chileans (one out of every four) are unemployed. Real wages and salaries are less than one third of the Popular Unity level.

Given free rein, the "market economy" spells ruin for small businesses. Bankruptcy has become a daily occurrence in the life of the so-called middle class. Chile holds the first place in the world in terms of currency devaluation. The national economy is literally falling apart. The economic condition of truck and taxi owners, small-scale businessmen and industrialists, small landholders and people in the liberal professions—those sections of the population which once con-
nived at the putsch—is deteriorating with each passing day. The educational system and the nation's culture are degenerating. Tens of thousands of students are unable to continue their education because of financial difficulties and political persecution by the junta. About one million Chileans had to leave the country after the coup.

Embezzlement of public funds is typical of the Chilean *Neue Ordnung*. Corruption and illegal currency transactions are rampant. The junta's generals make 30 to 40 million dollars a year from the sale of narcotic drugs which arrive in the United States via diplomatic channels from

Chile. Pinochet himself makes free with the nation's wealth. His family and numerous relatives also lead a high life by dipping deep into government coffers.

The dictator has proclaimed himself the country's ruler for an indefinite period: he expects to remain on top until the year 2000. Pinochet has dragged the country into the military and economic system of imperialism. The economy is kept alive by massive injections of foreign credits and by the superexploitation of the working class. The junta relies for survival on arms deliveries from Washington, London, Bonn, Tel Aviv, and Pretoria.

But while the dictator is clinging to power and to his schemes, various groups that supported him earlier are gradually moving to a critical position. The ranks of his opponents are swelling. Operating underground, the Communist Party of Chile advocates a united front of all opposition forces. Mobilization and unity of the masses and, consequently, a diversity of methods to be used in the struggle are this Party's tactics. Not only the Communists but also other Popular Unity parties see resolute struggle as the way toward a victory over fascism and restoration of democracy.

THE CIA IN BOLIVIA

"The reactionary sections of the armed forces support the regime... by brutal repression, assassination, torture, imprisonment, confinement, exile, confiscation of property, and persecution of thousands of patriots, revolutionary fighters, democrats and progressives."

Requiem for a Revolution

The CIA started its operations in Bolivia in the 1950s, when the revolutionary movement in this country, the heart of the Andes, was vigorously gaining strength. In April 1952 an armed popular uprising broke out in La Paz. It ended the long rule of the "tin barons"—the Bolivian nickname for the owners of tin mines. It was the beginning of the Bolivian bourgeois-democratic revolution which lasted for 12 years.

The events in Bolivia sent the White House into a panic. Before 1952, all coups had followed the same familiar pattern: from time to time the disgruntled faction excluded from the current "revolutionary" government and consequently from the official gravy train engineered a coup. Access to the national treasury, well-paying sinecures and lavish bonuses from foreign monopolies were the stakes for which the game was played.

The White House treated the frequent reports of coups in Bolivia with ironic indulgence. The coups merely changed the stage setting: the play remained the same. U.S. imperialist domination

over Bolivia was based on the control of the Guggenheim financier group over Patiño Mines and Enterprises—a company officially belonging to Simon Ituri Patiño, a Bolivian, but registered in Delaware. Patiño Mines produced 60 percent of Bolivia's tin, and it was the tin industry that shaped the economic situation in the country. Simon Patiño lorded it over both the economy and the nation's politics by pulling the strings of businessmen, lawyers, government officials, army generals and Liberal Party leaders. Nicknamed the "Patiño system", this plunderbund grew fat from selling Bolivia's natural resources, from embezzlement, corruption, profiteering and lavish handouts from U.S. monopolies. Simon Patiño, a formerly illiterate mestizo, installed and removed Presidents. But the orders came from the Guggenheim brothers who held a controlling interest in Patiño Mines.

In April 1952 the "Patiño system" was dealt a severe blow when the more nationalist leaders of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), a petty-bourgeois party, took office. In October, the tin industry was nationalized and handed over to the specially created government-owned Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL). The army was disbanded, and a workers' and peasants' militia was established instead. Popular pressure led the government to carry out several other bourgeois-democratic reforms: universal suffrage was enacted by abolishing the literacy qualification (which excluded almost 80 percent of the population from politics), social and labor legislation was adopted, and workers' control over production was introduced in the mining industry.

The revolution triggered an unheard-of upsurge of civic activity. The Communist Party of Bo-

livia, created in 1950, emerged from the underground. In 1952 Bolivia's labor unions merged in the Bolivian Labor Center (COB) which demanded that the MNR leadership step up the revolution.

President Eisenhower ordered the CIA to restore the old order in Bolivia and to prevent its rapprochement with socialist nations. In late 1952 Langley drew up and approved a plan which, much later, became the prototype of the CIA operation against the Allende government in Chile. It began with economic destabilization, fragmentation of the revolutionary movement and efforts to discredit the government; this was followed by a military conspiracy which culminated in the 1964 coup.

What made it particularly easy for the CIA to operate in Bolivia was that the most influential group in the MNR government was made up of people who entertained illusions about imperialism, favored compromises with it and feared genuine revolution. Besides, many government members wanted to use the changes in the country to their own financial advantage. From the very beginning, they looked for contacts with the U.S. ruling quarters via Victor Andrade, Bolivia's ambassador to the United States who had several times been Foreign Minister under the "tin barons" and then, for a long time, worked in the United States for IBM, a corporation of the Rockefellers. While in the United States, he played golf regularly with Nelson Rockefeller and Dwight Eisenhower. It was at a golf course that the two sides worked out the terms of the compromise.

Specifically, it was agreed that the Bolivian government would pay a sizable compensation to the owners of the nationalized tin mines, lift

the ban on transferring foreign companies' profits out of the country, abolish price controls, freeze wages and conduct massive layoffs among wage and salary earners in order to "improve" the operation of state-owned industrial enterprises and government agencies. A surreptitious denationalization of mines began under U.S. pressure. Under the 1956 Oil Code, U.S. monopolies secured concessions there of over 27 million acres.

In exchange for this readiness to "cooperate" the Bolivian government received U.S. economic assistance which was actually spent to pay government officials, finance the re-established army and, largely, to line the pockets of MNR activists.

Washington's assistance to Bolivia was in fact a smokescreen behind which the CIA started to hatch its conspiracy to overthrow the government. The agency recruited those willing to "cooperate" for a fee from among the personnel of the newly created Bolivian organizations which handled the U.S. assistance program. As a rule, these agencies were staffed by those Bolivian army officers and civilians whom the CIA saw as potentially useful to the United States. Through these lavishly paid agents, the CIA began to install its people in key posts in ministries, other government agencies, the army and the security services.

Special attention was paid to the Bolivian army. Called on to safeguard the "ideals of the Bolivian revolution", the army was sent to suppress popular manifestations, miners' strikes and other action by working people. Some of the army officers were of the old, expressly anticommunist mold.

Still, a large part of the officers were petty-

bourgeois supporters of the MNR platform. Their training, the government reasoned surprisingly, should be taken care of by the Pentagon. In 1958 the Bolivian government signed a mutual assistance and defense treaty with Washington. Then an FBI mission was sent to La Paz to reorganize the Bolivian police and the Interior Ministry and, upon request from MNR leaders, set up a department which would deal with suppressing the communist movement. As Interior Minister Antonio Arguedas Mendieta said in his testimony, "the United States Central Intelligence Agency has operated in our country in close contact with the state security services approximately since 1957.... The role the CIA played in the establishment of the notorious 'Control Político' of the MNR regime (the political police—*Authors*) was very important."²

After the mutual assistance and defense treaty was signed, Bolivian army officers began to be sent to U.S. military academies on the recommendation of the CIA station. U.S. Army Colonel Edward Fox, the CIA station chief, personally screened these officers. By 1964 more than half the Bolivian army officers had graduated from U.S. military training centers—the highest percentage in Latin America at that time. The CIA and the DIA selected the key figures for the future military coup from among these officers. René Barrientos was chosen to lead the new government.

Barrientos was a colorful figure. Ambitious and headstrong, this crafty demagogue, brilliant speaker, mountain climber and pilot was half-Indian (his mother was a Quechua Indian), and he always played on that skillfully in a country whose population was two thirds Indian. From 1942 Barrientos had been active in the military under-

ground fighting the "tin barons"—specifically, in the Santa Cruz Lodge dominated by MNR supporters. That was when his friend (and U.S. agent) Major Julio Sanjinés Goitia introduced him to Edward Fox, then on the staff of one of the U.S. aid services. Fox was the one who recruited Barrientos. The CIA helped Goitia and Barrientos in their careers. After the 1964 coup, Lieutenant Colonel Goitia was made Minister of the Economy and then ambassador to the United States. His political credo was clear from an admission he once made: "I am a confidant of the Americans."

Barrientos rose through the ranks from personal pilot of President Victor Paz Estenssoro to Commander of the Air Force. In the early 1960s he was sent to undergo training in the United States and then remained in Washington as Air Force attaché. After returning to La Paz, he was first made chief of transport aviation and then Air Force Commander.

Under the CIA agents Goitia and Barrientos, the Santa Cruz Lodge soon turned into the headquarters of the military conspiracy against the MNR government. The plotters relied for support on the 7th Division stationed in Cochabamba Department. The division's commanding officers belonged to the Santa Cruz Lodge, and most were CIA agents. Since the 7th Division was considered to be the most efficient in the Bolivian army, its support was very important for the stability of the government. Besides, Barrientos had close ties to the corrupt peasant union leaders of Cochabamba Department who had a peasants' militia of their own. Acting on advice from Fox and aided by U.S. instructors, Barrientos created the first paratrooper unit in Bolivian history. Stationed in Cochabamba, it was made up of peo-

ple personally loyal to Barrientos. The weapons and the transport planes were supplied by the U.S. Air Force.

Aside from the CIA, the U.S. Gulf Oil Company was active in the preparation of the coup. As it was learned later, Barrientos received large bribes from Gulf Oil. And he was not the only one on the payroll: others included Colonel Hugo Banzer, Minister of Education in the Barrientos government and President of Bolivia in 1971-1978, General René Bernal, General Juan Lechín, to name a few. In the wake of the 1964 coup Gulf Oil handed over two million dollars to Barrientos, ostensibly so that government employees could be paid their salaries.

In the fall of 1964 everything was ready for the coup, and Langley ordered Barrientos to go ahead.

Edward Fox, the CIA station chief in Bolivia, told Bolivian army officers that Barrientos would be made President because that was the way Washington wanted it. "It is obvious that the North Americans put Barrientos in power," the Bolivian journalist Sergio Almaraz wrote. "They did not do it by issuing a ukase or pounding the table: it was a long process. . . . But it was efficient because it made the President a Green Beret and a Green Beret, a President."³

The coup d'état of November 3, 1964 ended the bourgeois-democratic revolution era in Bolivian history. Imperialism and the CIA annulled the social and economic gains of the Bolivian people. The new President was installed to protect U.S. monopoly interests and to prevent any turn of events prejudicial to them.

Operation Cynthia

The treacherous murder of Ernesto Che Guevara, the prominent revolutionary who arrived in Bolivia in November 1966 to take part in the Bolivian liberation movement, was among the most revolting crimes committed by the CIA.

U.S. imperialists and their stooges in Latin America hated Che Guevara because he personified Latin American national liberation. Answering the accusations the enemies of the Cuban revolution levelled at him, Che said from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly in New York in December 1964: "I was born in Argentina; this is no secret for anyone. I am a Cuban and an Argentine and—no offense to the distinguished nations of Latin America—I am a patriot of any Latin American country; and whenever necessary I will be ready to give my life to the liberation of any Latin American country, without asking for anything of anyone, without demanding anything, without exploiting anyone."⁴

Che Guevara was well-known as an ardent champion of an anti-imperialist revolution in Latin America. His convictions drove him to be in the forefront of the anti-imperialist struggle, to blaze the especially dangerous trail of the Latin American Revolution. On May 23, 1967, *Siete dias ilustrados*, an Argentine periodical, published a letter he wrote to his parents. In it he wrote: "I hold that armed struggle is the only way out for nations fighting for their liberation."⁵ That was why Che left Cuba to fight in Bolivia.

Ernesto Che Guevara believed that a center of guerrilla activity in Bolivia, the heartland of Latin America, would hasten a liberation explosion, a beginning of the end of reactionary and impe-

rialist domination in Latin America. The guerrilla unit was deployed in an area bordering on oilfields owned by Bolivian Gulf Oil Company. This was forest country, far from cities and towns. In July 1966 the guerrillas bought the Calamina ranch situated in this area, close to the Nanchahuazú River.

Unfortunately, the guerrillas were not cautious enough, and the CIA learned their whereabouts. It is clear from the October 23, 1968 testimony by Bolivian Interior Minister Antonio Arguedas that information provided by a certain López Durán and knowledge of the routes taken by Julio Dagnino Pacheco, the guerrillas' treasurer, who was followed by CIA agents enabled the CIA to trace the location of the guerrilla unit. Ciro Alganaraz, a wealthy farmer and former mayor of the town of Camiri, began spying on the guerrillas from the very start. On signal from him in January 1967 the CIA sent one of its operatives to the ranch. The guerrillas stopped him when he was already in their camp. He told them he had come to spend the Sunday at the place of Alganaraz, his friend, but lost his way. He was released after a brief questioning.

The CIA was interested not so much in the guerrillas themselves as in whether Che Guevara was with them. Victor Marchetti, an ex-CIA man well acquainted with the case, wrote: "The Clandestine Services were obsessed with Guevara, and even somewhat fearful of him. He was in part a constant and irritating reminder of their failure in the Cuban operation.... The CIA's Clandestine Services were left to brood over their failure—until Guevara exposed himself. In so doing he presented himself to the CIA as an inviting target; his capture or death would provide some measure of revenge for past failures."⁶

The CIA activated its entire network not only in Bolivia but also in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The orders were to find Guevara at all costs. Finally, in February 1967 CIA agents in Bolivia stumbled on a trail which ultimately led them to their objectives. "Stumbled" is right: quite accidentally, they learned that an Argentinian artist they were keeping an eye on had personally seen Guevara in a guerrilla unit. By using various techniques the CIA station in Bolivia determined the approximate strength of the unit, its armament, connections, etc.

A concomitant to the hunt after Che Guevara was the CIA goal of bleeding the Bolivian liberation movement white and depriving it of support from the population. In early 1967 there was a nationwide campaign of mass arrests of activists and members of Left parties. The reprisals were planned and carried out carefully and purposefully. Thousands of suspects were thrown into jails and concentration camps; hundreds were killed and tortured to death. The CIA and FBI advisers who directed the raids participated personally in the interrogations and tortures.

In July 1967 Barrientos announced the start of Operation Cynthia (codenamed after the daughter of his friend General Luis Reque Terán) to liquidate the guerrilla movement. The operation was planned by U.S. advisers. The area of guerrilla activity was watched closely. The least suspicion of contact with or sympathies toward the guerrillas was enough to have people arrested and brought to the torture centers established by the CIA. The army and the special groups detailed by the Interior Ministry and the National Police Directorate patrolled all cities, villages, roads and river crossings. "Surprisingly", this was when and where American Peace Corps

volunteers began conducting their "surveys of social relations in rural areas".

Beginning in April 1967, C-130 and C-141 U.S. Air Force cargo planes airlifted weapons and equipment to La Paz and Santa Cruz from the Canal Zone. Under pressure from Washington, Argentine, Brazilian and Paraguayan troops joined the campaign against the Bolivian democratic and guerrilla movement not only by sealing off the borders but also by supplying Barrientos with weapons and ammunition.

A large group of U.S. instructors arrived in Bolivia to train a special counterinsurgency battalion of rangers. With Barrientos' consent, each ranger unit had its own U.S. adviser. On June 24, 1967, the Day of John the Baptist, the U.S.-trained Bolivian rangers were "baptized" in blood—they murdered hundreds of defenseless miners.

By the fall of 1967 there was a total of 1,000 U.S. military advisers in Bolivia. General Richard B. Johnson, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and General Robert W. Porter, chief of the U.S. Southern Command, wanted the Green Berets to be sent to Bolivia. CIA Director Richard Helms offered the services of his agency for the elimination of Che Guevara. Finally, a special task force was set up under General William Sker, chief of U.S. Southern Command Intelligence, who had become expert at suppressing guerrilla movements in Peru, Colombia and Venezuela. In Bolivia proper, the operation was directed by General Henry Alger, commander of the Green Berets and Colonel Edward Fox, CIA station chief in Bolivia.

Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance planes of U.S. Air Force Intelligence took aerial photographs of the major guerrilla bases. The U.S. National In-

telligence Board also used its spy satellites for this purpose. The entire U.S. intelligence community was thrown into action against Che Guevara and the handful of his supporters. The final stage of Operation Cynthia began in late September. One third of the Bolivian armed forces moved into the area where Guevara's group, much less than one hundred strong, operated. General Jorge Belmonte Ardiles, chief of the Bolivian Air Force, told journalists that napalm was being used against the guerrillas.

On October 7, 1967 the guerrillas entered the Yuro Canyon. Che wrote about it in the last entry in his diary: "Eleven months of our guerrilla activity have elapsed without complications, bucolically.... The 17 of us started on our way; the moon was very dim and the march was very arduous.... At two we stopped for a rest, but it was pointless to go on."⁷ Guevara did not know that the Bolivian rangers and their U.S. advisers had learned about the guerrillas' route and prepared an ambush.

At 8.30 in the morning Guevara was told that Yuro was surrounded. A battle began. Some of the guerrillas broke through and escaped, but Che was not among them.

At about three in the afternoon on October 8 a Bolivian guerrilla was trying to carry Guevara, wounded in the leg, to safety. But Che was captured by the soldiers. Captain Gary Prado, commander of the ranger unit sent to Yuro, identified the wounded man and immediately radioed Colonel Zenteno, commander of the 8th Division. The code signal was "500 cansada" ("Che captured"). Zenteno contacted La Paz and was told to ensure complete secrecy of everything connected with Che Guevara.

Zenteno said subsequently that on October 8,

having received the report about the clash with the guerrillas, the troops' casualties and the capture of Che Guevara and others, he sent to Yuro a helicopter carrying Lieutenant Colonel Andrés Selich who was to ascertain what had happened. At 6.30 on October 9 Zenteno arrived at the Vallegrande airfield where he was approached by Captain Félix Ramos of the CIA who asked Zenteno's permission to accompany him: Ramos said he knew Guevara personally and this would help in the identification and interrogation of the prisoner.

On arrival in La Higuera, Zenteno learned from reports delivered by Major Ayoroa and Captain Prado that the bodies of five guerrillas and the captured knapsacks and documents were in the house belonging to a certain Hidalgo, the local telephone operator. In the courtyard of the house, Zenteno saw Captain Félix Ramos photograph a red notebook—Che Guevara's diary.

Having collected Che Guevara's diary, carbine and several other items, Zenteno took a helicopter back to Vallegrande. A few minutes later General Ovando, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, accompanied by General David La Fuente and Rear Admiral Horacio Ugarteche, arrived there too. Zenteno gave Guevara's diary to General Ovando. At eleven o'clock on the next day a press conference was held in Vallegrande at which Che Guevara's diary was displayed.

Zenteno told all this to a military tribunal in July 1968. Asked on whose orders and for what purposes Captain Ramos had photographed the diary, Zenteno replied that no special order had been given and that Ramos had taken the photographs on his own initiative, in accordance with "established practice".

Lieutenant Colonel Andrés Selich testified that

"all documents were always collected by Mr. Gabriel García, member of the CIA ... and photographed in their entirety in Vallegrande by Captain Félix Ramos, member of the 2nd Section (counterintelligence—*Authors*) of the 8th Division Command and also a CIA agent. As far as I know, these documents were developed in the United States and the photocopies were subsequently handed over to the Second Department (military counterintelligence—*Authors*)". According to Selich, the documents captured in the battle of Yuro were given to Ramos who had arrived in La Higuera with a great deal of equipment and a powerful radio transmitter "which was installed immediately, and a coded message was sent ... to an unknown destination".

There was the following exchange:

"Q.: Do you have anything to add to your preceding statement?

"A.: Yes, General. Simply that the CIA Intelligence Group sent to the zone of operations did an important job; I would stress that they produced original photographs of the guerrillas operating in the area as well as their complete descriptions. ... I would also like to say that all the documents captured in Vallegrande Province were collected and brought to the city of La Paz by Mr. Gabriel García."

Here is a quotation from the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Miguel Ayoroa, commander of the 2nd Ranger Battalion:

"Q.: Did you take part in the battle of Yuro or did you arrive at the scene immediately afterward?

"A.: I was present during the battle of Yuro from the moment I arrived, but I took no part in it in view of the fact that Captain Gary Prado had directed it from the beginning. Immedi-

ately after it was over Captain Prado, Colonel Selich and myself met at the battlefield in order to issue certain instructions, especially with regard to Che, who was wounded....

"That was when we were surprised by the arrival of a helicopter with Colonel Zenteno himself, the division commander, accompanied by Captain Ramos. Having given my report, I invited Colonel Zenteno to the command post. He indicated that he wanted to see the prisoner, and I replied that there was no prisoner, that the wounded man had died."

These direct or indirect participants in the La Higuera operation testified in July 1968, many months after the event. Nevertheless, it is clear that they contradicted one another and tried to escape the responsibility.

Going back to October 1967, let us recall that Colonel Zenteno, Rear Admiral Ugarteche and General Ovando held a press conference on October 10, after visiting Yuro and La Higuera. Zenteno announced that Guevara died of his wounds on the battlefield. Ugarteche added that Che identified himself just before dying. Ovando completed the picture by quoting Guevara's last words: "I'm Che." All three were literally lying like troopers.

But there were other witnesses who saw a helicopter land at the Vallegrande airfield at about five in the afternoon on October 9. They saw a man (it was Ramos) take Guevara's body out and try to keep journalists away from the helicopter. Che's body was then taken to the hospital morgue where doctors got to work on it under Ramos' supervision. They took a death mask of Guevara's face, cut off his hands and preserved them in alcohol. The killers wanted to have proof that their victim was indeed Che. Unwittingly,

the doctors gave the lie to the testimony of Ovando, Zenteno and Ugarteche. The fact is that several bullet wounds were found on Che's body, but only one (near the heart) was lethal. The doctors determined that Guevara had died about five hours previously, that is, about noon on October 9. But the battle of Yuro was over on October 8. This meant that Guevara, who "died of wounds on the battlefield", was alive after his "death".

Later, some of the direct participants in the affair started talking. Second Lieutenant Mario Huerta testified that Che had not died on the battlefield, that attempts had been made to interrogate him on the morning of October 9. The peasants of La Higuera saw Che Guevara too. A woman teacher of the school where he was kept talked to him. Félix Ramos, drunk, once bragged to his colleagues in the United States that he had personally taken some shots at Che's legs.

The available facts make it possible to fully reconstruct the tragic events of the morning of October 9. Wounded in the leg, Che was brought to La Higuera and put in one of the two rooms in the hut that passed for the local school. The guards did not leave the room, keeping a close watch over him. Attempts to interrogate him were made first by Selich, then by Miguel Ayoroa, Gary Prado, Ugarteche, Zenteno and, finally, Ramos. Che did not answer. Ramos tried to make some kind of a deal with Guevara but failed again and left. Colonel Zenteno and his aides were waiting for Ramos in the school courtyard. Zenteno ordered Captain Gary Prado to execute Guevara, but Prado refused to comply. Mario Terán, a Bolivian army officer, was the first to fire his U.S.-made automatic carbine. A group of

trigger-happy officers and men appeared at the door. Ramos whipped out a .45 Colt and shot Guevara in the left breast (this was the fatal wound). Seeing that Che was still stirring, Sergeant Huanca shot him in the neck. A brief pause was followed by another shot, but Che was already dead.

After a while the helicopter engine revved up and Zenteno left for Vallegrande. He was followed by Ramos who was bringing Guevara's body in another helicopter.

On October 11 Che's body disappeared from the morgue. Witnesses have reported that at six o'clock in the morning a plane with no identification signs landed at the Vallegrande airfield. The plane carried Ramos and the casket with Che Guevara's body. True, Barrientos and Ovan do claimed that Guevara was buried in Bolivia and that they alone knew the location of the grave. Then both said the body was cremated and the ashes buried. We are inclined to agree with those who maintain that CIA agents transported Che's body to the Canal Zone.

A Bolt Out of the Blue

In the small hours of July 21, 1968 two people crossed the Bolivian border into Chile and immediately asked for political asylum. They were Antonio Arguedas, the Bolivian Interior Minister, and his brother Jaime. This was a sensational development. Even in turbulent Latin America, interior ministers rarely ask for political asylum.

Antonio Arguedas was born into a prosperous family. In his youth, however, he belonged, for a time, to the Left Revolutionary Party which,

although claiming to be an "independent Marxist party", was very far from Marxism. Soon Arguedas drifted away from "Marxism", enrolled in the National Air Force School and established close ties to MNR supporters among the cadets and officers. Antonio Arguedas served in the Air Force from 1946 to 1966.

He met René Barrientos in 1963. During his Air Force career he also came on friendly terms with other people who had connections in the U.S. embassy and the CIA—Colonel Zenteno and Colonel Juan Quiroga Terán. Very soon Arguedas became Barrientos' political and economic adviser. Then Barrientos asked him to set up a special group to develop the general's political platform for the Presidential elections, prepare his election campaign speeches, maintain relations with the press and the like. Immediately after the 1964 coup, Barrientos appointed Arguedas Deputy Interior Minister and in August 1966, Interior Minister.

Two years later Arguedas asked for political asylum in Chile. He was immediately handed over to Chilean intelligence, but before that he managed to make public the fact that he had sent Che Guevara's diary to Cuba in 1967. Arguedas told newsmen that "on November 15, 1967 I received the negatives (of the diary—*Authors*) from CIA agent Hugh Murray. I had made several copies of them and on the next day returned them to CIA agent Gabriel García. Later they gave me a complete set of the negatives ... for President Barrientos. This was the copy I sent to Cuba."

On January 14, 1969, testifying before the district court of the La Paz criminal police, Arguedas offered the following explanation of the motives behind his decision to send the diary to

Cuba: "From conversations with U.S. officials I learned that the U.S. government was greatly interested in encouraging curiosity about the contents of the field diary of Comandante Ernesto Guevara, so as to present a concocted version or introduce important modifications into the original; the aim was to justify an armed multinational aggression against Cuba and mass reprisals within the nation—a provocation which would result from the publication of a false or altered edition of this document." The CIA did plan to discredit Cuban revolutionary leaders by publishing an appropriately distorted version of the diary. And then, while the brightest of the CIA's analysts were working on such a text, Guevara's authentic diary, the one supplied by Arguedas, was published in Cuba. Enraged, the CIA bigwigs demanded that the source of the leak be traced.

Arguedas' interviews and testimony at his trial in La Paz, where he returned in August 1968, reconstructed the unsightly picture of CIA interference in all aspects of Bolivia's economy, politics and culture. As *Punto Final*, a Chilean periodical, wrote, "as soon as it was learned that Arguedas had fled to Chile, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mobilized diplomatic and police channels to silence the Bolivian cabinet minister. As a prominent member of General René Barrientos' government and the man directly in charge of the police agencies, he had extensive knowledge of U.S. clandestine operations in Bolivia and in other Latin American countries."⁸

In his interview to *La Prensa*, a Lima-based newspaper, Arguedas described some of the aspects of CIA activities in Bolivia.⁹ One example concerned the pressure the CIA once brought to

bear on the Bolivian government in order to land a lucrative contract for Brown Engineering, a U.S. company. At his August 17, 1968 press conference in La Paz Arguedas told newsmen about the interrogations he had been subjected to in the Latin American Center of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division in Lima.

CIA agents dealt ruthlessly with union activists at U.S. enterprises in Bolivia, monitored the political reliability of the personnel, suppressed strikes and even provided scabs. They used their contacts among journalists to organize slanderous campaigns in the Bolivian press against persons the monopolies had a grudge against. If that failed, they staged assassinations. Arguedas stressed that CIA agents in Bolivia were mostly Cuban counterrevolutionaries. He named some of them (Mario González, Félix Ramos, Gabriel García and Nicolás Hernández). He also identified John Shelton and Hugh Murray, allegedly of USIA, as the CIA station chief in Bolivia and his deputy. Arguedas disclosed that the CIA had established radio stations and torture centers of its own in Bolivia (in La Paz and Sorata) where people the agency was interested in were interrogated. The CIA helped some and removed others, but it never lost sight of the interests of U.S. monopolies in that country. CIA agents (including Arguedas) ensured particularly lucrative contracts, tax rebates and the like for them.

On August 27 *Punto Final* ran an article entitled "The CIA in Chile" which said Arguedas had left with the periodical information on the CIA to be made public if Langley decided to have him killed. Arguedas also sent photostats of these documents to *Ramparts* magazine and *The New York Times*. *Punto Final* stressed that

the Chilean government granted political asylum to him on condition that he did not expose CIA activities. According to Arguedas, the CIA station chief in Santiago de Chile was Oscar Pizarro Barrios, while the CIA men in the Chilean security services were Eduardo Zúñiga Pacheco, deputy chief of the Chilean police, Enrique Krauss, deputy Interior Minister, Colonel Emilio Oelckers, head of the General Directorate of Investigation, and others.¹⁰

In his September 10 interview to *Punto Final* Arguedas said he had been appointed Interior Minister in August 1966, when a guerrilla movement had started in eastern Bolivia. Arguedas was summoned by John Tilton, the new CIA station chief in Bolivia, and told that advisers to the Interior Ministry would include Gabriel García, Ramos, Mario González and other CIA officials. Hugh Murray, Tilton's deputy, was made security adviser to the Bolivian government. Arguedas recalled that "the CIA knew about the guerrillas' preparations several months before they launched operations. A guerrilla group in Santa Cruz was under investigation. The man who supplied information was a certain Mr. López Durán. He informed us that a guerrilla unit of the pro-Peking Communist Party was being organized. I suspected that this individual was telling us only half of what he knew, and I ordered the police to investigate him in depth. This was how we came across a house near the Mexican embassy where a so-called press information service under a certain Mr. Monje Pinedo operated. They had telegraph equipment, devices to monitor telephone conversations, etc. The house was raided and the police seized it all. When I was preparing to announce the exposure of an intelligence network of the pro-Peking guerrillas,

the CIA operative Hugh Murray, very much annoyed, visited me and told me that both the equipment and the network belonged to the CIA. In other words, the CIA maintains its own intelligence networks and spying equipment, apart from the relevant services of the local government."¹¹

At that time, Arguedas said, the CIA charged him with going to Santa Cruz and bribing Federico Escobar, the miners' leader just back from a trip to China and the socialist community. The play fell through. Then the CIA entrusted Arguedas with organizing a campaign to discredit Alberto Bailey, one of the directors of the *Presencia* magazine whose associates' views worried the station. Another mission was connected with an effort to wreck loan negotiations with France because U.S. banks did not want to lose a profitable customer.

The CIA, Arguedas charged, used its people in the Bolivian state apparatus to prevent the establishment and development of economic and diplomatic ties with socialist nations. "The power the CIA wields in all Latin American countries is well known," Arguedas said in his interview to *Punto Final*. "Not only in our country but in all Latin American countries the CIA is on the lookout for reliable men to introduce as agents into the intelligence services."

Here is an excerpt from Arguedas' testimony at the trial on October 23, 1968:

"Q.: You have indicated that American organizations like the Peace Corps, USIA, etc., are part of the CIA. Why do you maintain that?"

"A.: When I was released in the United States the CIA agent in whose custody I was gave me a telephone number in Lima so that in case it was necessary I could contact a man who

would answer to the name 'Nancho'.... I contacted this agent, and it turned out that this gentleman's name was Carranza and that he was a member of a group of economic advisers in Peru. In the course of investigating the existence of guerrilla groups (in Bolivia—*Authors*) some of my agents told me that Peace Corps members in rural areas did not limit their activities to technical cooperation but tried to obtain information about the antecedents of the people who inhabited a definite area or community. Well acquainted with the methods of agent infiltration and with the incidents that occurred in different parts of the world, I am convinced that the U.S. intelligence services use all these methods to infiltrate their agents into localities....

"Q.: Since when has the CIA infiltrated our state security agencies?

"A.: As to U.S. infiltration of our Ministry's intelligence service, I cannot cite precise dates, but I believe that since 1965 U.S. officials have worked in close contact with the chiefs of the Control Politico. At the 1965 Interpol Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Commissioner Fortino Baldovieso told a representative of the U.S. delegation that USAID police advisers in Bolivia were preoccupied more with organizing 'political control' (against the Left—*Authors*) than with really advising the police."¹²

An excerpt from Arguedas' testimony at the trial on January 14, 1969:

"Q.: Could you describe the ways the United States Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA, uses to interfere in Bolivian affairs, and are high-level government officials aware of this interference?

"A.: U.S. colonization is an objective fact, and Bolivian patriots are greatly concerned about it.

As a repressive tool of the U.S. government, the Central Intelligence Agency utilizes all the available means of obtaining information, manipulating public opinion, monitoring the information received by the national governments, slandering and discrediting the liberation movements; all that is done to facilitate these countries' infiltration by the big capitalist consortia and to make the governments bow to them.

"Q.: Since when do you believe the CIA has been interfering in security operations and agencies?

"A.: Your Honor, I would say it has been approximately since 1957, but there have been press reports to the effect that ... contacts with the Americans have been maintained since the term of office of the first MNR government (i. e., since 1952—*Authors*)....

"Q.: Tell us if you belonged to the CIA....

"A.: My relations with the United States Central Intelligence Agency were official, and I am convinced that aside from a few exceptions Interior Ministers have always maintained such contacts and received subsidies for various purposes. In some countries where the institutional tradition is more firm, the CIA looks for contacts with career functionaries and probably cooperates with politicians. Government may change many times, but the apparatus of foreign domination and domestic coercion remains unchanged. That is the basic rule....

"Q.: Do you believe that you have disclosed all you know about the CIA?

"A.: No, Your Honor. The current military legislation ... prevents me in certain cases from answering in full, but I believe I have said enough for the people to form a picture."¹³

Before this testimony at the trial, while still

in Chile, Arguedas spent some time with Chilean intelligence and then visited Buenos Aires, London, New York and Lima. He made statements for the press at each stop. While in Lima, he surprised everyone by announcing that he was returning to La Paz, to face trial and answer for what he had done.

And now, back to the question about the way Arguedas was recruited by the CIA. We might recall that after seizing power, Barrientos made his protégé Deputy Interior Minister.

An excerpt from Arguedas' testimony at the trial on January 14, 1969:

"Q.: What were the circumstances of your appointment as Deputy Interior Minister and then Interior Minister in the cabinet?

"A.: Initially, when we were talking about future work, I asked (Barrientos—*Authors*) to be put in the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Labor or the Ministry of Finance, but Colonel Quiroga Terán, a personal friend of mine, asked me to accept the post of Deputy Interior Minister. Forty days after my appointment I had to resign under pressure from the U.S. embassy. But after submitting me to an interrogation in Lima, the U.S. government no longer obstructed in any way my promotions; on the contrary, its diplomatic, political and intelligence officials began to praise my activities."¹⁴

What happened was that the CIA station in Bolivia decided to recruit Arguedas, a close friend of Barrientos. Colonel Edward Fox had long "heart-to-heart" talks with him. But, since Arguedas had been connected with the Left Revolutionary Party and called himself a "Marxist" in his youth, he had to be screened. And so he left for Lima, accompanied by Edward Fox, Larry Sterfield, the new Bolivian CIA station chief, and

Néstor Leondiris, chief of the U.S. public security mission in Bolivia. At that time, Lima was the site of the Latin American Center of the Western Hemisphere Division in the CIA Clandestine Services. For 20 days Arguedas was subjected to intensive questioning in the CIA interrogation chamber. The latest techniques were used, including LSD and other narcotic drugs. The CIA wanted to be sure Arguedas was no "Communist" or "KGB agent".

Apparently, the CIA bigwigs in the Lima center were satisfied with the outcome of the interrogation. Arguedas received a check for 6,500 dollars and agreed to "cooperate" with the CIA. On his return to La Paz the new CIA agent was reinstated as Deputy Interior Minister.

Arguedas went through a new check in July 1966, when he was about to become Interior Minister. This time he had to go to the United States, to undergo an "examination" in Langley. Another check for 6,500 dollars followed, and Arguedas returned to La Paz. On August 6, 1966 he was made Bolivian Interior Minister.

Two years later Arguedas decided to call it quits. At the trial, he was often asked about the motives behind his determination to leave Bolivia. He cited two chief reasons. "I left the country," he said, "because in the course of exercising my duties as cabinet minister I had become objectively convinced that our country had lost a large measure of its national sovereignty, and that the U.S. services had become all-powerful."¹⁵ Arguedas told newsmen: "I have definitively broken with the CIA. I have ceased to be a foreign agent in my own country, I have recovered my human dignity. I will never again convert myself into a U.S. agent."¹⁶ Arguedas added that the CIA threatened to kill him for having

released Che Guevara's diary and for his attempt to "come clean".

The well-known Argentine journalist Gregorio Selser described Arguedas' decision as the awakening of a mutilated conscience. No doubt, one of the motives was his wounded pride, his desire to get back at the CIA for years of humiliation. Another probable reason was his realization that he had been an accomplice to crimes against his country and that it was possible for him to restore his good name in his own eyes. There is no doubt that here Guevara's diary was a catalyst. This passionate book written by a selfless internationalist can and does affect anyone who reads it. It is quite capable of awakening the conscience of one who still has at least a minimum of integrity, patriotism and will to act.

Obviously, Arguedas knew too much both about the habits and ways of the La Paz rulers and about CIA activities in Bolivia. As Bolivian Interior Minister he knew the true story of Che Guevara's death. Obviously, Arguedas' familiarity with the CIA's "sensitive operations" in his country finally made him see the light. A politician of long standing, he realized that the rule of Barrientos was nearing its end, that Ovando would soon win his internal struggle with the President; this boded ill for the well-informed Interior Minister and personal adviser to the President.

The reaction of the CIA to Arguedas' defection from Bolivia was mixed. On the one hand, the agency wanted to keep the former Interior Minister from spilling CIA secrets. On the other hand, Langley realized that if a man well acquainted with CIA ways decided to defect, he was sure to have some aces up his sleeve to protect himself with. After his defection Arguedas spent

a week in Chile where CIA agents were present during his interrogation by Chilean intelligence. Then he embarked on his strange odyssey from Chile to Buenos Aires to London to New York to Lima, accompanied by Leondiris and Pizarro, both CIA agents.

The CIA wanted Arguedas to "come to his senses"; it even drew up a scenario according to which the blame for the release of Guevara's diary would be put on General Ovando or General Marcos Vasquez, a close friend of the latter. Leondiris told Arguedas: "Why don't you say that it was Marcos Vasquez who obtained the copy and sold it, that you, to save your nation's dignity, took on the role of the scapegoat? In this case, if you mean you're ashamed, all you have to do is write down a figure, and I tell you my country will pay." Then there was a plan to infiltrate Arguedas into Cuba. "You'll transmit all the information to us," Leondiris said, "and in this case we offer much more. In this case you can be sure we'll do anything you want."¹⁷

It goes without saying that simultaneously, the CIA threatened Arguedas too. He later admitted that CIA agents promised to have his wife and four children who lived in La Paz killed if he told "too much" about CIA operations in Bolivia to journalists or anyone else. That is why at the trial in La Paz Arguedas announced that the information he had collected from the Interior Ministry's secret files to provide himself with "insurance" was kept in a safe place and would be used if necessary, if the CIA decided to eliminate him. When the judge asked him whether it was true that he had deposited a tape recording somewhere in Lima to be used if his life was threatened, Arguedas replied that he had prepared not one but one hundred and seven such

tapes. On the other hand, Arguedas admitted that "in order to prove his good faith to the CIA in intending to keep his promise (to say nothing about the CIA in Chile), he revealed the name of the person who had in La Paz a tape recording of the circumstances of Che Guevara's death.... The CIA recovered the tape on the eighth of this month (August—*Authors*)."

Apparently, during Arguedas' forced tour of Buenos Aires, London, New York and Lima, he did reach some sort of compromise with the CIA. This is borne out by the fact that while in his first interviews Arguedas cited many facts, his subsequent statements were increasingly confined to vague generalities. True, in some interviews Arguedas did say that he had collected "certain documents to write a book denouncing the infiltration of U.S. imperialism into my country and in particular, about CIA activities in various Latin American countries".⁴⁹

Naturally, the book never materialized. Meanwhile, the Arguedas affair became a cause célèbre, and it was decided to play it down. At first the Bolivian authorities wanted to charge Arguedas with treason for sending Che Guevara's diary to Cuba and to have him court-martialed. But then the case was transferred to a civilian court, and Arguedas was accused of abusing his powers and, a short while later, merely of interference in the affairs of the armed forces. In January 1969 the case was dropped and Arguedas was released.

But it turned out that Arguedas was a marked man. Within a very short time there were three attempts on his life. Finally, a burst of machine-gun fire from a passing car caught him in downtown La Paz, and he was hospitalized. Immediately after his discharge from the hospital

he sought refuge in the Mexican embassy and, having secured permission to emigrate, left Bolivia.

Barrientos, a Green Beret trained by Edward Fox, whose destiny (and the CIA) had led him to the Presidential palace, became dangerous to the CIA. To begin with, he lost touch with reality, proclaimed himself "President for life" and decided to become the complete boss. Another thing that increasingly annoyed the CIA was his extortionist habits: U.S. monopolies operating in Bolivia had to pay him sizable bribes. Concessions and contracts also had a stiff price. For example, the Matilde deposit was handed over to Philip Brothers, an American company, only after Barrientos received 300,000 dollars in cash. J. A. Jones Construction, another U.S. firm, paid him 10 million dollars to land the contract for the building of the Cochabamba-Chaparo highway. In 1975 Robert Dorsey, President of the Gulf Corporation, admitted that his company had paid Barrientos and his cronies over four million dollars. The U.S. monopolies which were in constant contact with CIA men began to bombard top level Agency officials with complaints about Barrientos, urging them to put the upstart in his place.

Meanwhile, tensions were mounting within the Bolivian ruling clique. Resentment against Barrientos was spreading not only among the people but also in the armed forces, despite the generous fringe benefits enjoyed by the officers. Eventually, the opposition rallied around General Ovando. For his part, Barrientos decided to purge the armed forces of his opponents and drew up the so-called May Plan. A clandestine military organization was set up for this purpose, called the Nancahuazú Lodge. The choice of the name

was no accident: its members included Goitia, Arguedas, Reque Terán, Prado, Selich, Ayoroa and others connected with the 1967 events in Nancahuazú, with the murder of Che Guevara. But it was not enough to start a conspiracy and prepare agents. What was lacking was the consent of the CIA.

Barrientos asked Larry Sterfield, the Bolivian CIA station chief, for permission to "remove" Ovando. But the permission never came. Langley was alarmed by Barrientos' attempts to arm his supporters and start a war against Ovando. The CIA was also worried about the possible disclosure of its ties to Barrientos. Although the latter worked hard to prevent this information from leaking to the public, he failed. The dictator became a dangerous nuisance. He had to be taken care of.

A certain Captain José Rico Toro arrived unexpectedly in Cochabamba in April 1969, during Barrientos' visit to the city. Toro, an agent of the DIA, was accompanied by three expert snipers. He and his boys had a sensitive mission to accomplish.

On April 27, 1969 the sun shone on the Western airfield in Cochabamba. A huge crowd had assembled there to attend celebration of an event Barrientos recalled with particular pleasure: five years back a mutiny of the Cochabamba garrison had launched Barrientos on his way to the Presidency. Barrientos strutted toward his helicopter (he loved to strut).

The helicopter climbed smoothly, but then the incredulous crowd below saw it skid, hit a power line mast and explode.

The official explanation was that it was an accident and blamed it on the pilot who failed to avoid the collision with the mast. The Presi-

dent of Bolivia died in a burning helicopter, the one presented to him by the Gulf Oil Company. In actual fact, the crash was staged by CIA agents. When the helicopter lifted off, several shots were fired from a hill opposite the runway, killing the pilot. Two years after Barrientos' death, several journalists managed to find witnesses who saw the snipers. The doctor who had examined the bodies testified that he had found bullet wounds on the pilot's body. Besides, the policemen who had been on duty guarding the helicopter on that day said that when the helicopter had crashed, three unidentified persons had run toward it from the hill but fled when the patrol was approaching.

Generals Come and Go But the CIA Abides

General Ovando was in seventh heaven: at long last, he was President of Bolivia. Captain José Toro, the man who directed the snipers, was immediately promoted and, now a major, was put in charge of the President's military office. The death of Barrientos started a chain of equally "mysterious" accidents in which scores of his closest supporters were killed. Those who survived fled abroad. The CIA was getting rid of dangerous witnesses.

But Ovando's rule was short-lived. The attempt of this ambitious general who had waited so long for his turn in the Presidential palace to pass himself off as an advocate of reform and champion of national sovereignty was received coldly. Ovando remained anathema to the Left: his hands were stained with Che's blood. Washington was not happy with him either: his actions were considered "hasty" and "affecting U.S. interests". The Pentagon wanted an improved Barri-

entos in Bolivia—an up-to-date version of a leader who would be skilled at combining nationalist phraseology with protection of U.S. monopoly interests. That was also the ideal of Barrientos' supporters and others of the far right. Ovando's backers were apprehensive too, fearing that "playing at reforms" could get out of hand and lead to an explosion of popular discontent and increased activity on the Left.

With the CIA's blessing, General Rogelio Miranda, commander of the army and chairman of the Supreme Council of National Defense, General David La Fuente, the Defense Minister, and Colonel Juan Ayoroa, the Interior Minister, headed a conspiracy against Ovando. In early 1970 the U.S. embassy in La Paz was the site of secret meetings between representatives of this group and Pentagon and CIA envoys. In the fall of 1970 the crisis in the leadership of the Bolivian armed forces reached its peak. The powerful Nancahuazú Lodge demanded that President Ovando return to a hardline policy.

On October 1 Miranda issued an ultimatum demanding that the President resign and hand power over to a junta. On October 4 an army mutiny broke out. Deprived of army support, Ovando hastened to announce that he was resigning in favor of a military junta led by Miranda. But the junta failed to assume power. While the supporters of Barrientos and Ovando's followers in the top echelons of the Bolivian army quarreled over who would take which post in the future government a left-wing military group under General Juan José Torres suddenly interfered and seized power on October 7. The decisive role in the take over was played by two political forces: the Left groups and parties united in the Politi-

cal Command of the Workers and the People and the nationalist factions in the army.

It was General Torres' turn to move into Palacio Quemado, the Presidential palace. A nationalist, he saw the army as the only force wielding real power in Bolivia: "In semicolonial countries (he held Bolivia was one—*Authors*) there is no sufficiently strong class; neither the proletariat nor the peasants nor the middle class nor the bourgeoisie is capable of defending the country against imperialist exploitation. In these countries, only the armies possess organization and force." ²⁰ Torres believed that the army should above all be an instrument of and a vigorous participant in the social and economic development of its country, not a tool used to protect the interests of the oligarchy and imperialists. At the same time, Torres was unable to rid himself of the most typical petty-bourgeois trait—the lack of faith in the capabilities of the people and the striving to find a "common language" with Washington.

Trying to preserve good relations with the United States and with the right wing, Torres appointed General Luis Reque Terán, a CIA agent and a friend of René Barrientos, commander of the army. Admiral David La Fuente, another close friend of Barrientos and a fervent anticommunist, was made Minister of Defense. Obviously, such people could hardly be expected to support the policy of "building a new society" proclaimed by Torres. Besides, the President could not bring himself to follow the advice of a group of young army officers—arm a workers' militia in the capital.

Meanwhile, a new conspiracy was being hatched. The first attempt to bring off a coup came in January 1971. Having failed, it was followed

by others: on March 4 and 27 and on April 26. Ernst Siracusa, the new U.S. ambassador, arrived in Bolivia. This former CIA station chief in Peru was a U.S. State Department expert on coup preparation. The CIA's Bolivian network also played its part in the conspiracy.

Three military factions vied with one another for the honor of leading the coup: an extreme right group led by General Juan Lechín and two rival groups of Barrientos' followers—the Nanchuazú Lodge under the brothers Miguel and Juan Ayoroa and the Santa Cruz Department group of Colonel Hugo Banzer and Andrés Selich. The leaders of the rival groups held meetings in the U.S. embassy in La Paz discussing terms. Finally, an agreement was reached: the CIA was to pay 1.5 million dollars to the civilian leaders and twice as much to the military. Like in 1964, large sums were provided by the Gulf Oil Corporation.

As always, the coup was preceded by a mass media campaign. Newspapers and radio stations were screaming bloody murder, charging that Torres had sold out to international communism and was planning to establish a "dictatorship of the proletariat". Right-wing radio urged extermination of all Communists, claiming that they had plunged the country into chaos. Among the newspapers, the most vociferous was *Libertad* which, contrary to its name, was financed by the U.S. embassy. *Libertad* reported that Hugo Banzer was about to launch a "liberation" invasion from Brazil. Other newspapers asserted that Santa Cruz Department had already set up a government of its own.

Forty-eight hours prior to the coup the U.S. embassy warned American citizens in La Paz to build a stock of food and to remain at home for

the next few days. On August 18 Brazilian Air Force planes began to openly deliver weapons and ammunition for the insurgents to airfields in Santa Cruz Department. The mutiny was touched off by the rangers: the disciples of U.S. Green Berets were again in business. "Now the guns will talk," Andrés Selich said. "Shoot first and ask for identification later" was the motto of his cutthroats who organized a citywide man-hunt for progressives. After the rangers, several army units in La Paz and Cochabamba also mutinied.

General Reque Terán stormed into the President's office in Palacio Quemado:

"Mr. President, everything is lost.

"I will not resign. I will discharge my duties as President of my people to the last moment, even if I have to die for them to leave the palace.

"General, I don't want you dead. It was you back then, and you who have planted the seeds of this process have to come back to our side.

"Don't insist, General. I have told you I will not resign. I cannot abandon the people. I will stay on their side, whatever happens to me. The clash between imperialism and the unarmed people is inevitable. You are either for the interests of Bolivia or against them."²¹

Huge crowds converged on the palace from all over La Paz, chanting "Arms! Give us arms!" Loyal troops under Major Sanchez were ready to attack the mutineers.

The narrow-mindedness of a petty-bourgeois nationalist in a general's uniform led to yet another defeat of the progressive anti-imperialist forces. The interests of the Bolivian people were sacrificed to the mythical "unity of the armed forces".

New U.S. Puppets Come on Stage

It is perfectly obvious that there was no unity in the Bolivian armed forces. Among the military there were people of progressive views, quists, open advocates of the hard line, and CIA agents. The CIA station was working hard in the Bolivian army, setting up numerous splinter groups and factions whose leaders kept jockeying for power.

This means that Torres' fallacious determination to preserve the "unity of the armed forces" at any cost spelled defeat. One must admit that the CIA was pursuing a sufficiently flexible and farsighted policy, without trying to railroad things through. In the case of Torres, the CIA station waited for all or most of the patriotic army officers to reveal themselves, and only then moved to crush them ruthlessly. The purge that followed the coup removed all officers and generals holding anti-American views from army ranks. Many of them were later assassinated by CIA agents. That was what happened to General Torres: after emigrating to Buenos Aires, he was killed there by a CIA agent in June 1976.

In 1971 Palacio Quemado opened its doors to Colonel Hugo Banzer. A graduate of the U.S. Academy of the Armored Forces, he had served as military attaché in the United States and—this is particularly important—was one of the "disciples" of Edward Fox. Having assumed the Presidency, this CIA agent promoted himself to the rank of general and announced his intention to "save our country from communism" and build a "New Bolivia".

Over the seven years of his rule, this "President" whom no one had ever elected turned Bolivia into a huge concentration camp. Hundreds

of patriots were killed, thousands were jailed. Industrial strikes and peasant outbreaks were suppressed by force of arms. CIA operatives who were collaborating closely with the Bolivian security services did much to help Banzer. During his rule Bolivian security officers went through advanced training in CIA and FBI schools in the United States.

In an attempt to provide some justification for the reign of terror and the tortures of innocent people, the CIA station in La Paz supplied its Bolivian colleagues with a faked document entitled *Safra Roja* (Red Harvest). Hugo Banzer loved to brandish this "secret document of international communism". The "document", typed as indistinctly as the notorious Plan Z advertised by Pinochet's secret police, was ascribed to General Torres who had ostensibly intended to eliminate Bolivia's top military and civilian leaders within three days and to proclaim the country a socialist republic. The executions, the paper asserted, were to be held everywhere, preferably as public spectacles at stadiums. Amado Canelas, a Bolivian journalist, summed it up very aptly when he said that the "Red Harvest" was "made for consumption by fools".²²

The late 1970s witnessed a whole series of military coups in Bolivia. General Pereda Asbún, yet another puppet, brought off his coup on July 9, 1978. This incensed General David Padilla, and he overthrew Asbún on November 24, 1978. The first thing Padilla did was to discharge Banzer, Asbún and some of their followers from the army. The new ruler held out for almost a year, but on November 1, 1979 Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch seized power, and Padilla became a retired general himself.

The game of Presidential leapfrog the generals

were playing was a clear indication that something had gone awry in the smoothly functioning mechanism the CIA had set up in Bolivia. Three coups in two years were too much even for Bolivia. But the scramble for power among the generals had its reasons. In the United States, Cosa Nostra is another name for the Mafia, the organization controlling the underworld. "Coca Nostra" is a Bolivian term: the country was turned into a giant plantation of the coca shrub whose leaves are the source of cocaine. Bolivia became one of the world's foremost producers and exporters of narcotics. According to the most conservative estimates, the Bolivian Mafia made over 1,200 million dollars selling drugs to the United States in 1980²³—at least twice the official export earnings figure. From a country of "tin barons" Bolivia turned into a domain of "coca barons". To be in the Presidential palace meant control of the cocaine traffic or at least access to fabulous profits.

In 1979 President Jimmy Carter ordered the CIA to build up an "image of decency" for Bolivia. On orders from Langley, Natusch handed power over to a civilian government under Lidia Geiler Tejada and left for Switzerland where he had the foresight to transfer the eight million dollars he had made during his two weeks in office.

In June 1980, even Presidential elections were held in Bolivia. The winner was Hernán Siles Zuazo, a prominent MNR leader. But even before he moved to Palacio Quemado, the *Christian Science Monitor* wrote that "the military could well move against Mr. Siles Zuazo"²⁴ because they saw this very moderate—perhaps too moderate—politician as a "Communist".

On the eve of the elections Siles Zuazo held

secret negotiations with General Luis García Mesa, a CIA man. García Mesa and his friend Luis Arce, the Interior Minister, were closely connected with the drug traffic. García Mesa was told to sound Siles Zuazo out.

And so García met with Zuazo to discuss two questions: Zuazo's position vis-à-vis the military and the issue of the coca plantations and the cocaine business. General García let it be understood that Zuazo's future as President would depend on his answers to these questions. Siles Zuazo assured the general that he understood the role of the military in the nation's politics and that the military budget would be increased if Zuazo became President.

Difficulties arose on the second issue. Siles Zuazo pointed out to General García that many of his colleagues had become too notoriously involved in the drug traffic and that their Mafia connections, corruption and currency swindles had aroused widespread indignation. "No army in the world would tolerate such people," Siles Zuazo said, and these words sealed his fate. "Pity," García replied dryly.

Immediately after Siles Zuazo's victory at the elections, another military coup broke out. Led by General García, it started in Santa Cruz Department, and naturally, the rallying cry was "save the country from communism". Here is what *Resúmen*, a Venezuelan periodical, wrote in this connection: "It is common knowledge that it is ridiculous to talk about communist menace in Bolivia. The winner in the recent elections, Dr. Hernán Siles Zuazo, is, ideologically, no more than right of center which does not go beyond a liberal democracy."²⁵

The gorillas scream about the "communist threat" and the "eradication of communism"

merely to disguise their truckling to imperialism, their lust for power and money. Felipe Rodríguez, member of the Communist Party of Bolivia Central Committee, said in his interview to *L'Humanité* that "Mesa and his acolytes represent the most reactionary faction of the army 'bunker'. These officers have ties to the Mafia. . . . Referring to the role of the CIA in these developments, Rodríguez said that "everyone knows about the ties between the Bolivian military and the CIA. The U.S. agency was therefore aware of the preparations, if not directly responsible for the coup." 26

During a conference called immediately after the coup, García Mesa received 90 million dollars from the "coca barons". In return he declared that there would be no more gambling with elections and that he would remain in office for as long as it would take to get rid of the cancerous growth of communism, whether it took five, ten or twenty years.

Certain similarities between the Bolivian and the Chilean coups are readily apparent. Like in Chile, tens of thousands were thrown into makeshift concentration camps at stadiums. Thousands (3,000 to 4,000, according to some estimates) were shot or tortured to death. Activists of the Left were hunted throughout the country by outfits created by the CIA and comprising army men in plain clothes, police officers and underworld types. Night and day they cruised in ambulances around Bolivian cities looking for victims. Like in Chile, there were thousands of "missing persons". A "Fascist International" was active in Bolivia: it sent its interrogation and torture experts to La Paz. The local Mafia thugs were also used widely to assassinate Left-wingers.

But García was too hasty in assuming that he

was irreplaceable and firmly in control. Langley was very displeased when García's connections to the international Mafia and the drug traffic were not only made public in Bolivia but also caused a scandal in the United States, to the chagrin of the White House. García's sponsors could either openly approve of drug pushers or take "appropriate steps". The scandal over the Humi Mining Company was the last straw. It was revealed that this Mafia-owned company secured an exclusive right to mine precious stones in Santa Cruz Department in exchange for promising half its profits to García. This was a clear case of Mafia connections. In April 1981 well-informed sources reported that "the Reagan administration believes that a coup against General Luis García Mesa is only a matter of time". 27

The La Paz CIA station chief visited García and advised him to vacate Palacio Quemado and turn the Presidency over to General Luis Añez Rivero, the army chief of staff. But García was adamant. So, on June 27, 1981 Añez and General Umberto Coyoja, commander of the army, led an army mutiny—again, to "save Bolivia". Since García could hardly be described as a sympathizer of "international communism" the generals spoke of "returning to the pure sources of the revolution". The mutiny failed because most generals valued García and their share in the drug traffic even more than their friendship with the CIA.

Then generals Natusch and Prado came on the scene—the latter was the Prado who had been involved in the October 1967 murder of Che Guevara. The mutiny broke out in the city of Santa Cruz on August 4, 1981. After it was joined by most provincial garrisons, García resigned in favor of yet another military junta. The CIA station

could now report to Langley that all was quiet in Bolivia.

However, subsequent developments in Bolivia brought such rapid changes that they baffled even the Langley professionals. A fresh powerful upsurge of the revolutionary movement, the increasingly frequent strikes in the major industries organized by the Bolivian Labor Center against the ruling army elite and its campaign to thwart the social gains of working people (real wages had been cut in half over four years), the growing discord in the armed forces, and the sharp deterioration in Bolivia's economic position—these were the causes which prompted the military to reconsider Siles Zuazo's candidacy. In October 1982 the Bolivian parliament, dissolved in June 1980, resumed its work and, on October 5, elected Siles Zuazo and Jaime Paz Satorra President and Vice-President respectively, by 112 votes in favor to 33 against. Having returned from Peru where he had been an émigré, Zuazo formed a government and declared that it would uphold the traditions of the 1952 revolution.

The government formed by Zuazo in 1982 even included two Communists. Patriotic officers were appointed to key posts in the army, the police and the security services. Scores of high-ranking army officers, including García, were dismissed from their posts. Other top level brass hats—among them several former Presidents (Generals Natusch, Torrelio and others)—were transferred to the reserve, the first step toward an early retirement. Siles Zuazo stresses the need to purge the armed forces of antidemocratic and mercenary elements. Of particular importance were the personnel changes in the customs service which, under military dictatorships, had been involved in the drug traffic. Just before the mili-

tary gave up control of the country, illegal cocaine sales totaled over two billion dollars—four times the worth of Bolivia's official exports.

Still, the situation remains complicated and precarious. The CIA has created an effective network permeating the entire government and social structure of Bolivia. Many top army officers involved in the cocaine business refuse to reconcile themselves with the loss of their privileges and are trying to destabilize the government. Right-wing paramilitary outfits organized in recent years are still in existence. The political forces opposing the Zuazo government are still strong in the National Congress. Another difficulty is that the patriotic forces among the military and civilians are fragmented and that the Bolivian petty bourgeoisie and its leaders invariably end up agreeing to compromises with imperialism. Only time will tell whether CIA domination in Bolivia is over, but one thing is certain: no one has ever succeeded in crushing the people's striving toward freedom and progress, a striving nourished by life itself, by the grave economic, social and cultural conditions of over 90 percent of Bolivia's population.

THE COVERT WAR AGAINST CUBA

"A whole arsenal of measures was used against our country. They started with refusing us commercial credits at the beginning of the Revolution, then they stopped their oil deliveries, then they revoked our sugar quota, and finally imposed a harsh and total economic blockade...."

"Relying for support on the exploiter classes which had been removed from power, and all that gang of politicians allied to imperialism who had plundered our country, they organized hundreds of counterrevolutionary groups. I repeat, hundreds. They were following a methodical plan to eliminate the Revolution's leaders...."

Fidel Castro

The CIA and Batista

Born into a poor peasant family, Ruben Fulgencio Batista-y-Zaldívar became a telegraph operator and, in January 1933, brought off a coup d'état in Cuba and became dictator. His meteoric rise is explained by his old and firm connections to U.S. intelligence. On advice from his American sponsors, Batista became leader of a group of noncommissioned officers who were dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the country. This "sergeants' conspiracy" was what installed him in Havana's Presidential palace.

Batista was a de facto dictator up to 1940, when he staged "elections" to make himself a "legitimate" President for the next four years. In 1944 his "election" trick failed, and he fled to the United States. Three years later he returned and, aided by U.S. agents, began to prepare his comeback. On March 10, 1952 he led a new coup, seized power and established a brutal dictatorship. Two years later Batista was "elected" President.

Cuba was enslaved and turned into an appendage of the United States supplying it with agricultural produce and raw materials by the injection of American investment which in 1958 totaled one billion dollars—almost 12 percent of all U.S. investments in Latin America. A conservative estimate of the profits U.S. companies drained out of Cuba between 1949 and 1958 puts it at 1.5 billion dollars—that aside from the money the Mafia made there. The United States accounted for over 60 percent of Cuban exports and over 80 percent of Cuban imports. The Policy Program of the Communist Party of Cuba noted that over the period since the proclamation of the republic (1902) to the victory of the revolution, "the U.S. exercised effective control over our economic, political and cultural life".²

As Earl Smith, the US ambassador to Cuba recalled later, for many Americans Batista symbolized stability and protection of US business interests; the United States helped him by training and equipping his army.³

The reactionaries stepped up their reprisals in 1956, when Fidel Castro organized an armed resistance movement. From 1952 to January 1, 1959 over 20,000 Cubans were killed. This figure does not include the casualties the Insurgent Army suffered in action against the dictator's troops. Most of Batista's victims were defenseless women, old people and children.

In 1956, when, led by Fidel Castro, the Cuban people began their liberation war against the Batista dictatorship, the United States boosted spectacularly its military assistance to him. From 1956 to 1958 Batista's arms purchases from the United States totaled 200 million dollars. Besides, the Pentagon allowed the dictator's air force to use the Guantanamo base for refueling and tak-

ing on bombs and napalm before raiding guerrilla-held areas. American-trained and American-armed, crack government army units were airlifted to Santiago de Cuba in planes provided by the Americans as gifts when Batista announced a scorched earth policy against the guerrillas.

In the 1950s the CIA and the FBI helped to reorganize the dictator's repressive services. Agents and informers of the CIA station were active in suppressing underground resistance in Havana, Santiago de Cuba and other cities. Besides, the CIA regularly supplied the authorities with information on Cuban revolutionaries in the United States and Latin America. According to former CIA Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick, the CIA promised to provide information on the composition and activities of the Cuban Left, particularly Castro's supporters.⁴ The revolutionaries captured by Batista's sadists and CIA experts were subjected to such inhuman torture that only a miracle could bring survival. The so-called Tigers of Masferrer, a private army of killers kept by Senator Rolando Masferrer, were especially notorious for their brutality. "The police of the tyrant Batista," *Bohemia*, a Cuban periodical, wrote, "acted as an imported Gestapo; Batista's army behaved like an army of occupation in its own country."⁵

Naturally, as long as the Batista regime more or less coped with its punitive functions, the most cordial of relations were maintained with the White House. But as soon as it became obvious that Batista would lose control, Washington started thinking of solving the Cuban question in a different way.

In March 1958 the U.S. State Department officially announced that the United States observed neutrality in relation to the civil war in Cuba

and that for this reason it would no longer provide military assistance to the Cuban government. Simultaneously, however, the White House let Batista know that the Pentagon would continue to support him in every way it could, that arms deliveries would continue, although via third countries—Somoza's Nicaragua and Trujillo's Dominican Republic.

Operation Caña Brava

In June 1957 U.S. Ambassador Earl Smith was dispatched to Cuba on an important mission.

In October 1957 the CIA gathered a group of Cuban bourgeois opposition politicians in Miami and formed the so-called junta of liberation from among them—a government in exile led by former Cuban President Carlos Prío Socarrás. A secret agreement was finally signed between the junta and the leaders of the "loyal opposition"—those of Batista's men who wanted the regime to remain unchanged and only to replace the dictator with someone less notorious. It only remained to cajole Batista into resigning and leaving Havana.

Lyman Kirkpatrick, a high-level CIA official, arrived in Havana to take care of the plan. His report to Washington was that the government was "out of touch with the people ... hanging on desperately and hoping for a miracle".⁶ Intensive negotiations finally led to the decision to hold Presidential elections in November 1958 at which Andres Rivero Aguero, Batista's former personal secretary, was to win.

Rivero Aguero was duly elected, although most voters stayed away from the ballot box. The new "President" immediately appointed Batista commander-in-chief of the armed forces. But the

army was completely demoralized, and Batista's appointment only added to the disorder.

Something had to be done immediately, and Ambassador Smith, a beanpole of a man the Cubans nicknamed Caña Brava (Bamboo Shoot) drew up a plan which he began to implement with the help of CIA station chief John Topping. Operation Caña Brava was essentially aimed at getting Batista to leave Cuba, replacing him with General Eulógio Cantillo, Batista's chief of staff. The CIA even entertained the hope that the rebel leaders could be duped and power could be handed over to the "junta of liberation" under the cover of a "peaceful settlement".

On December 28, 1958 Cantillo met with Fidel Castro on an old deserted plantation near the Oriente sugar factory, several miles from Palma Soriano.

After two hours of tête-à-tête conversation they worked out the surrender terms for Batista's army. General Cantillo agreed that Batista was to be overthrown and, together with his henchmen, tried by the people. The general even set the day and the hour of the coup: three in the morning on December 31.

On New Year's Eve Havana did not look like the "fun city" as it was described in the advertising brochures of U.S. travel agencies. Malecón, the famous promenade by the sea, usually thronged with people, was deserted: there were few people there besides policemen. A triple cordon sealed off the U.S. embassy buildings.

For the last time, a traditional New Year banquet was given by Fulgencio Batista in the Havana Hilton. The guests ate, drank and were merry, as though to affront the unusually silent and dimmed-out Havana. Still, this reception differed greatly from the previous ones—above all,

in that the two key figures were absent: Fulgencio Batista and Earl Smith.

At about two in the morning a group of the dictator's closest associates left the hotel unnoticed. In fifteen or twenty minutes a motorcade pulled up in front of the gate of the Campo Colombia army camp, Batista's stronghold. For two months now a DC-4 plane had been sitting on the far end of the runway, guarded by the dictator's bodyguards.

At 2.30 Fulgencio Batista climbed the ramp and turned to the party below:

"I have invited you here to tell you my decision. I want to put an end to this senseless bloodshed. I am leaving Cuba. General Cantillo will be in charge. Cantillo, you know what I've told you and what you have to do.

"Yes, general.

"Well, Cantillo, don't forget my instructions. The success of the action you take from now on depends on you."

A few minutes later the plane took off and headed for Santo Domingo. General Batista, the ex-dictator of Cuba, was flying to the country of Generalissimo Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic.

At three in the morning Cantillo phoned Smith to tell him that Batista had left Havana.

"Very good, general. Happy New Year and congratulations on your new high responsibilities," Smith replied.

Cantillo and his U.S. masters were rubbing their hands with glee. To him and his CIA stage managers, the important thing was to see to it that Batista joined his friend Trujillo, play for time and find a new man to fill the Presidency.

At 4.30 a conference was called in the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces building, attended by

the top military and civilian figures of the Batista regime. The meeting was opened by Cantillo. After giving a brief outline of Smith's instructions on the composition and policy of the future Cuban government, he suggested that this government ask the United States to intervene militarily in Cuba. On recommendation of the U.S. ambassador, the meeting immediately elected Carlos Piedra, chairman of the Supreme Court of Cuba, Provisional President.

At 7.20 in the morning General Cantillo presented the new President to the press. At about 11 Cantillo escorted him to the Presidential palace where Piedra began signing decrees.

However, at one in the afternoon Piedra's rule came to an end. Ambassador Smith paid a surprise visit to the palace and, without even stopping to talk to the "President", invited General Cantillo to have a confidential talk behind closed doors.

The trouble was that not a single opposition politician, not a single bourgeois party, to say nothing of the patriotic forces, accepted Piedra as President. As expected, the leaders of the Insurgent Army refused to recognize the "President", let alone negotiate with him.

At 11.30 Fidel Castro called on the Cuban people to stage a general strike on January 2 to support the Insurgent Army and thus ensure a complete victory for the revolution. At 12 noon the Havana revolutionaries emerged from the underground and declared a citywide political strike. The commanders of the besieged garrisons in Santiago de Cuba and Santa Clara reported to Cantillo that the insurgents began a decisive assault. Government troops and the police began to make themselves scarce.

A meeting with CIA station chief John Top-

ping gave Smith a new idea: if people like Rivero Aguero or Piedra would not do because of their involvement in the crimes of the Batista regime, why not try a "revolutionary"? The station's file yielded the name of Colonel Ramon Barquin.

The CIA had contacted him in the early 1950s. In April 1956 Langley had tried to arrange a palace revolution to replace Batista with Barquin. A conspiracy had been organized in the army, but a traitor had exposed it.

Thanks to his CIA connections, Barquin had not been executed. Instead, he had been jailed on the island of Pinos. Now his American masters could use him as an "opponent to the Batista regime" and "revolutionary" imprisoned by the dictator. The CIA decided that a "martyr" like Barquin would be a suitable President.

At about four in the afternoon on January 1, 1959 a Cuban Air Force plane took off from Campo Colombia. An hour later Colonel Barquin and a group of his followers were in the palace, and in 20 minutes the radio broadcast a message saying that Barquin assumed command of the army. But Barquin's rule was confined to Havana and only lasted until two in the afternoon of the following day, when he handed the keys to Campo Colombia over to Ernesto Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos.

"War Horse" Instead of "Bamboo Shoot"

The entry of the Insurgent Army into Havana spelled the end of Earl "Bamboo Shoot" Smith's diplomatic career. His bluff was called and it turned out he had no aces. So he was recalled to Washington to face the wrath of his superiors. Smith was replaced with Philip "War Horse"

Bonsal. The CIA wrote a new scenario for its covert war against Cuba, based on a memo from CIA Director Allen Dulles to President Eisenhower. The President read it and told Dulles to take all the necessary steps to prevent Cuba from going communist. Langley decided to make use of the political forces hostile to the leadership of the Insurgent Army. A fallback version was also prepared in case the internal counterrevolutionaries failed. Allen Dulles proposed that an army of Cuban émigrés to the United States be trained and sent to invade Cuba in order to overthrow the revolutionary regime. Vice-President Richard Nixon advanced a similar proposal in April 1959.

The Pentagon and the CIA were told to keep Cuba under "constant surveillance". The U.S. Air Force and Navy began to patrol maritime routes and photograph incoming and outgoing vessels. A constant monitoring of the telephone conversations of Cuban leaders began; for this purpose the CIA availed itself of the services of ITT which owned all of Cuba's communications. By the spring of 1959 Lockheed U-2 spy planes had begun their overflights of the island.

Although the Insurgent Army wielded actual power, the Miró Cardona postrevolutionary government initially included right-of-center politicians who had a collaborationist background and did not believe it was possible to be free of imperialist domination.

The first conspiracy against the revolution was led by Cardona who tried to set himself up as an alternative to the genuine revolutionaries. But the CIA's stake on its own horses in the government failed to pay off. On February 16, 1959 Cardona was forced to resign. The second conspiracy, led by President Manuel Urrutia, former

Supreme Court judge, also fell through.

After these two failures the CIA stepped up its activities within the Cuban army. Besides, steps were taken to organize armed counterrevolutionary groups. In the summer of 1959 terrorist organizations were exposed in many Cuban cities and the caches discovered yielded a great amount of weapons, ammunition and military uniforms. Assassination attempts against Left trade union and civic activists and Insurgent Army officers grew increasingly frequent—all this against the background of an anticommunist campaign aimed against the revolutionary government and Fidel Castro personally.

In May 1959 Cuban counterintelligence exposed a conspiracy in the army. The mutiny was to be led by Major Uberto Matos. In early 1958 this son of a big landowner had joined the insurgents after delivering a consignment of weapons from Mexico to Sierra Maestra. The plane in which the cargo was delivered was piloted by Diaz Lans. Uberto Matos hoped that by joining the rebels in time he would make a brilliant career. After the victory of the revolution Matos was appointed commander of the Camaguey Province Military District. That was where the CIA organized its dangerous conspiracy in the Insurgent Army. Diaz Lans, by that time commander of the Cuban Air Force, also joined the plot. Even a clandestine "government" was formed, with former Batista Senator Arturo Hernández at the head. But the ring was exposed in time. Diaz Lans and Captain Manuel Artime, Matos' right-hand man, escaped to the United States, but Matos himself was tried and sentenced to a prison term of 30 years.

Particularly thorough preparations were made for a coup that was to start in August 1959.

The CIA engineered a mutiny in Oriente Province, and Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, was to furnish an invasion of a "liberation army" which even included some of his bodyguards. Besides, the conspirators received five million dollars from him. But the vigilance of the Cuban government enabled it to expose the plot and swiftly crush the Oriente mutiny. Trujillo lost his nerve, and the CIA-planned invasion never materialized.

Operation Pluto

Faced with the failure of the conspiracies, the CIA imposed an economic blockade of Cuba. Since sugar formed the backbone of Cuba's exports and oil, the only fuel the national economy used, the United States stopped its purchases of sugar and deliveries of oil.

In February 1959 planes piloted by CIA agents began their overflights of Cuba. These were followed by air raids on Havana. Fires on sugarcane plantations and bombings of sugar factories became more frequent. The difficulties were compounded by the fact that at that time Cuba did not yet possess an air force capable of rebuffing the aggressors.

In a bid to undermine confidence in the Cuban government and to confuse the population, the CIA launched a "war on the airwaves" against Cuba in the summer of 1959. Subversive radio programs were broadcast by powerful radio stations in New York, Miami, the Bahamas, Central America and by special radio-equipped ships off the coast of Cuba. These vessels enabled the CIA to imitate Cuban-based transmitters, and some Cuban listeners did fall for this trick. Of particular importance was a CIA radio station on one of the Swan Islands off the coast of Honduras.

This station was maintained by the Gibraltar Steamship Corporation, a CIA front company registered in Miami. Thomas Cabot, a career U.S. intelligence officer and banker, was its director. This former head of the United Fruit Company had been active in the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala.

Radio Swan broadcast instructions to CIA agents in Cuba had provided liaison between the CIA office in Miami and the camps of Cuban counterrevolutionaries in Central America. In the fall of 1959 the CIA began to land saboteurs and terrorists in Cuba by sea and air. In early 1960 it was joined by U.S. naval and air force intelligence. In March 1960 CIA agents brought off their biggest operation: they blew up *La Coubre*, a French vessel carrying a consignment of weapons, in the Havana harbor. The explosion killed 100 people and wounded several hundred.

Miami became the headquarters of U.S. anti-Cuban activities. This was where those who fled from the changes in Cuba settled. Emigré organizations mushroomed: their number increased from 14 in late 1959 to over 180 in 1960.

Both the condition and the social composition of the émigrés were far from uniform. Many were unemployed and got involved in underworld activities. This helped the CIA to raise a "liberation army" in the fall of 1959. In May 1960 representatives of émigré organizations formed the so-called Revolutionary Council presided over by former Prime Minister José Miró Cardona.

Originally, the idea of an armed invasion of Cuba was advanced by Allen Dulles and Richard Nixon. In April 1959 Nixon wrote a confidential memo to President Eisenhower, the National Security Council and top-level officials of the Pentagon and the CIA. Nixon admitted in his me-

moirs *Six Crises* that "the covert training of Cuban exiles" was "due, in substantial part at least, to my efforts" and that the White House approved the invasion plan "as a result of my direct support".⁸ In July 1960, having studied the "Cuban situation", the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the President sanction an armed invasion of Cuba.

CIA Deputy Director Richard Bissell, generally considered Dulles' successor, was entrusted with the direct preparation of the plan. Dulles and Bissell kept telling President Eisenhower that the invasion and the overthrow of the Cuban revolutionary government would be easier than the earlier similar operation in Guatemala.

The U.S. government provided the CIA with considerable financial resources, weapons and military experts for the "liberation army". The Cuban émigrés recruited by the CIA were carefully screened and either sent to the several large camps preparing the invasion or handed over to the U.S. army to be used elsewhere.

Some 20 training bases were set up in the United States and in Central America. The largest camp of the "liberation army" was the CIA's Tracks base near the Guatemalan city of Retalhuleu. The units trained there were codenamed Brigade 2506. These bases provided training for a total of over 7,000 Cuban émigrés. Many were recruited as agents of the CIA and the DIA. At its Tracks base, the CIA formed a special secret outfit comprising the most reliable of the counterrevolutionaries who were to seize Cuban security archives immediately after the coup and to set up "provisional police" units which would eliminate persons Langley had earmarked in advance for extermination.

The White House took further steps to seal

Cuba off economically. U.S. citizens were prohibited to travel to Cuba, and an embargo was imposed on Cuban imports to the United States and U.S. exports to Cuba. In September 1960 the U.S. Congress passed a resolution making it mandatory for the President to immediately stop economic assistance to countries who supported Cuba militarily and economically. In January 1961 the United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The CIA became increasingly active in its efforts to create spy networks and terrorist organizations in Cuba. In early 1960 their activities centered on the Sierra del Escambray mountains in Las Villas Province where CIA agents, aided by Cuban counterrevolutionaries from Miami, had set up numerous armed gangs. Speaking at the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, Fidel Castro said: "These armed bands were later organized in every province, even in Havana. The United States openly supplied them by air and sea. . . . The struggle against these groups led to the loss of many sons of the people and cost our economy hundreds of millions of pesos. In the cities, sabotage against production centers led our working people to shed their precious blood."⁹

In January 1961 John F. Kennedy, the new U.S. President, took office. He had approved of the secret plan of the invasion of Cuba in November 1960, during his election campaign.

After his inauguration, President Kennedy called the first conference on the Cuban question on January 22. Six days later the National Council held an enlarged session and decided that the CIA would be in charge of preparing the "liberation army" for the invasion but that the Pentagon would oversee the preparations. In Feb-

ruary 1961 a Pentagon inspection group toured the CIA's bases in Guatemala. The VIP visitors watched war games imitating the future landing and the establishment of a beachhead. On March 11, 1961 an NSC meeting in the White House discussed the combat readiness of the invasion troops. The Pentagon inspectors said they doubted the "liberation army" was ready and tried to persuade the NSC to recommend invasion by regular U.S. troops. On March 14 the NSC held another meeting at which the final decision was taken in favor of the Guatemala version. Under pressure from the Pentagon, however, the landing target was shifted from an area south of the Escambray Mountains to the Bay of Pigs.

The chief objective of the operation, codenamed Operation Pluto, was the capture of the coast of the Bay of Pigs, the landing of the "government-in-exile", its immediate recognition by the governments of the United States and its OAS allies, and an appeal for their help from the new "government".

The CIA pinned great hopes on the Cuban counterrevolutionary underground which was to make its move immediately following the landing of the "liberation army". As Pentagon officials testified during the secret investigation into the causes of the fiasco conducted by a commission under Robert Kennedy in April and May 1961, "the key to the plan was popular uprisings all over the island", but "ultimate success would depend on the extent the strike force served as a catalyst".¹⁰

On April 4 the White House went over the final details. Operation Pluto was scheduled to begin on April 17. *The New York Times* reported that an armed force of five to six thousand men was ready to invade Cuba from bases in Guate-

malá and several other Caribbean countries.¹¹

On April 13 the Cuban "Revolutionary Council" leaders, escorted by CIA and FBI agents, came to the Hotel Lexington where they waited for a U.S. plane to take them to a "liberated area" where they would proclaim themselves as the "provisional government" and, in accordance with the Washington scenario, appeal to the OAS for assistance.

On April 14 the "liberation army" arrived in Puerto Cabezas, a small port in Nicaragua. Some thirty U.S. planes were waiting on the town's airfield. The "army" boarded its ships, gifts of the U.S. Navy, and set out for the Bay of Pigs. Brigade 2506 was 1,500 strong. Besides, the invaders' vessels were carrying 15,000 weapons of various types to be handed over to the volunteers supposed to be waiting for them in Cuba.

The Nicaraguan dictator Somoza delivered a send-off speech telling the invaders that the "free world" was on their side. While the vessels, escorted by two U.S. destroyers and the *Boxer* aircraft carrier, were approaching their destination, U.S. B-26 bombers bearing Cuban Air Force identification signs bombed Cuban airfields. The crews of the raiders were ordered to land in Florida and announce that they were rebellious Cubans, although the bombers in fact took off from bases in Nicaragua.

On Sunday April 16, CIA officials reported to those directing the operation that "Castro's air force has been completely destroyed", producing as proof aerial photographs taken by Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance planes. In actual fact the raid did not affect Cuban Air Force planes but served instead to put the country on the alert.

A CIA bulletin circulated among the Brigade 2506 leaders claimed that "the insurgent Army

is demoralized", that "only 20 percent of the population will support the government, 25 percent will support the invasion and the rest will wait for results", and that "many garrisons will join the invaders".¹²

At 1.15 in the morning on April 17 the CIA's Swan Island radio station broadcast the signal for the landing to begin. The landing party attacked a border post manned by a handful of militia members. At six in the morning C-46 and C-54 U.S. Air Force transport planes began dropping paratroopers onto the roads leading through a swamp to the Island's interior.

However, the operation did not develop as planned by the CIA. First, Cuban Air Force fighters appeared—the very planes the CIA had photographed as destroyed. Second, the diversionary action planned in Oriente Province did not work, and the U.S. destroyers hastened to remove the remnants of the landing party to Guantanamo and Key West, Florida. Cuban Coast Guard cutters intercepted the *Western Union*, a vessel bound for the Bay of Pigs to deliver ammunition and military equipment. A U.S. destroyer and planes were dispatched from Guantanamo to support it. But the *Western Union* crew, fearful that a single salvo would be enough to blow up its cargo, turned back and headed for Key West.

With the arrival on the scene of regular Cuban troops, the position of the "liberation army" deteriorated rapidly. In an effort to boost the mercenaries' morale, Radio Swan told the Brigade 2506 leaders that the U.S. aircraft carrier *Boxer* was about to land 3,000 Marines on Playa Giron. One of the prisoners taken on Playa Giron—a certain Pablo Organvides Parada, who was the CIA's liaison man with the commanders of Brigade 2506—said later that Allen Dul-

les' assistant Charles Gorman had promised the mercenaries direct support from U.S. troops in case the invasion failed.¹³

At midnight on April 18 an emergency meeting was called to discuss the Playa Giron rout. It was attended by top NSC, Pentagon and CIA officials. Many urged President Kennedy to launch an immediate invasion of Cuba. However, the President and his closest advisers decided against it, well aware of the possible consequences: a few hours before the conference started the Soviet government warned that it would not abandon the Cuban people in their hour of trial and would render all the necessary assistance and support for their just struggle to uphold the freedom and independence of Cuba.

At dawn on April 19 the CIA ordered all its available Puerto Cabezas-based planes into action. They were to be supported by fighters from the *Boxer*. However, when the orders were transmitted to the Puerto Cabezas base and to the aircraft carrier, a mistake was made which failed to account for the difference between the Nicaraguan and Cuban time zones—one hour. This cost the aggressors a lot: ten of the B-26 planes which appeared over Playa Giron were shot down and the rest were damaged by Cuban Air Force fighters. The fighters from the *Boxer* arrived when it was all over.

The "liberation army" ceased its resistance to the Cuban troops. In an attempt to rescue the survivors, the Americans sent six destroyers to the Bay of Pigs, but a barrage of artillery fire kept the boats launched from the destroyers from approaching the shore. The "liberators" showed the white flag and 1,200 people surrendered. Their composition was very revealing: 800 were members of the former Cuban elite, 200 had

been servicemen and police officers under Batista, and the rest were gangsters and other underworld scum.¹⁴

The Bay of Pigs fiasco inevitably led to a certain cooling of relations between the White House and the CIA. The Agency had promised that the liberation of Cuba would be almost a picnic, but it turned into a debacle. Later though, Allen Dulles claimed that the CIA had not expected an easy victory, that it had merely been trying to establish a beachhead from which to launch subsequent operations. An irate President Kennedy appointed a commission of inquiry into CIA activities. CIA Director Allen Dulles and his deputy Richard Bissell, the author of the invasion plan, resigned.

The findings of the commission which, chaired by Robert Kennedy, investigated the causes of the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April and March 1961, were made public only in 1979, when *U.S. News & World Report* got hold of them. The documents quoted show that the Pentagon, the CIA, the State Department and the White House were trying to blame one another for a failure. Still, all those testifying did not for a single moment doubt the right of the United States to conduct future operations of the Pluto type. "Despite the disaster," Richard Bissell said, "the United States must retain the capability for unofficial military actions."¹⁵ It was also clear that President Kennedy had no intention of disciplining the CIA. On the contrary, he ordered it to start a full-scale secret war against Cuba.

On December 29, 1962 over 50,000 people gathered at Miami's Orange Bowl Stadium. But they were not football or baseball fans. President Kennedy and other VIPs were reviewing a

parade of 7,000 Cuban émigrés wearing American uniforms. Having graduated from special training courses at Fort Knox, Fort Benning and Fort Jackson, they were enrolled in the U.S. armed forces. These people formed a special unit, a "Cuban division" which could be thrown into action against Cuba on signal from Washington. Those marching past the Presidential box also included members of Brigade 2506, veterans of the invasion.

Two people approached the President and handed him the flag of Brigade 2506. "I want to express my great appreciation to the brigade," the President said, "for making the United States the custodian of this flag. I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a free Habana."¹⁶ The crowd roared its approval.

The White House granted the CIA new powers, provided it with comprehensive support and ordered it to expand its efforts. Anti-Cuban operations were considered so important that, for the first time, virtually every U.S. government agency was involved in them.

Routine operations were entrusted to Theodore Shackley who had directed covert operations against the patriotic forces in Laos in the 1950s. Later he was appointed Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA Clandestine Services. Soon after the Bay of Pigs rout the CIA put him in charge of a special group which was to step up the secret war against Cuba. In February 1962 Theodore Shackley set up a new CIA branch office in Miami.

Codenamed J. M. Wave, this body directed operations against Cuba until 1969, when its functions were taken over by the CIA. The Miami office became the largest CIA branch in the world, with a staff of up to 700—and that aside

from the U.S. army officers under contract to it. The annual budget exceeded 50 million dollars.

J. M. Wave had its headquarters in a former Navy center in the southern part of the city and the name it assumed was Zenith Technical Enterprise. There were 54 other front organizations—a real estate firm, a travel agency, a boat-ing store and the like. J. M. Wave maintained its own radio stations, hospitals, printing shops, training camps, airfields and arsenals. The outfit had planes and scores of launches at its disposal.

The CIA office in Miami comprised several departments. One dealt with the financing of Cuban counterrevolutionary groups and activities conducted among the émigrés. Another kept them under surveillance—resulting in complete CIA control over all Cuban émigrés. The chief department interrogated Cuban defectors. But the key mission of the office was to organize terrorist acts in Cuba proper. Each J. M. Wave official supervised four to ten “major” agents, and each of these had 10 to 30 ordinary agents under him. The network covered the entire coastline of Florida and all of Central America.

The CIA office in Miami was also the coordinating center of the covert war against Cuba on the international scale. Each major CIA office abroad included at least one official dealing exclusively with anti-Cuban operations.

Such experts were particularly numerous in CIA branch offices in Latin America. Their mission was to ensure a severance of diplomatic and other relations between their host country and Cuba, to intensify anti-Cuban activities and to collect information of any kind on Cuba. J. M. Wave agents were hunting after Cuban citizens, trying to recruit them.

After the defeat on Playa Giron, the CIA de-

vised to switch over to using the Cuban counterrevolutionary underground and its armed gangs. According to Cuban data, there were 179 such outfits by the end of 1962 in Cuba. The Escambray Mountains, where 79 such units had their camps, were the CIA's base of operations. At night U.S. Air Force planes dropped the latest weapons and ammunition for the counterrevolutionaries. The bandits raided civilian communities, assassinated university students and teachers who were conducting the campaign against illiteracy, blew up bridges and set fire to sugarcane plantations, cattle-breeding farms and various offices.

The early 1960s witnessed a sharp rise in the number of saboteur and terrorist groups the CIA was sending to infiltrate Cuba from bases in Florida, the Bahamas and Puerto Rico. These operations are described in *The War That Never Was. An Insider's Account of CIA Covert Operation Against Cuba*, a book written by former CIA official Bradley Ayers.¹⁷

As a rule, the terrorists were issued Cuban People's Militia uniforms, Cuban currency, identification papers forged by the CIA, silencer-equipped firearms, grenades and plastic explosives. Their operations were planned in minute detail, with due attention to the latest aerial photographs. The timing of each step was marked on the maps. U.S. Navy vessels tugged the launches of the saboteurs close to the island, and then they continued under their own power, using muffled engines. The vessels were in radio communication with the landing party. If the group was spotted while landing or Cuban Coast Guard boats started pursuing it, the U.S. naval vessels' guns covered the terrorists' retreat. Ayers said in his book that the Pentagon provided

direct support to the CIA in "the training of small commando units for raids and infiltration, and the planning and use of demolitions and explosives."¹⁸

The Pentagon's aggressive forays took other forms too. In the 1960s U.S. Air Force planes violated Cuban air space over one thousand times. U.S. strategic aviation planes carrying nuclear bombs and cruising along Cuba's borders posed an even greater threat. To this day, two or three U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and many vessels of the 2nd Atlantic Fleet keep hovering north of the Cuban coast, while the U.S. Navy regularly conducts exercises to build up tensions in the adjacent areas.

Until quite recently border incidents were staged near the U.S. Guantanamo base in Cuba. In the early 1960s the Pentagon and the CIA were thinking of faking an attack against the base—a raid by combat planes with Cuban identification signs—which would prompt "retaliation". These CIA schemes were exposed by the Cuban government at the United Nations. Throughout the 1960s and in the early 1970s armed forays by the U.S. garrison against Cuban border guards aimed at precipitating a conflict repeatedly created explosive situations around Guantanamo. Since 1959, U.S. Air Force planes and Marine detachments have committed over 12,000 violations of Cuban air space and territorial waters.

The economic blockade imposed by U.S. imperialism has resulted in great damage to the Cuban economy. The country had to look urgently for new sources of fuels, raw materials and food as well as for new markets for its products. Under Batista, the Cuban economy had been oriented toward and largely dependent on that of

the United States; besides, the major enterprises, equipment and transport belonged to Americans. Therefore, the blockade was sure to hurt Cuba.

Under U.S. pressure, all Latin American countries (except Mexico) broke off trade relations with Cuba. The blockade was also joined by most of the United States' NATO allies. Simultaneously, U.S. imperialism embarked on a campaign of large-scale sabotage. CIA agents in Western Europe kept pressuring owners of shipping companies and airlines to cancel their service to Cuba. They spread false rumors claiming that Cuba was bankrupt in order to prevent the country from receiving foreign credits. They damaged Cuban goods during storage and transportation so as to discredit the republic as a trade partner. All this was directed by the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology.

Operation Mongoose

On June 19, 1975 a celebration was held in an ultramodern townhouse in a Chicago suburb: the host, Sam Giancana, was 67 years old. The guests left at 11 p. m., so the FBI car parked nearby radioed headquarters that all was well and left. As usual, Giancana went downstairs to the armored vault, to his wine cellar. He had a habit of sitting there alone for an hour or two, going over the day's developments.

Suddenly, shots rang out. When Giancana's bodyguards and family rushed into the cellar, it was all over. Death caught up with Sam Giancana on his 67th birthday: somebody pumped seven shots from a .38 Colt, favorite make of gangsters and FBI agents, into him.

The incident could well have passed unnoticed in the crime-ridden country of the "Ameri-

can way of life", except for the fact that Giancana was one of the bosses of Cosa Nostra, the American Mafia. Besides, two days before his murder he had received a summons from the Senator Church Committee investigating CIA activities. On Friday June 20 Giancana was to appear before Frank Schwartz, the committee's legal adviser. And finally, two stories appeared in the papers immediately after the assassination. The first to react was, of all people, CIA Director William Colby who said that his Agency had nothing to do with the murder. The second report described Giancana's funeral, at which Carlo Gambino, the Cosa Nostra chief, pledged to punish the killers of his best friend. But Gambino failed to keep his word.

A look into the past will help us understand who killed Giancana and why Gambino, who is no longer alive either, could not keep his promise. In August 1960 John King, chief of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, got a brainstorm. He decided to use the Mafia to assassinate Cuban revolutionary leaders.

All kinds of plans were discussed. One proposed spraying the radio station studio where Castro was to speak with a chemical whose effect was similar to that produced by LSD. Then CIA experts took several boxes of cigars and treated them with a solution which would play tricks with the victim's orientation. There was a plan to contaminate Castro's shoes. Then the Directorate of Science and Technology developed poisonous substances to arrange an "accident" for Castro.

The Church Committee which investigated, in the 1970s, CIA activities aimed at assassinating foreign leaders noted that there was concrete evidence of at least eight conspiracies involving

the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965.¹⁹

Although it was the CIA who advanced the idea of the assassination, the FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover told the CIA Director that "during recent conversation with several friends Samuel Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed regarding this statement Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions."²⁰ The FBI stumbled on the scheme originally advanced by John King. We do not know how the CIA reacted to Hoover's memo. But the Church Committee report indicates that action was taken on this plan: "As Maheu recalls the conversation, the Support Chief asked him to contact John Rosselli, an underworld figure with possible gambling contacts in Las Vegas, to determine if he would participate in a plan to 'dispose' of Castro."²¹

The Support Chief Maheu referred to was John O'Connell, the CIA official in charge of the operation, who met with Maheu in a Washington hotel. Maheu himself was generally known as the owner of Robert Maheu and Associates, a prosperous private detective agency, and an aide of the billionaire H. L. Hunt. Maheu's company took care of various delicate assignments—from spying on people of interest to the customers to wiretapping and bribing politicians and other public figures. However, no one was aware that Robert Maheu was also a CIA agent and that previously he had been one of the bosses of the Mafia's Washington "family". Serving in his double capacity as CIA agent and

owner of a private detective agency, he retained his Mafia connections. That was why he accepted O'Connell's commission, all the more so because the CIA paid him a handsome fee.

Maheu flew to Los Angeles where he met with John Rosselli, Giancana's close friend and partner who, in 1975, would attend the Giancana's birthday party. Maheu asked Rosselli if he and his Chicago friends could help dispose of Fidel Castro. Having secured Rosselli's tentative consent, Maheu flew to Miami where 14 Cuban counterrevolutionary organizations were already functioning in late 1959. There he met with Giancana who also agreed to take part in the operation. Giancana received an advance of 150,000 dollars.

The reason why Maheu came to the Mafia and to Giancana personally becomes obvious if we trace Giancana's biography. He started his career in the Chicago "family" when he was 17. From an ordinary "soldier" he rose through the ranks to become a "killer" and then, when Al Capone noticed him in the 1930s, a "lieutenant", Capone's assistant.

By the mid-1950s Giancana was the "godfather" of the Chicago "family", a prominent figure in Cosa Nostra. His influence in the American underworld was enhanced by the fact that, together with Santos Trafficante and Carlos Marchello, chiefs of the Tampa and New Orleans "families", and Meyer Lansky, the notorious New York gangster, Giancana controlled the Cuban entertainment industry. Cosa Nostra entrusted to these four the mission of taking care of the Mafia's interests in Cuba, where the casinos alone brought 100 million dollars a year to the U.S. underworld empire. The gangster chiefs were great friends of Batista. So, when Batista

was overthrown and the Fidel Castro government confiscated Mafia property in Cuba, Meyer Lansky offered to pay 100,000 dollars to have Castro assassinated. Giancana and his lieutenant Rosselli could not forgive the Cuban government for depriving them of their profits. Many years later Rosselli testified before the Church Committee that CIA officials had told him that it was the U.S. government which wanted Fidel Castro removed and that, although it was a disagreeable mission, it was instrumental for the success of the invasion of Cuba.²² Having considered the possibilities, Giancana proposed that a poison capsule be smuggled into Cuba and planted in a drink Castro was to take at a reception. Giancana's accomplices in Cuba volunteered for the mission.

On instructions from Technical Services Division of the Clandestine Services the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology produced the capsule. In February 1961 the chief of Technical Services Division gave the capsule to Rosselli. The latter handed it over to Giancana who had it smuggled into Cuba. But the conspiracy was exposed by Cuban security.

There was no second attempt. The FBI wanted Giancana for questioning in connection with a series of mysterious murders in Chicago. Giancana either decided not to wait for the CIA to make a deal with the FBI, or perhaps he thought that it was the CIA who had put the FBI on his trail, so he left the country in a hurry and returned when the Bay of Pigs adventure was over. He bought a house in a Chicago suburb, had an extremely sensitive alarm system, an armored vault and bullet-proof doors installed, and decided to lie low there, surrounded by his numerous bodyguards.

It looked like his tactics paid off. Years passed,

and the disturbing memories of the meetings with CIA agents began to fade. But on June 17, 1975 Giancana received a summons from Schwartz to see him on Friday, June 20. Mafia members take the pledge of omerta, and its violation is invariably punished by death. Could it be that Langley was afraid Giancana might disclose something to Schwartz? We are convinced that Giancana was murdered on orders from the CIA. That was why Gambino was unable to "punish the killers". But it appears that the CIA had another reason for doing away with Giancana, aside from his knowledge of the CIA's role in the assassination attempts against Fidel Castro.

Giancana was on friendly terms with the other Mafia chiefs who had interests in Cuba and commanded a network of agents among criminals and counterrevolutionaries in Cuba. It is on record that in April 1961 Trafficante told José Alemán, a Cuban counterrevolutionary leader, John Kennedy would be "removed". After the assassination of the U.S. President, the conspirators' links were traced to the Mafia, to Cuban counterrevolutionaries and to the CIA. One can consider it a proven fact that Lee Harvey Oswald, to whom the assassination is ascribed officially, was an agent of the CIA. Jack Ruby, Oswald's killer, was one of Trafficante's assistants on Cuban affairs. The investigation also put the spotlight on several other people who were clearly involved in the Kennedy assassination. As the investigation progressed, they began disappearing without a trace.

The mutual favors the CIA, the FBI and organized crime do one another and the ties that exist among them are so intricately intertwined that one can hardly discern where the interests of the U.S. intelligence community end and

those of the underworld begin. Testifying before the Church Committee in June 1975, five days after Giancana's death, Rosselli gave a detailed account of the way the CIA had enlisted the aid of Giancana, Trafficante and himself in the attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro. Rosselli lived one year after his appearance before the committee. His body was discovered in an oil drum floating off the coast of Miami.

Obviously, Giancana knew too much to stay alive. In 1978 Trafficante admitted that he had been party to the plans to assassinate Fidel Castro and that he had met with CIA agents. The investigation revealed that the CIA had set up its own outfit for political assassinations in Cuba—the so-called International Anticommunist Brigade.

The attempt to use Giancana was not the only case of this kind. In 1981 it was reported that the CIA approached Patriarca, the "godfather" of the New England "family", with a similar proposal and that he offered the services of Nick Palmiggiano, a hired killer. Cuban sources estimate that up to 1976 the CIA organized "at least 20 assassination attempts against Fidel".²³ What we would like to stress is that these operations were discussed at the highest level in the United States.

CIA confidential files prove that the plan to assassinate Castro, codenamed Operation Mon-goose, was discussed by Pentagon and State Department leaders²⁴ and General Edward G. Lansdale was entrusted with its implementation. In a secret memo dated April 14, 1967 CIA Deputy Director John McCone informed Richard Helms that the decision was to "liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro" and that the Pentagon was in charge of the operation.²⁵

The documents also reveal that a special in-

teragency group was set up for this purpose and that this move was approved by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and State Secretary Dean Rusk. Following is a memo from William K. Harvey, chief of Task Force W which was to direct the assassination, to the CIA Deputy Director on Planning:

"14 August 1962.

"Memorandum for: Deputy Director (Plans)

"Subject: Operation Mongoose

"1. Action: none. This memorandum is for your information.

"2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were: 'including liquidation of leaders'.

"3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's Office on 10 August.

"It was the obvious consensus at that meeting in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow that it is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record.

"I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comment or study on this point.

"4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's Office and, in his absence, pointed out... the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised... that as far as the CIA was concerned we would write

no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it.

"I strongly urged... to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.

"5. For your information also in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

*"William K. Harvey
Chief, Task Force W"*

Today it is clear that the CIA has not given up its attempts to assassinate Cuban revolutionary leaders. In July 1981 Cuban security captured near Havana a terrorist group sent in from the United States to do the job.

The Covert War Goes On

U.S. imperialism does not pause for a single day in its attempts to hamper the building of socialism in Cuba and to destabilize the economy and the internal political situation of the republic. Forced to refrain from direct action against socialist Cuba, the United States now resorts to other, long-term tactics—the use of undercover agents, economic and political sabotage, anti-Cuban propaganda, large-scale psychological warfare and incessant ideological attacks. The CIA has ordered its agents to build up their cover and to act independently. U.S. intelligence makes wide use of Cuban counterrevolu-

tionaries. Another anticommunist manifesto was reported by Associated Press in 1980. Entitled "Put an End to Cuba", it was produced by an organization innocuously called the Coalition for a Democratic Majority—a group of politicians advocating a tougher U.S. foreign policy.

The authors of the manifesto claim that although the current U.S. administration has been "considerate" toward Cuba, the latter has been engaged in "anti-American activities", and that this calls for a crusade against Havana. These people suggest that the 1962 agreement under which the United States promised not to attack Cuba be revised. There is also the proposal to set up an anti-Cuban radio station similar to Radio Free Europe, the CIA-owned subversive radio center.

The United States keeps up its efforts to intimidate and demoralize Cubans. In 1979 the U.S. President ordered that aerial surveillance of Cuba be resumed. The republic's air space is violated regularly by U.S. SR-71 planes, the latest type of high-altitude aircraft for electronic aerial reconnaissance. In October 1979 U.S. Marines staged a landing in Guantanamo, under the pretext of conducting a war game. Announcing large-scale naval exercises in the Caribbean in 1981, U.S. authorities maintained that this was aimed at safeguarding U.S. interests there and protecting the coastal countries from Soviet or Cuban attack in a region of traditional concern to the United States. There was a hullabaloo in the United States over the alleged Soviet military presence in Cuba. In 1979 Washington announced the establishment in Key West, Florida, of a permanent headquarters of the Caribbean Task Force Staff. Comprising units from all arms and services, this task force, the Pentagon has stated, is to be the rapid de-

ployment force for the region. The White House has also declared that U.S. forces will continue to be stationed at the Guantanamo base, in violation of Cuba's sovereignty over this part of its territory.

During his election campaign, Ronald Reagan advocated a naval blockade of Cuba. Now the White House wants Congress to pass legislation enabling the U.S. Navy to stop any vessels leaving Cuban ports. The U.S. government also intends to stiffen the trade embargo against Cuba introduced 20 years ago. In 1981 CIA Director William Casey ordered a study of the ways the CIA could use to expedite and increase its assistance to anticommunist forces fighting against Cuba.

From December 1979 the organization of Cuban counterrevolutionary émigrés stepped up their terrorist campaign. A bomb exploded near the Soviet mission to the UN on 67th Street in New York. Several Soviet diplomats were injured by fragments, and the blast shattered windows on the ground and second floors. The Soviet Union immediately declared in a TASS statement that the explosion occurred with the connivance of U.S. authorities.

In the evening of Sunday, January 13, 1980 a new powerful explosion shook the Aeroflot office on Fifth Avenue. That same night bombs exploded near the Cuban mission in Montreal. Omega-7 claimed responsibility for all these acts.

Omega-7 terrorist operations are supported mostly by the leading anti-Cuban groups based in New Jersey, Florida and Puerto Rico. Each has a legitimate-looking front and public relations officers, as well as clandestine organizations. Virtually all of them enjoy the protection of the local authorities and receive generous financial assistance.

Five members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement (MNC) were indicted on charges of complicity in the assassination of Orlando Letelier ordered by DINA, the Chilean secret police. MNC established close ties with DINA in 1973. The Novo brothers—Guillermo and Ignacio—had been leaders of the group for over ten years, up to their arrest in connection with the Letelier affair. In 1964 they had fired a bazooka at the UN building while Che Guevara was speaking before the General Assembly. After their arrest, Armando Santana took over the leadership.

MNC has a "southern branch" led by Felipe Rivero, a man trained by the CIA, who masterminded a series of terrorist acts against Cuban diplomats and other officials all over the world. A diehard fascist, Rivero also maintains contacts with DINA.

Abdala, another terrorist group, is oriented toward the younger generation of the émigrés. It has its headquarters on 29th Street in New York and an activist branch at Rutgers University. Abdala is a member of the Youth Council of the USA. Established in 1969, the Youth Council follows in the footsteps of the U.S. National Student Association which had to be dissolved after the exposure of its CIA connections.

Brigade 2506 unites hundreds of émigrés, originally trained by the CIA for the Bay of Pigs invasion. Veterans of the Brigade took part in the warfare the United States conducted in the Congo and in Vietnam.

At 16.45 on May 8, 1980 a fire broke out in the ten-storey building of Cuba's largest kindergarten, located in the Marianao district of Havana. From the ground floor the fire leaped upward and immediately engulfed two elevator shafts and the staircase, trapping 570 children

and several members of the staff on the higher floors. The situation was critical, and only the selfless and courageous action by the firemen and militiamen, supported by the local residents, averted a tragedy. All those trapped by the fire were rescued.

After a careful examination of the scene of the fire, Cuban Interior Ministry experts concluded unanimously that it was the result of a premeditated act. The blowing up of *La Coubre*, the fire in the Encanto department store in Havana, the explosion of a Cuban airliner after its takeoff from Barbados (each of these crimes has resulted in heavy casualties), as well as the fire in the Marianao kindergarten are all links in one chain of events.²⁶ Imperialism and the CIA are clearly behind these and many other crimes against Cuba.

It was no coincidence that on the next day after the huge 1980 May Day rally in which virtually the entire population of Havana participated, a provocation was staged in front of the U.S. Interests Bureau building (diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba were severed in 1961). Several hundred ex-convicts recently released from jail who decided to leave Cuba for the United States were summoned by Bureau officials to gather in front of the building early in the morning of May 2. These officials incited the crowd to riot. Within 24 hours since the moment Cuban television broadcast a recording of the antigovernment disturbances clearly showing the instigatory role played by the American diplomats, fire was set to the Marianao kindergarten. The United States offers asylum to perpetrators of such crimes and extolls them as political dissenters and even heroes.

Analyzing the so-called political refugees

problem, *Granma* has said that the United States first encouraged illegal emigration from Cuba and then used the émigrés in dirty imperialist propaganda.²⁷ A great show of welcome to these antisocial elements was staged in the United States.

Subversion against Cuba is conducted under diplomatic cover too. For example, one foreign diplomat served in the embassy of a Latin American country as counselor and press attaché, holding the second highest rank after the ambassador. His status as press attaché and the fact that the country which the embassy represented had always been friendly toward Cuba enabled him to meet a great many people in Havana, travel freely around the country and hold receptions.

Shortly after this diplomat's arrival in Havana, the Cuban radio monitoring service detected shortwave transmissions beamed from Miami and Nassau (the Bahamas). They began with the opening bars of *La Paloma*, a popular Cuban song, or *Chilita Linda*, a Mexican tune. The answering transmissions were traced to a foreign embassy located in Havana's Miramar district.

When they were deciphered, it turned out that an American spy was gathering information on the state of the Cuban economy, the country's difficulties, the morale of the people and the like. The agent was also closely following the development of Soviet-Cuban relations and sought information on the personnel and activities of socialist countries' embassies in Cuba. Of particular interest to the CIA was anything related to people who came in contact with Fidel Castro, generally those working for government agencies and especially, Cuban security.

Cuban counterintelligence exposed the spy.

Although holding the second highest rank in the embassy, he had never before worked for his country's foreign ministry; the post he filled had not existed previously and was created with the express purpose of fitting him in. As he himself admitted later, "I was not a career diplomat but a diplomatic messenger boy." Still later, faced with incontrovertible evidence, he confessed that he had worked for the CIA. The man was ordered to leave Cuba.²⁸

The Central Intelligence Agency was directly involved in the February 1981 seizure of the Ecuadoran embassy in Havana by a group of Cuban antisocial elements. This was stressed in the Cuban government statement read out by Deputy Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon at a press conference in Havana.

The statement noted that the CIA had used the services of Francisco Sales Mascarenhas, the Portuguese charge d'affaires in Cuba, to stage this provocation, aimed at undermining Cuban-Ecuadoran relations. Cuban security, the statement said, had traced the Portuguese diplomat's connections with a CIA agent working against Cuba.

Information supplied by the persons who forced their way into the Ecuadoran embassy on February 13 and seized a group of Ecuadoran diplomats as hostages, as well as the results of the investigation indicated that Mascarenhas had had advance knowledge of the criminals' plans to leave the country illegally. These plans envisaged kidnappings of diplomats and raids against foreign embassies. Mascarenhas also had had advance and detailed knowledge of the planned raid on the Ecuadoran embassy and had himself suggested it as a target, choosing it because of the good relations existing between the Cuban and Ecuadoran governments.

Mascarenhas supplied the conspirators with the layout of the embassy building, information on the makes and license plates of the cars its diplomats used, and telephone numbers of several diplomatic missions, including the Portuguese embassy. He suggested that they call there immediately after the Ecuadoran embassy was seized, and promised them assistance. According to the plan of the raid, a foreign journalist was to wait nearby and immediately send out a report on the incident.

Mascarenhas briefed the conspirators on their subsequent course of action, designed to avoid any armed clash with the forces of the law. In his apartment he kept a .22 pistol which was among the weapons used in the seizure of the embassy.

Definite proof was obtained that possibilities of assassinating Fidel Castro had been discussed during meetings between the Portuguese diplomat and the conspirators.

In 1977 it was reported that in 1971 the CIA had elaborated and implemented a plan of introducing swine pest in Cuba which developed into an epizootic. The container with the germs was delivered to Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone and then smuggled into Cuba near Guantanamo on board a fishing trawler. In early May 1971 an epizootic broke out in Cuba, killing hundreds of thousands of swine despite the measures taken by the government. This shows that the CIA resorts even to bacteriological weapons in its efforts to undermine the Cuban economy.

Fidel Castro drew the attention of world public opinion to the suspicious circumstances in which a wave of epidemics began in the country in 1979. In his speech delivered on July 26, 1981 he accused the United States of waging biological warfare against Cuba. In 1979 pests

destroyed one third of the sugarcane plantations and almost 90 percent of the tobacco plantations, causing great economic losses. Epizootics decimated Cuba's cattle and swine herds.

The CIA does not even stop at using bacteriological weapons against the Cuban population. In 1981 an epidemic of dengue fever broke out in Cuba. Over 350,000 people contracted the disease and 150 died, mostly children.

Speaking at the 36th UN General Assembly on September 25, 1981, Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca of Cuba criticized harshly the Cuban policies of the Reagan Administration. He said Cuba was convinced that U.S. imperialism, U.S. government agencies used biological weapons against its people. In less than three years Cuba went through five serious epidemics; epizootics and pests affected cattle, sugarcane and tobacco crops. Then there was a wave of dengue fever and hemorrhagic conjunctivitis. As to the dengue epidemic, in-depth research by Cuban scientists and foreign experts led to the conclusion that the dengue virus had been brought to Cuba from abroad. It is on record that biological warfare research centers in the United States devoted special attention to the development of the dengue virus.

The First National Congress of Biologists held in Havana in November 1981 denounced the biological warfare waged against Cuba. A statement adopted at the congress noted that the recent epidemics in Cuba had occurred with the regularity and intensity which ruled out their spontaneous nature. Evidently, the document added, biological weapons were being criminally used against Cuba. The almost 900 delegates of the congress called on biologists throughout the world, and especially in the

United States, to come out against the militarist schemes of the U.S. government and its aggressive anti-Cuban acts.²⁹ As Julius Mader wrote in his article entitled "The CIA's Secret Plan Against Cuba", "the Reagan administration is now unable to refute the proof supplied by the government of Cuba to the effect that the CIA is waging criminal bacteriological, chemical and even meteorological warfare against the socialist island in the Caribbean".³⁰

Granma has described the Cuban policy of the Reagan Administration as a case of primitively aggressive anticommunism. The Cuban newspaper recalls that since the revolution of 1959 the United States has repeatedly resorted to sabotage and economic blockade, organized the Bay of Pigs invasion, threatened to destroy Cuba with nuclear weapons, drew up plans to assassinate Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders. The American authorities have acted to introduce contagious diseases to the island, instigated terrorism, made countless slanderous statements, staged military provocations and tried to destabilize the national economy. This policy, the paper notes, has intensified abruptly with the advent of the Reagan Administration. Over 450 modern fighter-bombers have been stationed close to Cuba's shores. Three U.S. aircraft carriers are patrolling the Caribbean. The United States is constantly building up its military and naval presence in the region. Aerial surveillance of Cuba by SR-71 planes has reached unprecedented proportions. Intensive naval exercises are conducted close to the island. The Cuban people, the newspaper says, want peace and peaceful coexistence, but this does not mean that they have given up their sacred right to defend themselves and prepare to repulse aggression.

THE UNDECLARED WAR IN EL SALVADOR

"World opinion must know that two wars are now raging in El Salvador: a war of extermination, an unjust war conducted by Yankee imperialism and local reaction against our people, and a just war conducted by the people of El Salvador for liberation from the brutal reactionary dictatorship that has been oppressing them for almost half a century, a war for democratic freedoms, independence, and social justice."

Shafik Jorge Handal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of El Salvador¹

Training Cutthroats

Jaws set, eyes glaring cruelly from under the helmets, machine-guns at the ready—this photograph of Salvadoran rangers from the Atlacatl Battalion has appeared in many U.S. newspapers and magazines. The battalion, over 1,000-strong, has been trained specially for "search and destroy" missions.² American-armed, members of this punitive unit are transported to target areas in Huey helicopter gunships flown by U.S. Air Force pilots.

The U.S. instructors with the Atlacatl Battalion are Vietnam veterans, and they have taught their Salvadoran charges accordingly. Colonel David Monterrosa, commander of the battalion, has told journalists that his men treat insurgents and civilians alike.

The people who survived the carnage in the village of Mosote, in El Salvador's Morazan Department, told newsmen that the soldiers had indiscriminately shot at everyone in sight, including women, children and old people.

The soldiers entered the village in the even-

ing of December 11, 1981. They burst into the peasants' homes and drove everyone to the village square. Then the beatings, torture and executions began. During the night a fire was built and the bodies were cremated, on an officer's orders. Church groups estimate that 926 people, including some 300 children, have been killed in Mosote and three other villages.

"This horror story has not been substantiated. Show me 700 skulls, and I'll believe it," was the cynical comment from a highlevel U.S. official.³

Eyewitness reports paint a chilling picture of brutalities committed by the Salvadoran junta on instructions from Washington. The villages of Mosote, Cerro-Pando, Joya, Poza-Onda and Capilla are now deserted and almost totally destroyed. Each was another My Lai, faithfully reproduced in El Salvador by the Americans' disciples. In 1981 over 12,000 innocent people were killed in El Salvador.⁴

This small Central American country has turned into a huge battlefield. "Let us take a look at what is happening in El Salvador," says Manuel Mora Valverde, General Secretary of the People's Vanguard Party of Costa Rica. "Why have its people risen in arms? Why are they making such sacrifices? Can one, even if he has the most superficial knowledge of realities, believe that thousands of people will risk their lives and tranquility in response to calls from outside? No, the people of El Salvador are fighting because they can no longer endure brutal exploitation and abject poverty. The nation is in fact divided up among 14 of the wealthiest families. The peasant is compelled to labor by the sweat of his brow for a handful of rice. Like a slave he can be bought or sold together with the patch of land cultivated by him. The

fascist-minded dictatorship and the terrorism with which it responds to any sign of protest are what made the people rise in struggle."⁵

Historically, the armed struggle against the reactionaries can be traced to the tragic events of 1932, when the right-wing military brutally crushed a nationwide uprising spearheaded by peasants and agricultural laborers who demanded land.

The insurgents captured several towns and villages. General Hernández Martínez, head of the then military junta, imposed martial law and sent crack troops against the "rebels". After suppressing the uprising, the reactionaries unleashed savage reprisals against the patriots. At least 40,000 people were killed. A court martial ordered the execution of Farabundo Martí, Alfonso Luña and Mario Cepata, leaders of the Communist Party and of the uprising.

Reactionary military regimes have ruled the country for 50 years, and popular resistance has been going on without respite.

This struggle gained new momentum in late 1979, when a group of young army officers overthrew the corrupt regime of General Romero. A junta composed of army officers and civilians formed a new government in which progressive and democratic forces were represented. But the right wing wrecked the planned reforms and ousted Left national-patriotic elements from the cabinet and the government apparatus. This touched off a severe political crisis which developed into drawn-out nationwide hostilities.

In April 1980 the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FRD) was forged in the course of the armed struggle. FRD was the political wing of the liberation movement uniting several political parties, mass organizations, labor

unions, student associations, intellectuals, clergymen and supporters of democracy among army officers. In October 1980 Left armed detachments merged to form an insurgent army—the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).

Unable to cope with the popular armed resistance, the junta appealed to the United States for help. The first American move was to allocate three million dollars in aid and to send military advisers to El Salvador in 1980. In 1981 the Reagan Administration boosted its aid along both channels. Financial assistance to El Salvador reached 63 million in 1981 and 200 million dollars in 1982. Tanks, armored personnel carriers, planes and helicopters arrived from the United States. The Pentagon rearmed and retrained the Salvadoran armed forces, 20,000-strong. Special counterinsurgency units have been organized, including the Atlacatl Battalion. Some 4,000 Salvadoran servicemen went through special counterinsurgency training courses at Green Beret bases in the United States. In 1982 1,500 more Salvadorans were in training there.

The Salvadoran security forces now number 5,000 officers and men. Raised by the CIA and the FBI, this second army has been fully equipped and armed by the United States. "Key positions in the Salvadorean security establishment", *NACLA*, a U.S. periodical, writes, "were often filled by graduates of OPS* training, including those brought to Washington D.C. for studies at the International Police Academy."⁶

Thugs from ORDEN and the White Warriors' Union, the fascist paramilitary organizations set

* Office of Public Safety.

up by the CIA, also contribute to the terrorist campaign against the people. ORDEN, the biggest organization of this kind, was founded by General José Medrano, a man with close CIA ties. Together with regular army troops, ORDEN members took part in the massacre of 600 defenseless peasants near the Sampul River on the Honduran border. The White Warriors' Union functions under Roberto D'Aubuisson. A graduate of the International Police Academy in Washington, a collaborator with the CIA and a former deputy chief of Salvadoran intelligence, he personally tortured prisoners. During his 1981 visit to the United States he met with Lieutenant General David Graham, formerly Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, and some other influential figures, including Roger Fontaine, adviser on Latin American affairs to the President's assistant for national security.

Significantly, the Reagan Administration has appointed to key posts connected with El Salvador people with extensive experience in subversion. Colonel Eldon Cammings, chief of the U.S. military assistance group in El Salvador, used to be adviser to Laotian General Vang Pao, commander of CIA mercenary troops in Laos. Deane Hinton, the new U.S. ambassador to El Salvador (appointed in 1982) was in Santiago de Chile at the height of the CIA's campaign of subversion against the Allende government.

In an effort to conceal the increase in the number of U.S. military personnel in El Salvador, the Pentagon enlisted the aid of its allies. Israeli instructors, South Vietnamese mercenaries of the CIA, Cuban gusanos (counterrevolutionaries), remnants of Somoza's National Guard who had fled to Guatemala, and Chilean merce-

naries began to appear in El Salvador. Israel, France and Brazil delivered large consignments of weapons to the Salvadoran junta. Tel Aviv sent counterinsurgency aircraft, Arawa transport planes, small arms and ammunition. AMX-13 light tanks arrived from Paris and reconnaissance planes, from Rio de Janeiro.

U.S. Green Berets not only take part in the hostilities against the patriots but also direct the torture of prisoners. This, among other things, has been reported by Carlos Antonio Gomes, a defector from the Salvadoran army.⁷

Here is what Philip Agee said about the situation in the country in his interview to *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, a Soviet newspaper:

"Q. You have recently written a book exposing CIA interference in El Salvador. Would you comment on that?"

"A. This book (Agee points to a book in red-and-white cover entitled *White Paper White-wash: Interviews with Philip Agee on the CIA and El Salvador* in black) cites a document, an analysis of the Salvadoran situation prepared by various government agencies for the U.S. President. Incidentally, this is its first publication. It traces the connections between the CIA and the Salvadoran armed units of the extreme right—or, to put it bluntly, the thugs who have murdered thousands of innocent people.

"The forms these connections take include, for example, the so-called lists of subversive elements. These lists, containing up to 500 names each, are compiled by CIA stations in each country where the Agency operates.

"It's quite a challenge to keep these lists. When the time comes, the list is handed over to the local security service or gangs of the Squadron of Death type. The Salvadoran junta

has murdered more than 32,000 people over the two years of its rule (1979-1980). Many of the victims were on those subversive elements lists.

"Q. Mr. Agee, I'm sure the name of Roy L. Prosterman is familiar to you. Who is this man and what is he doing in El Salvador?"

"A. He's an old hand. In El Salvador, he is chief adviser on the 'agrarian reform program', already a failure. In many ways it is similar to the 'pacification' campaign conducted by U.S. troops and the Saigon puppets in Vietnam. Anyway, that comes as no surprise. In those years Roy Prosterman directed, together with former CIA Director William Colby, Operation Phoenix—that's forced resettlement of South Vietnamese peasants into the so-called strategic villages. Official sources alone estimate that at least 20,000 Vietnamese were killed in the course of the operation. Now Prosterman directs the murders of Salvadoran peasants."⁸

Facts Versus Lies

In order to vindicate the United States' growing interference in El Salvador's internal affairs and its support of the criminal junta, the Reagan Administration launched, in 1981, a propaganda campaign claiming that the Salvadoran insurgents received arms from the Soviet Union and Cuba via Nicaragua. The campaign culminated in the publication of the *White Paper on El Salvador*. As other materials produced by the CIA, the paper offers no proof but abounds in all kinds of inventions and groundless allegations about the "long arm of Moscow" and "accomplices from Havana". Simultaneously, the CIA told the press that the Soviet Union had already delivered 600 to 1,000 tons of the

most sophisticated weapons to the "Reds" in El Salvador.

Visión magazine, which prints anything Langley supplies it with, has published an article entitled "The Red Offensive in Central America", claiming that while the Salvadoran guerrillas receive Soviet weapons, the junta's army has been deprived of Washington's support, that aside from supplying arms, the USSR is waging an "around-the-clock ideological aggression". *Visión* also asserts that the Soviet embassy in Costa Rica is chock-full of KGB agents who direct subversive activities throughout Central America.

The CIA's slanderous campaign has been fully exposed by the Cuban government. In October 1981 Fidel Castro wrote to *The Washington Post*. Here is an excerpt from that letter:

"*The Post* recently published an article by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak ("The Bridge over the River Lempa", Oct. 19) dealing with Central America, El Salvador and Cuba. The article was widely publicized.

"It claimed that during the second half of September, Cuba had sent 500 to 600 elite troops with the purpose of becoming directly involved in the developments in El Salvador. It even sought to link up the guerrilla action that destroyed the Puente del Oro in that country (a bridge over the Lempa River—*Authors*) with the alleged contingent of Cuban troops. When asked by different press organs, the State Department refused to confirm or disprove the news.

"Thus an attempt was made to add another element to the campaign already under way for several weeks, concerning the situation in Central America and, particularly, in El Salvador,

with regard to Cuba's alleged participation in recent arms shipments to the Salvadoran revolutionary forces and the sending of Cuban military advisers to cooperate with them. These totally false reports were officially issued by the U.S. State Department and by Secretary of State Haig himself in the months of July and August. On September 3, in a press release the Cuban revolutionary government publicly challenged both Mr. Haig and the government of the United States to offer one shred of evidence to back their slanderous assertions. Neither Mr. Haig nor the U.S. Government has answered this denouncement."¹⁰

Instead, Washington sent its emissaries, carrying copies of the *White Paper*, to Latin American capitals in an effort to prove to the unconvinced that an "indirect armed aggression by the communist powers" was under way in El Salvador. However, the unconvinced remained unconvinced.

Philip Agee, who used to concoct similar documents in the 1960s, says that the information collected so painstakingly by U.S. intelligence appears "superfluously researched, poorly translated, grossly embellished and partly fabricated".

There are telling blunders in the *White Paper*. For example, "Document E"—a report on a trip by Shafik Handal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of El Salvador, to several East European countries—was ostensibly discovered in a guerrillas' cache. It follows from the Spanish version that the document was written by Cubans. But the English translation says the text appeared after "Comrade" (Shafik Handal) had left Cuba. How this document came to be found among

other "secret papers" allegedly discovered in El Salvador remains a mystery.

CIA analysts display the same carefree abandon when they describe the internal organization of the Salvadoran guerrilla movement too. There are incorrect and arbitrary translations of aliases, and there is confusion in the attribution of different slogans to different guerrilla movements. For example, the slogan of the People's Liberation Forces is ascribed to Ana Guadalupe Martínez, leader of the "Revolutionary People's Army" movement.

The *White Paper* contained numerous other blunders and inconsistencies. The only thing lacking was authentic facts. CIA experts tried very hard to offset the lack of proof with old anti-communist clichés. One might note in passing that CIA-produced *White Papers* are of poor quality.

The paper's authors cite information long shown to be false. They claim, for example, that the guerrillas were to blame for 6,000 of the 10,000 deaths which occurred in El Salvador in 1980. However, Robert White, the former U.S. ambassador there, asserts that the mass murders were committed by rightwing extremists and the junta's security forces. White has also refuted reports of guerrilla "invasions" from Nicaragua. In his opinion, the *White Paper* contains "questionable" information compiled, in all probability, by people from the Defense Department and U.S. intelligence services—the agencies bent on securing permission to interfere directly in El Salvador.⁴¹

The U.S. administration is trying to prove Cuban and Nicaraguan "involvement" in the Salvadoran developments by citing crude fabrications as evidence. Yet another soap bubble

burst when Orlando José Tardencilla Espinoza, a Nicaraguan national captured in El Salvador by the junta's troops, exposed the dirty methods used by U.S. intelligence. The Reagan Administration saw the Nicaraguan, allegedly taken prisoner during a battle with the Salvadoran guerrillas in 1981, as an ace in the hole. But when the State Department presented Tardencilla to newsmen so that he could corroborate Nicaraguan and Cuban involvement in El Salvador, he declared he had never been to Cuba, never seen a single Nicaraguan or Cuban in El Salvador, and that his previous testimony about having undergone military training in Cuba and having been sent to El Salvador by the Nicaraguan government had been made under duress.

Commenting on the Tardencilla affair, the Cuban *Granma* stressed that Washington had staged it in order to "justify an aggression against Nicaragua".⁴²

Another Vietnam

In May 1982 Alvaro Magaña, a banker, took the oath of office as Provisional President of El Salvador, thus ending the scramble for power among the right-wing parties which had taken part in the "general elections" of March 28.

Washington expected this electoral farce to impart a semblance of legality to the ruthless pro-American regime in El Salvador. However, the elections, held at gunpoint, were won by the fascist far right and not by the Christian Democratic Party of Napoleon Duarte, the junta's chief. The extremists secured a majority in the Constitutional Assembly, currently functioning as the country's parliament. Roberto D'Aubuisson—a "pathological killer", according to

former U.S. Ambassador White—became head of the Assembly.

Washington moved to touch up the façade of the new fascist regime in El Salvador by installing an “independent” President. Magaña’s appointment was the result of vigorous efforts by American emissaries and the U.S. embassy in El Salvador to secure the consent of D’Aubuisson and other leaders of the far right coalition.

The new head of the Salvadoran government is a CIA stooge, one of the wealthiest people in the nation. He received his higher education in the United States and, as a banker, has close connections with U.S. monopolies. Described officially as an independent politician, he has full support of Duarte’s party. Magaña’s extensive contacts in the army are explained by his constant cooperation with and financial support of El Salvador’s military regimes.

In other words, the official reshuffling in El Salvador is merely a change in the stage setting. The hated junta of army officers and civilians has been replaced by a “constitutionally elected” President who represents the same interests as his predecessors did. The difference between the new and the old regimes is only that the fascist elements who previously cooperated with the government surreptitiously have now officially become—thanks to the “election experiment” run by the United States—part of the ruling coalition.

But neither the election farce nor the campaign of brutal terror can overcome popular resistance. Armed struggle has spread throughout the country. The patriots’ operations are becoming increasingly effective. Intense fighting between the guerrillas and Washington’s puppet troops is raging in 9 out of the 14 departments

of El Salvador. The insurgents held the town of Jocoaytique for an entire week. A daring raid has been conducted against the Ilopango Air Force base near San Salvador. Pitched battles have been fought on the slopes of the Chinchontepec Volcano (70 kilometres east of the capital), one of the chief bases of the liberation front. In 1981 government troops made five attempts to take this area. In January 1982 one-third of the army, including the Atlacatl Battalion, staged the sixth attempt which also failed. The patriots’ victory would have long been a reality but for the United States’ support of the Salvadoran regime. Washington is doing its utmost to extinguish the flame of revolutionary struggle and to preserve its economic, political and military positions in El Salvador. A close look at the tactics of the Reagan Administration makes it possible to discern a hierarchy of objectives. First, efforts to distort facts, discredit revolutionary organizations and hunt down their leaders; all this against the background of a massive psychological offensive—brandishing the bugbear of totalitarianism and twisting the arms of the undecided. What follows is physical extermination of patriots by the punitive troops directed by U.S. military advisers, the purge accompanied by “free” elections. If the army fails to cope with the situation and the “elections” fail to dupe the people, a third option can be used—direct military intervention. The central and everpresent objective is to isolate—and, if possible, destroy—socialist Cuba, the “chief source of instability in the region”.

The United States has proclaimed its readiness to do anything in its power to prevent any Central American country from becoming “the theater of terrorism”.¹³ Under the pretext of

fighting "international terrorism", Washington reserves the right to openly interfere—whether under the cover of the OAS or without it—in these nations' affairs, up to and including direct armed intervention.

U.S. involvement in the undeclared war in El Salvador is expanding. Former Foreign Minister Héctor Dada of El Salvador has stated that the country's government is fully controlled by the U.S. embassy and the U.S. brass. Dada has likened the evacuation of civilians from El Salvador's northern provinces to the tactics the Pentagon used in Vietnam—concentrating the population in "strategic villages" so as to wipe out all the other villages over a large area. According to *Estudios*, the Uruguayan Communists' periodical, Green Berets and other U.S. advisers are applying in El Salvador the tactics of massive terror aimed above all at isolating the guerrillas from the rest of the people.¹⁴ The U.S. military advisers in El Salvador already number over 800.

Prior to the announcement of a new injection of financial and military assistance to the Salvadoran regime (worth over 600 million dollars), the White House performed a publicity stunt. On January 28, 1982 President Reagan signed a document which maintained that government troops in El Salvador were making substantial efforts to further the observance of human rights. Without such testimony by the U.S. President, Congress would have refused to consider the proposal of additional aid to the junta. An amendment to that effect was passed in the fall of 1981, when it was no longer possible to keep public opinion in the United States ignorant of the actual state of affairs in El Salvador. But the amendment was inherently inef-

fective. Congress can neither override a Presidential executive order nor even question its motives.

What happened was that only some U.S. newspapers did criticize Washington's attempts to whitewash its vassals. On the eve of the day the White House decided to pat the Salvadoran military on the back, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* published articles on the December massacre of Mosote, Morazan Department. This had no effect on President Reagan, and the Bulgarian *Rabotnichesko delo* wrote: "Since August the army (of El Salvador—*Authors*) has conducted 28 punitive raids in rural areas, mostly in Usulután, San Vicente, Cuscatlán and Morazan departments, using heavy artillery, combat planes and helicopters. Central American radio stations report that, contrary to President Reagan's assertions that human rights are respected in El Salvador, the government and the army of this small country continue to wage genocide against their own people. The U.S. government . . . has essentially agreed with the cynical statement of the Salvadoran military that it is 'difficult to tell insurgents from peasants'."¹⁵

Washington has become a direct accomplice in the crimes of the Salvadoran rulers. Harping on the myth of "Soviet and Cuban interference", the U.S. government wants to save the hated junta from the wrath of the people. Hundreds of millions of dollars, all kinds of weapons and military equipment and a stream of U.S. military advisers are pouring into El Salvador to crush the liberation movement.

The threat of U.S. aggression is looming over Central America and the Caribbean. Invasion plans are being drawn up by the Pentagon gen-

erals and the President's aides. American officials are openly discussing "options" of armed intervention aimed against Cuba, Nicaragua, the Salvadoran patriots—in other words, all those who refuse to bow to U.S. imperialism.

Washington politicians, with their penchant for declaring virtually the entire world a sphere of "vital interests of the United States", demonstrate their complete lack of respect for national sovereignty and human rights in El Salvador and other countries where Washington supports reactionary dictatorships.

Despite all the propaganda smokescreen, world public opinion is aware of and protests against U.S. interventionism.

In France, friends of El Salvador have launched a fund-raising campaign under the slogan "One million francs for the Salvadoran resistance", in the old tradition of internationalist solidarity with freedom fighters. In Mexico, Cuba and other Latin American countries solidarity rallies are held. Organizations, political leaders and the press in Greece, Sweden, Canada and other nations publicly denounce the junta's crimes.

Internationalist solidarity was highlighted by the February 1982 Latin American Conference for Peace, Human Rights and Self-Determination for the People of El Salvador. Held in Lima, the conference was attended by representatives of democratic organizations, a broad range of movements, political parties and progressive clergy from Europe and the Americas.

The Final Declaration unanimously adopted by this representative international forum was an indictment not only of the dictatorship but also of its U.S. imperialist sponsors, the real culprits of the brutal campaign of terror unleashed

in El Salvador by the reactionary military. Rejecting Washington's inventions of "Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement" in El Salvador, the conference participants declared that the real threat facing the region was not the mythical "communist peril" but the very tangible alliance of local oligarchies with transnational corporations, together plundering the national wealth of Latin American countries.¹⁶

So far the United States has refrained from direct armed interference in El Salvador. But this is not a sign of "restraint", as Washington would have world public opinion believe, it is rather a restriction life has imposed on Washington: the Reagan Administration is aware that within the United States there is opposition to such a move and that it would touch off a wave of indignation around the world. Hence the attempts to internationalize the Salvadoran question. Today, the prime motive force behind U.S. foreign policy is rabid anticommunism and a striving toward international confrontation. The objective is to alleviate the worldwide crisis of the capitalist system and to divert the Americans' attention away from their own problems.

AS DARKNESS LIFTS

"Mr. President, have you approved of covert activity to destabilize the present government of Nicaragua?"

"Well, no, we're supporting them, the oh, wait a minute, wait a minute, I'm sorry.... Here again, this is something upon which with national security interests, I just—I will not comment."

From President Reagan's press conference of February 18, 1982¹

A Victim of U.S. Aggression

In 1981 Carlos Fonseca, one of the founders of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), wrote in his book *Under the Sandinista Banner*: "To understand the actual political situation in Nicaragua one has to take into account certain aspects of our national history. Nicaragua is a country that has suffered from foreign aggression and oppression for over four centuries.... At the same time, Nicaragua was among the first victims of the aggressive policy of the United States."² In his book, Carlos Fonseca analyzes 15 particularly significant cases of U.S. intervention in Nicaragua between 1850 and 1960.³

The U.S. aggression against Nicaragua began in the middle of the 19th century. In 1848 and 1854 the United States made its first attempts to annex Nicaragua. In 1855 a group of American adventurers led by William Walker seized power in Nicaragua and proclaimed Walker President. The campaign was financed by Frank Vanderbildt, the famous millionaire. The United States immediately recognized Walker as a legitimate head of state and government. However, Walker was soon driven out of the country. True,

he kept trying to regain what he had lost, but failed: in the 1860s he was captured and shot by a firing squad.

After this fiasco, the United States did not cease trying to install its puppets (corrupt generals and politicians) in the Presidential palace. In 1909 Juan Estrada received one million dollars from U.S. banana companies, 200,000 dollars from the Joseph Birs Company and 150,000 from the Samuel Wale Company. The general told a *New York Times* correspondent that these U.S. companies had subsidized his revolution. To support the "revolution", which began in 1910, the U.S. cruiser *Paduka* landed a detachment of U.S. Marines in Nicaragua. The Marines executed about 200 Nicaraguans, and General Estrada became head of the Nicaraguan government. When the people rose against the American stooge two years later, U.S. Marines were again landed to support him. Hostilities between the Marines and the patriots lasted for several months.

The people who took turns serving as Presidents of Nicaragua were Washington's docile puppets. In 1916 John E. Jefferson, the U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, said it in so many words that only one who coordinated his foreign and domestic policy with the United States could become President of Nicaragua. Naturally, Nicaragua's patriots never accepted their country's transformation into a semicolony of the United States. In 1926 another uprising broke out, and Washington promptly sent in its troops to crush it. President Adolfo Diaz, a man who pathologically feared his own people, declared that U.S. Marines should remain in Nicaragua for good.

The uprising was led by General Augusto Cesar Sandino, the "general of free men". Answer-

ing the suggestions of traitors and cowards that he lay down his arms because U.S. troops would surely defeat him, Sandino said proudly: "Nicaragua must not be property of the oligarchy and traitors, let alone should we swallow humiliation at the hands of the pirate expansionists of the dollar."⁴ In July 1927 George Hartfield, commander of the 40,000-strong U.S. army of occupation, sent an ultimatum to Sandino demanding his immediate surrender. Sandino replied: "I have received your message yesterday. Here is my reply. I will not surrender and I am waiting for you here. I want my country to be free; failing that, I want death. I am not afraid of you; the patriotic ardor of those who are with me inspires me. Patria y Libertad. A. Sandino."⁵

The U.S. invaders brought all their military might to bear on Sandino's troops in order to drown the uprising in blood. Prior to 1932, the Sandinistas had fought 510 battles with Americans. Between 1926 and 1936 the aggressors killed over 120,000 people in this small country. Contrary to all the pessimistic predictions, Sandino's army kept on fighting, while the invaders suffered defeat after defeat despite their overwhelming superiority in strength and weapons. Then Washington decided to switch to different tactics. In November 1932 the puppet government approached Sandino with a proposal of peace talks. Sandino agreed—on condition that U.S. troops withdraw from Nicaragua.

The White House did not object: by that time the Americans had created a Nicaraguan "National Guard", ready to do their bidding. So, in January 1933 U.S. troops left Nicaragua, having detailed its advisers to serve with the National Guard. The Guard was put under the com-

mand of Anastasio Somoza García, a man who met all the White House's requirements. His great-grandfather had been a highwayman, hanged publicly in 1849. His father, the owner of a small coffee plantation near the city of Granada, had been bent on marrying into the local oligarchy; his ambition was fulfilled when he married the daughter of the aristocratic Debayle-Sacasa family from the city of Leon. Anastasio chose a different path to the top: he became an informer with the invaders. The Americans saw Anastasio Somoza García as a suitable candidate for the post of National Guard Commander. President Sacasa—Anastasio was his maternal nephew—had no objections. The paid informer of the U.S. secret service was made general.

But that was only the beginning. Following in the footsteps of his father, a life-long gigolo, Anastasio Somoza García began an affair with the wife of the U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua. The ambassador entrusted him with the delicate mission of assassinating Sandino. The "general of free men" was lured into Managua for "peace talks" and killed there on February 21, 1933. The day before the assassination Somoza held a conference at which he said Washington insisted that Sandino be eliminated. Somoza's reward was not long in coming. In 1933 he became dictator of Nicaragua. U.S. Marines, *Newsweek* says, handed power to him.⁶

Somoza and Co.

"This camarilla," Carlos Fonseca wrote about Somoza's clique, "turned Nicaragua into a neo-colony."⁷ Anastasio Somoza was a true descendant of his highwayman great-grandfather. He was completely amoral. The people nicknamed

him "Tacho"—meaning "cesspool". On assuming power, Tacho let loose a wave of brutal terror which killed some 20,000 Nicaraguans. "Somoza," the Nicaraguan journalist José Benito Escobar wrote, "swam to power across a sea of blood."⁸ Blood was what the dictator grew rich on. By 1950 the man whose bills used to be paid by the U.S. ambassador's wife was worth 60 million dollars. *Bohemia*, a Cuban periodical, wrote: "The Somozas are also part of a group called 'Sucesión Somoza', the most powerful economic cartel of Central America.... The notorious millionaire Howard Hughes was an associate of the family.... With its Hughes connections, the 'Sucesión' invested in oil refineries, air transport, tourism, hotels, casinos and the export of blood plasma."⁹ According to *U.S. News & World Report*, in Nicaragua, "most people were certain that the U.S. aim always was to keep the Somozas in power."¹⁰ By 1979 the property of the Somoza clan was estimated at one billion dollars.

An intricate network of links connected the clan and the "Sucesión" with the U.S. government. The family kept contributing hundreds of thousands of dollars to both the Republican and the Democratic election coffers. No matter which party landed in the White House, the new President invariably showed the "Sucesión" every consideration. This took the form of U.S. military assistance. By 1979, the Somoza family had received 100 million dollars of this aid—an unheard-of sum for a nation of barely over two million people. The United States armed and trained the National Guard, set up special forces of the Green Beret type and sent a large group of military advisers to Nicaragua.

In 1956 Anastasio Somoza García finally got

what had long been coming to him: Rigoberto Lopez Perez, a Nicaraguan patriot, shot and fatally wounded him on September 21. A U.S. hospital plane, dispatched on personal orders from President Eisenhower, brought Anastasio, Sr. to the Canal Zone, but U.S. doctors failed to save the dictator's life. "The Nation and I personally," President Eisenhower declared, "regret the death of President Somoza of Nicaragua as a result of the bastardly attack made upon him several days ago by an assassin. President Somoza constantly emphasized, both publicly and privately, his friendship for the United States—a friendship that persisted until the moment of his death."¹¹ Luis Somoza Debayle, Anastasio's eldest son, succeeded his father and ruled for several years. But then the clan decided that Anastasio, Jr., the youngest son and West Point graduate, would be a better choice for the post. Anastasio Somoza Debayle had the reputation of a sadist—he personally tortured prisoners. He became President in 1967.

His son Anastasio Somoza Portocarrero, a graduate of the Green Beret school at Fort Bragg, Texas, was being groomed for his turn at the Presidency. Meanwhile, the situation in Nicaragua was changing rapidly. The shot fired by Rigoberto Lopez was not an isolated incident. In 1958 a guerrilla movement was launched in the north of the country, and in 1962 the Sandinista National Liberation Front was organized. The Pentagon and the CIA hurried to the aid of Anastasio, Sr.'s heirs. In the 1960s the rearmament and retraining of the National Guard and the security forces began under the military assistance and public safety programs the United States inaugurated in Nicaragua. Together with Anastasio Somoza Portocarrero, a group of U.S.

Green Berets led by Michael Echannis and Charles Sanders arrived in Nicaragua.

The mission of the group was to form a crack army unit completely loyal to the Somoza dynasty. The Somozistas themselves later called it the "SS Battalion". The unit was organized along the lines of a U.S.-created special army school under Echannis.

Echannis' establishment was nicknamed the "school of killers". It included two concentration camps where live subjects were provided for students to train on and Echannis and Sanders shared the expertise they had gained in Vietnam. The CIA and the FBI were in complete control of the Nicaraguan security network.

The repressive apparatus of the dictatorship was ruthless in crushing the most feeble attempts to bring about change. In the 1970s, reprisals and terror became all-encompassing. A special mission led by Gunther Warner of the CIA organized the Nicaraguan "Squadrons of Death". They consisted of local police officers, members of Somozista youth organizations, Cuban counter-revolutionaries and U.S. army veterans as advisers. The Squadrons of Death began a planned campaign to exterminate the opposition in the cities; in rural areas this was the mission of Echannis' school graduates. An FSLN communique of December 27, 1974 said that "the special forces of the National Guard have acted with the ferocity of tigers crazed by blood; they kill, torture, destroy crops, rape, and devastate the country by terror".¹² The Fronts' appeal to the Nicaraguan people of July 31, 1969, written by Carlos Fonseca, one of the FSNL founders, justly described the Somoza regime as "brutal, blood-thirsty, inhuman and amoral".¹³

The Storming of Tiscapa

Anastasio, Jr. was preparing to do battle against "international communism". Tiscapa Hill which overlooked Managua was turned into a fortress. The dictator had an underground bunker built there in which he spent most of his time, guarded by 2,000 cutthroats from the "SS Battalion".

In the latter half of the 1970s the struggle against the dictatorship intensified. The 1976 FSLN guerrilla campaign against the Somozistas was so effective that the Pentagon sent Green Berets into Nicaragua. *Ideología*, a Venezuelan publication, called this move an occupation of Nicaragua by the United States.¹⁴ In July 1978 the Movement of the People United was created, comprising 23 different political and civic organizations in opposition to the Somoza dictatorship. On August 22 Operation Carlos Fonseca Amador: Death to Somozism was carried out—a venture virtually without precedent in Latin American guerrilla history. In downtown Managua, 25 people seized the National Palace with over 2,000 hostages—government officials, members of parliament, armed guards and visitors. The guerrillas held the building for over 48 hours and, having forced Somoza to meet their demands*, left the country.

The successful operation shook the country. On August 25, 1978 a nationwide strike began which

* The FSLN Manifesto was broadcast by all the radio stations in the country; political prisoners were freed; the 25 guerrillas, all the freed political prisoners and the key hostages seized in the National Palace were allowed to leave the country unhampered; 10 million dollars to be used in the struggle against the dictatorship were handed over to the guerrillas.

developed into an armed uprising. The United States hurried to its puppet's aid, sending in planes, helicopters, tanks, armored cars, tow trucks, howitzers, missiles, napalm bombs and other materiel. Large arms shipments arrived from Brazil and Israel. To put down the 1978 uprising, Somoza used not only the National Guard but also groups of mercenaries composed of U.S. nationals and Cuban counterrevolutionaries.

In the punitive campaign, government troops killed some 5,000 people, mostly civilians. They burst into people's homes, took all males over 14 years of age out and shot them. The reprisals were especially brutal in rural areas where whole villages were burned down together with their inhabitants. The dictator wanted the bloodbath to completely crush any will of the people to resist. Manuel Salazar-y-Espinoza, the bishop of Leon, told a France Press correspondent that the atrocities committed by government troops against civilians defied description. On September 19, 1978, asked by an NBC interviewer about these indiscriminate killings, Somoza replied that "in any civil strife, in any country when lines are now drawn and you have to go after insurgents, some people get hurt without cause". He said he was satisfied with the performance of the National Guard.

On February 2, 1979 in Managua, Nicaragua's patriots formalized the organization of the National Patriotic Front (FNP) which united all the opposition forces. On February 21—the anniversary of Sandino's death—FSLN guerrillas executed Colonel Federico Davidson, a direct participant in the assassination of Sandino 45 years before. In March FSLN started a nationwide military campaign. By June 7 some 25 cities and towns were liberated, including Leon, Matagalpa,

Somotillo, Masaya. On July 5 FSLN troops converged on Managua from three directions, trapping Anastasio, Jr. in his bunker.

In 1979 the United States was pursuing a dual policy. On the one hand, it was doing its utmost to save Somoza. Americans participated directly in military operations against FSLN; U.S. Air Force planes flew combat missions from their bases in the Canal Zone. U.S. naval vessels shelled guerrilla-held coastal areas. The dictators of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras also did their bit—they sent armed detachments to aid Somoza. The United States suggested that their vassals disregard public opinion and invade Nicaragua.

Simultaneously, however, the strategists in Washington decided to replace Somoza with a less odious leader. The United States drew up a plan under which the CIA was to find a Liberal Nationalist Party figure suitable for heading the National Guard.

On July 17, 1979 a plane landed at the Homestead Air Force base near Miami. One of the passengers, incongruous in a black vested suit in the summer heat, presented a passport with a U.S. entry visa. The passport was made out to Anastasio Somoza. True, he had been clinging to power until the last moment. He had kept calling Washington, trying to reach President Carter. He made the last call late on July 17. Carter was at Camp David, and the White House telephone operator switched the call to the State Department. The man who answered was Warren Christopher, chief of State Department Intelligence. Christopher told Somoza dryly that he would soon receive an answer through diplomatic channels. The game was obviously up. Fleeing from the bunker, Somoza left in his place Francisco Urquyo, his son's father-in-law, who immediately

declared that he was supported by the United States.

But the patriots upset the CIA plan to install Urquyo as President. On July 18 FSLN troops entered Managua. Urquyo fled abroad. The people of Nicaragua were at long last free of the brutal dictatorship. The darkness which had lasted for decades finally lifted.

The CIA on the Warpath

U.S. imperialism refused to accept the end of its domination in Nicaragua. From the very first days of the Sandinista revolution, an all-out effort was begun to topple Nicaragua's new authorities. The United States has been trying to destabilize the government. It has resorted to economic pressure and political blackmail. It has threatened direct armed intervention. It has enlisted the aid of counterrevolutionaries. It has been conducting ideological sabotage and slanderous campaigns.

CIA propaganda against Nicaragua uses old, familiar stereotypes. Nicaragua is slanderously pictured as a country infested with thousands of Soviet and Cuban military advisers and exporting terrorism to other countries. The U.S. press accuses the Nicaraguan authorities of suppressing human rights and asserts that the nation has been plunged into chaos, that the people are starving and the economy is dislocated.

The decision to begin CIA operations against Nicaragua was adopted at the November 16, 1981 session of the National Security Council, on President Reagan's instructions. According to *The New York Times*, this secret meeting also discussed the option of direct U.S. armed interference in Nicaragua.¹⁵ General Néstor Sánchez, a top

CIA official and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs, was designated coordinator of covert operations against Managua.

At the next meeting, held a week later, President Reagan approved the plan of financing the so-called Democratic Forces of Nicaragua via CIA channels. The aim is to bribe and finance the bourgeois factions favoring confrontation with the government: the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement, the Nicaraguan Social Christian Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and the National Confederation of Labor with its AFL-CIO connections. The CIA also feeds money to the Nicaraguan extreme Left. The efforts of CIA operatives are gradually bringing the bourgeois opposition and the extreme Left closer together on a counterrevolutionary basis.

Speaking in the UN Security Council on March 29, 1982, Daniel Ortega, coordinator of the administrative council of the National Reconstruction Government, exposed the key aspects of U.S. imperialist subversion against Nicaragua. The list begins with the CIA's covert operations for which the Reagan Administration has allocated 19 million dollars (this has also been reported in the U.S. press).¹⁶ Special camps have been set up along the Nicaraguan border in Honduras. This is where the "liberation army" is being raised from among Somoza's National Guardsmen and mercenaries from the United States and several Latin American countries. These are trained by U.S. military instructors. From March 15, 1982 U.S.-supplied weapons began to pour into these camps. Organized and trained by the CIA, armed gangs raid Nicaragua from Honduras. U.S. spy planes and naval vessels keep Nicaragua

under constant surveillance. Between June 1981 and March 11, 1982 U.S. Air Force planes committed at least 40 violations of Nicaragua's air space.

In 1981 the Nicaraguan security forces routed 22 gangs which had been killing peasant activists, militiamen, servicemen and border guards. Great quantities of U.S.-manufactured weapons were seized. Members of these gangs taken prisoner have testified that prior to their infiltration of Nicaragua they undergo special training in CIA camps located in the Canal Zone, Honduras and the United States itself.

In the summer of 1981 a CIA-inspired separatist movement emerged on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast—an area populated by 70,000 to 120,000 Misquito Indians. Langley frequently chooses to act through missionaries, and some of them do underground work among the Misquitos. Others, specifically Jehova's Witnesses, conduct antigovernment propaganda in the cities.

Economic moves are an important component of the effort to destabilize the Nicaraguan government. As early as his 1980 election campaign, Ronald Reagan said he opposed aid to Nicaragua since, he claimed, it was a "Marxist country". In January 1981 the United States suspended economic assistance to Nicaragua and simultaneously boosted military and economic aid to Honduras and El Salvador. On April 2, 1981 Washington announced the cessation of economic assistance to and the imposition of an embargo against Nicaragua.

The White House is working hard to create an anti-Nicaraguan military bloc in Central America. The Pentagon proposes that the first step should be the merger of the Guatemalan, Honduran and Salvadoran armies into a joint

armed force. At the same time, the United States is trying to disguise its interventionist schemes by reactivating the Inter-American Defense Board, set up in the 1960s to help suppress the guerrilla movement in the region but currently hogtied by the withdrawal from it of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Another CIA plan concerns efforts to provoke an armed conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua which could make it easier for the United States to intervene here. During the joint U.S.-Honduran military exercises in 1981, Colonel Samuel Dickinson of the U.S. Army declared that "the United States is ready to support Honduras in a war against Nicaragua".¹⁷ The Honduran-based counterrevolutionary gangs conducted almost 100 forays into Nicaragua in 1980.¹⁸

Faced with this U.S. threat, Nicaragua embarked on strengthening its defense capability. In January 1981 the government announced a drive to raise a volunteer militia of 100,000; in March the target figure was raised to 200,000. Nicaragua does not intend to lose the freedom that cost it so dearly: it rejects the attempts to restore U.S. domination. On the international scene, Nicaragua opposes the nuclear war threat and the arms race and supports a restructuring of international economic relations on a just basis.

In March 1983 the Somozista gangs trained in CIA camps in Honduras invaded Nicaragua. The CIA spent over 30 million dollars on this operation. Those who led the invaders declared openly that their goal was to overthrow the popular government of Nicaragua. Washington wanted the counterrevolutionaries to seize a section of the Nicaraguan territory and set up a puppet government there which could then appeal for assistance to the United States and the Central Amer-

ican dictatorships. There is nothing new about this scenario: the Cuban counterrevolutionaries who landed in the Bay of Pigs in 1961 had identical plans. We all know how their adventure ended. The same will happen in Nicaragua, no matter how many attacks the CIA's "liberation armies" launch. Truly popular revolutions know how to defend themselves. "Imperialism can shed much Nicaraguan blood and inflict enormous losses on our economy," Miguel D'Escoto, the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, said, "but it cannot compel the people to surrender the freedom they have won. The Nicaraguan army is not big and has no air force. Nonetheless, we will not allow ourselves to be intimidated. We have the most dependable weapon, namely, the total support of a united people, whose sons are prepared to lay down their lives for the revolution."¹⁹

CONCLUSION

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the revolutionary victories in Nicaragua and Grenada were the high points of the 1980s. They offered new proof that given the current alignment of world forces, popular struggle can defeat oppressors even on the doorstep of the biggest imperialist power. The victories these countries have won are justly viewed as forming part of the momentous developments which caused a new rift in the system of imperialist domination at the juncture of the 1970s and 1980s.

In a bid to restore its erstwhile hegemony and overcome its internal contradictions, U.S. imperialism is now heading for an all-out confrontation with socialism and the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples. One of its foremost objectives is to halt progressive changes in Latin

America and the Caribbean. *World Marxist Review* says that, weaned on the Monroe Doctrine, the ruling quarters of the United States react especially painfully to the defeats they suffer in what they see as a "traditional and natural" sphere of U.S. influence. The more reactionary factions, represented by the Reagan Administration are now committed to restore their honor which they believe was injured under Jimmy Carter.¹

The increased aggressiveness of the United States has galvanized the region's reactionaries into activity. The political climate has deteriorated abruptly. The goal Washington is pursuing in Latin America is perfectly clear: first, to retain the sources of raw materials, cheap labor and astronomical profits. Second, to bolster the already firm ties with the client regimes. Third, to use them more extensively in carrying out the United States' aggressive schemes. Fourth, to try and cope with the task the previous administration failed to discharge—stemming or at least discrediting the Latin American liberation movement and offsetting the revolutionary victories in Cuba and Nicaragua. And finally, to teach a lesson to all those opposing the imperialist interpretation of current problems, primarily to developing countries.

Having declared its intention to end communist influence in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. imperialism is trying to create a united reactionary front in Latin America. The previous, outwardly critical attitude to fascist regimes is a thing of the past. Full recognition has been extended to Pinochet, Stroessner, Duvalier and other dictators. In October 1981 the U.S. Senate lifted its ban on arms deliveries and military assistance to the Chilean junta. Similar favors

have been done for the strongmen of Uruguay, Guatemala and other countries. The genocidal government of El Salvador has received, aside from conventional weapons, toxic gases and bacteriological agents. Prominent political figures who displeased Washington died in mysterious circumstances—General Omar Torrijos of Panama, President Jaime Roldós of Ecuador, and Rafael Hoyos Rúbio, Chief of Staff of the Peruvian Armed Forces.

U.S. imperialism is doing its utmost to keep Latin American countries backward and dependent. As their chief exploiter, Washington is stepping up its economic and military infiltration and its political, ideological and cultural interference in Latin America. Allied with the local reactionaries, the United States is trying to prevent the region's countries from attaining economic and genuine political independence. In the final analysis, this is also the aim of the covert war U.S. imperialism is waging there.

For all their peculiarities in each specific case, the operations of the CIA in Latin America invariably display one feature common to them all. The CIA always acts as a reactionary force, using the dirtiest tricks to further the interests of the extreme right. CIA operations give the lie to the pious declarations of the U.S. ruling quarters who pay lip service to freedom, democracy and human dignity. With the White House's blessing, the CIA has been trampling all these values underfoot. As the Nicaraguan magazine *Amenecer* has aptly remarked, the CIA is Washington's secret weapon.²

And here is an appropriate quotation from *World Marxist Review*: "The growing consciousness of the people and the rising opposition to imperialist dictation are a mark of the times.

Ever larger sections of Latin American opinion realize that the peoples have a destiny of their own and that there is nothing they can share with imperialism."³

Defense of the revolutions that have already occurred and the struggle for the right to choose one's own road of development have become the common cause of the Latin Americans. Committees of solidarity with Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada, with the patriots of Chile and Uruguay, with the insurgents of El Salvador and Guatemala are springing up everywhere. Mass manifestation of support for these peoples are being held. This movement has transcended the region's boundaries and reached other countries, including the United States.

As to the prospects of revolutionary processes in Latin American countries, they are based on objective factors. The question of unity is also important. So far, this unity encounters great difficulties stemming from the heterogeneous nature of the political forces involved in revolutionary processes. Still, these difficulties are temporary. Imperialism is the chief enemy of the region's nations, the main culprit of their poverty and backwardness. This is a truth increasingly understood in Latin America.

The mounting struggle of Latin American peoples and the increasingly powerful joint action throughout the continent aid in enhancing the role the region's nations play on the international scene and in expanding their ties and contacts with the parts of the world from which they were isolated by domestic and foreign reactionaries. It is an objective historical process. The last colonial enclaves are disappearing in the Western Hemisphere. There are now 33 sovereign republics there (in September and November 1981 Belize,

Antigua and Barbuda and in September 1983 the Federation of St. Christopher and Nevis attained independence). Several countries are active in the nonaligned movement.

External factors are very important for the consolidation of Latin America's democrats. These factors include the possibility of offsetting the impact of imperialism by the growing influence and support on the part of socialism, of relying on the solidarity of progressive people throughout the world. A salient feature of Latin America and the Caribbean is that there the issue of preserving peace is seen as closely connected with two key political factors—the liberation movement and imperialist expansionism. To the Latin Americans, the peace drive is inseparable from the elimination of hunger, poverty, illiteracy, political and social oppression. It follows that this drive is closely linked with the struggle against imperialism, with efforts to curb its more aggressive quarters. That is what the region's progressive democratic forces see as their principal task.

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